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the Jiminy Cricket I encountered while heading towards the Land of Toys.
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the results of which are contained in this book.
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planning stage of the study presented in this book. In this respect, I also need to 
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I cannot forbear to mention here the students that I had the privilege to teach 
at the Department of Legal, Language, Interpreting and Translation Studies of 
the University of Trieste. Working with them on legal translation and legal Eng-
lish gave me the opportunity not only to delve further into the topics in which I 
have been doing research for several years, but also to get out of my comfort zone 
and learn more about branches of law and legal systems that I would probably 
have neglected otherwise.
Finally, I would like to thank my life companion Marco, for his constant reas-
surance, and my daughter Iris, for her patience when I am working from home. 
A big thank you also goes to my family, my sister, and my in-laws: were it not for 
their willingness to babysit, this book would not have existed.
9This book is the culmination of almost three years spent exploring the relation-
ship between national and supranational law in the rich body of case-law pro-
duced by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The project started as 
a research grant awarded to the author in 2017 by the University of Trieste un-
der the title “Linguistic creativity in international case-law: an empirical study 
of the English version of ECtHR judgments dealing with Italian cases”. Yet, the 
subject matter of the project revealed itself to be a largely unexplored field call-
ing for deeper and more comprehensive analysis. The one-year period originally 
planned for the research turned out to be insufficient and further investigation 
of the topic was required. 
The book is the product of the author’s research interest in legal language and, 
in particular, in English used in communicative situations where it serves as the 
language of supranational law. It is the natural outcome of the author’s previ-
ous research and teaching experiences. These include several years of research 
on the English and Italian legal languages as employed in the European Union 
and their relationship with the respective national varieties, participation in a 
major legal translation project carried out in a multidisciplinary team (Gialuz et 
al. 2014; 2017), and the teaching of Legal English modules within the Law degree 
programme of the Department of Legal, Language, Interpreting and Translation 
Studies of the University of Trieste. Her research on the language used in the 
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European supranational sphere on the one hand and the constant collaboration 
with legal scholars and law students on the other allowed the author to acknowl-
edge a lamentable scarcity of linguistic analyses on texts produced by European 
international bodies other than the European Union. For these reasons, this book 
is the first of its kind in being devoted to a systematic study of ECtHR case-law 
from a linguistic perspective. 
The book is divided into two parts, the first dedicated to the ECtHR in general 
and the second to an empirical study carried out on a corpus of judgments deliv-
ered by one of the possible judicial formations of the ECtHR, namely the Grand 
Chamber. The primary intended reader of this book is a researcher or a gradu-
ate student in legal linguistics or legal translation with a strong interest in the 
linguistic features of texts produced by international organisations and institu-
tions where translation is involved. However, some chapters could equally well 
be read by linguistically minded legal scholars and law students whose wish is 
to go beyond the essentially legal aspects and look into some linguistic aspects 
of ECtHR case-law. In point of fact, law can be seen as a communicative activity 
occurring at a certain point in time within a specific community and is therefore 
a social phenomenon. This means that law exists only through its interplay with 
the language in which it is expressed and the society to which it applies. Law 
and language are therefore intertwined to such an extent that it would be almost 
impossible to study legal language without having sufficient legal knowledge or 
to address legal issues without a satisfactory understanding of legal language. 
Based on these assumptions, the ECtHR and its case-law are illustrated here 
through the lens of a linguist and translator, trying to highlight the facets that are 
linguistically more relevant, but at the same time making sure the illustration is 
accurate from a legal point of view.
This book pursues several aims. Given the intended readership, most of whom 
are assumed not to have an in-depth knowledge of the ECtHR, the first goal is to 
help the reader obtain a better comprehension of the functioning of this Court. 
Therefore, Chapter 1 provides an overview of the historical background of the 
ECtHR, explains its internal structure, and illustrates how a case can be brought 
before it. The acquisition of this information is seen as a prerequisite for under-
standing both the content of ECtHR case-law and its language, which is the sub-
ject-matter of this book. Since the empirical study presented in the second part 
of the book involves a corpus of judgments passed by the Grand Chamber, special 
attention is devoted to the procedure before this judicial formation.
The second aim of the book is to provide an insight into the language re-
gime at the ECtHR, which is explored in Chapter 2. This regime is radically dif-
ferent from the extensively studied language system adopted by the European 
Union (EU). Whereas the latter has opted for complete multilingualism, which 
has been attracting considerable research attention in both law and translation 
studies (Derlén 2009; 2015; 2019; Pozzo 2012; McAuliffe 2013a; 2013b; Athanas-
sious 2006; van Els 2005; Mori 2018; Biel 2007), the ECtHR has endorsed a system 
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based on two official languages only, i.e. English and French. While this solution 
may seem simpler and is certainly more cost-effective compared to the language 
regime at the EU, it is shown that translation plays a major role not only in the 
drafting process of the ECtHR case-law, but also in its dissemination. 
In Chapter 3, a further step is made towards the analysis of the language of 
ECtHR case-law. First, a review of classifications of “legal language” developed in 
legal linguistics and in translation studies is provided as this is seen functional 
to framing ECtHR case-law as a legal genre with its own peculiarities. Given the 
constraints imposed on the corpus used for the empirical study, the chapter then 
provides a detailed portrait of the communicative situation and the macro-struc-
ture of ECtHR Grand Chamber judgments. The aim of this chapter is thus twofold. 
First, it is meant to provide a backbone for possible future studies in the field by 
analysing the macro-structure, which reveals a high degree of standardisation 
and formulaicity; second, it is intended to identify the variety of direct and in-
direct receivers by scrutinising the participants in the communicative situation.
Chapter 4 serves as a link between the first part of the book and the empiri-
cal study. Although the main focus of the study is not on translation practices at 
the ECtHR, the chapter opens with a brief overview of “culture-bound elements” 
(CBEs) as approached in translation studies. The reason underlying this choice 
is that the aim of the empirical study is to unveil – from a linguistic standpoint 
– the “interaction” between national law and supranational law in ECtHR Grand 
Chamber judgments. National law is one of the manifold expressions of a na-
tional culture and, therefore, system-bound elements (SBEs) are here considered 
as a type of culture-bound elements.
The empirical study of SBEs in ECtHR case-law is presented in two chapters. 
The study is meant as a first attempt to isolate linguistic expressions referring 
to elements embedded in a national legal and judicial system in a corpus made 
of judgments produced by a European supranational court. In particular, the 
study investigates the presence of Italian SBEs in a corpus of Grand Chamber 
judgments issued against Italy and published in English between the years 2000 
and 2018. In order to extract these SBEs from the corpus, an innovative method-
ology (illustrated in Chapter 5) has been developed which combines the event 
templates used in frame-based terminology with keywords. This methodology 
allowed for the identification of 401 expressions pointing at different types of 
Italian SBEs, which have been grouped into four categories. In Chapter 6, the ex-
tracted expressions are analysed from two different angles in order to evaluate 
their frequency and distribution in the corpus and to take a closer look at their 
linguistic forms. 
The analysis has confirmed that the judgments of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights are worth being investigated from a linguistic perspective. The first 
reason is that the study has revealed a feature that, to the author’s knowledge, has 
been left largely unexplored in legal linguistics, namely the abundance of quoted 
passages from multiple national, international and other sources. The co-existence 
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of such a variety of sources in the body of these judgments is necessary and crucial 
for the ECtHR to review the cases and provide the argumentation of its decisions. 
The need to recall national legislation and case-law and the presence of SBEs in 
ECtHR judgments also pinpoint the fundamental role played by translation in the 
process of drafting supranational case-law. Indeed, the shift from the national to 
the supranational level combines a recontextualization through translation with 
the adoption of linguistic strategies that make national legal and judicial contents 
understandable to a readership that has no direct access to the original sources 
in the national language. This, in turn, contributes to the dissemination of both 
supranational legal principles and national legal and judicial knowledge at least 
within the boundaries of the Council of Europe, with its forty-seven member 
States representing a population of approximately 800 million people.
13
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is an international court, or rath-
er a “supranational judicial body”, established by the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms or, simply, the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which “vested it with the power 
to adjudicate complaints (applications) lodged by individual persons” (Garlicki 
2009: 390). Although the aim of this chapter is neither to concentrate on the con-
tent and development of the Convention nor to delve into the subtleties of the 
functioning of the Court, a brief overview of the development and the function-
ing of both the Convention and the Court is considered a useful introduction to 
the main topic of this volume, i.e. judgments delivered by the ECtHR.
1.1 The European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of 
Human Rights
The last decade of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century have 
witnessed a “burgeoning of international courts and tribunals” (Higgins 2007). 
However, the history of the European Court of Human Rights is much longer. 
Indeed, the European Convention on Human Rights was opened for signature in 
Rome in 1950 and came into force in 1953. Since then, it has been amended sev-
1 The European Court 
of Human Rights
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eral times and supplemented with additional rights compared to those set forth 
in the original text. The Convention was “drafted within the Council of Europe, 
an international organization that was formed after the Second World War in 
the course of the first post-war attempt to unify Europe” (Harris et al. 2014: 3). The 
reasons for adopting the Convention are to be found in the political situation in 
Western Europe at that time: Western European countries wished to “provide 
a bulwark against communism, which had spread from the Soviet Union into 
European states behind the Iron Curtain after the Second World War” (Harris 
et al. 2014: 3). However, the Convention was also “a reaction to the serious hu-
man rights violations that Europe had witnessed during the Second World War” 
(Harris et al. 2014: 3). In other words, the aim of the Council of Europe was “to 
defend democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in Europe” (Letsas 2007: 1). 
The Convention has been ratified by all forty-seven member States of the Council 
of Europe, thus applying to approximately 800 million people. Given the hetero-
geneity of the Contracting Parties in terms of historical and legal background, 
“neither the Convention nor the Court have one single identity – they rather 
represent a merger of different traditions arising from different legal systems” 
(Garlicki 2009: 391). In this sense, the Convention is said to have evolved “in the 
direction of being a European bill of rights, with the European Court of Human 
Rights having a role with some similarities to that of a constitutional court in a 
national legal system” (Harris et al. 2014: 4).
The close relationship between the Convention and the Court has been 
stressed by the ECtHR itself in Tyrer v. United Kingdom1, in which it is stated that 
“[t]he Court must also recall that the Convention is a living instrument which […] 
must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions”. The same is empha-
sised by Garlicki (2009: 390), who affirms that “…the Convention would not be 
able to survive, had it not been regarded as a ‘living instrument’ and had it not 
been constantly developed in the case law of the Court”. By considering the Con-
vention as a “living instrument”, the Court can keep up with the times, interpret, 
and apply the Convention in the light of the current situation. However, although 
there seems to be general consensus on this point, the same cannot be said about 
the constitutional nature of the Court vested with interpreting this “living instru-
ment”. In fact, “the ways and methods of the ECtHR’s interpretation, as adopted 
in its case law, may not be very different from the ways and methods adopted by 
the national courts that deal with constitutional questions” (Garlicki 2009: 391). 
Nonetheless, “the ECtHR cannot be treated just like one of the constitutional 
courts”, since it “still conserves its nature as a supranational body, created and op-
erating within the realm of international law” (Garlicki 2009: 391). Similar doubts 
are raised by Letsas (2007: 38), who rejects the idea that the role of international 
human rights bodies may approximate that of constitutional courts, but recognis-
es that the ECtHR represents an exception. Ryssdall (1996: 22), in turn, defines the 
1 Tyrer v. United Kingdom (Application no. 5856/72), 25 April 1978, Series A No. 26, § 31.
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ECtHR as “a quasi-constitutional court for the whole of Europe”. Harris et al. (2014: 
39) do not share this view. They affirm that both states parties and NGOs “see the 
Convention as providing a remedy for all individual complaints”, but do not refer 
to the ECtHR as a constitutional court (Harris et al. 2014: 39, footnote 299).
Letsas is not the only scholar to recognise the exceptionality of the Europe-
an Court of Human Rights. Such exceptionality should not be attributed to the 
Court’s constitutional-like role. In fact, the ECtHR represents “a very strong en-
forcement mechanism” (Harris et al. 2014: 6) of the Convention, which allows 
any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals to apply to 
the ECtHR in case of an alleged violation of the Convention by one of the parties 
to the Convention (see Article 34 of the Convention). According to Letsas (2007: 
1), “[i]n international human rights law, the European system is considered to be 
a model of effectiveness”, and this is especially due to the fact that the judgments 
passed by the Court are binding in international law and the parties are required 
to enforce them. As Garlicki (2009: 391) puts it, “[w]hile, in the legal perspective, 
the Convention (as well as the judgments of the ECtHR) is binding on all member 
States, the compliance with those judgments must be assured on the domestic 
level”. However, although the Contracting States have recognised the ECtHR’s 
power to deliver binding judgments, “each judgment is only legally binding for 
the State Party that is a party to the case” (Gerards 2009: 408). Moreover, “the 
Court determines only whether the ECHR has been violated, it is not competent 
to annul national government acts (orders, legislation, etc.) that have caused this 
violation or to declare them non-binding” (Barkhuysen and van Emmerik 2009: 
439). Therefore, States are free to decide how to execute the Court’s judgments 
(except for the payment of just satisfaction, where awarded, and for pilot judg-
ments, where the Court sets out in detail how they should be complied with) and 
also whether national legislation should be amended to avoid future violations.
Although the effect of the ECtHR’s case-law is “formally limited to the concrete 
circumstances of one single case” (Gerards 2009: 408), the principles it promotes 
should be considered as fundamental rights to be safeguarded in all the Contract-
ing States. Both the need for judgments to be executed by domestic justice sys-
tems and the desire to disseminate the principles beyond the national boundaries 
of the State involved in the specific case have a significant impact also on the lin-
guistic choices of the ECtHR’s linguists. In this regard, Brannan (2018: 180), who 
concentrates on the specificities of translation at the ECtHR, maintains that:
The Court’s linguists must never forget that their translations will be read and inter-
preted by domestic courts and lawyers across Europe and may in turn be translated into 
other languages. Ultimately, the relevant Convention standards will have to be ‘translat-
ed’ into reality in the legal order of each country; the clarity, accuracy and terminological 
consistency of the official-language case-law are therefore all the more important.
The exceptional nature of the ECtHR thus comes to the fore also with regard to 
the linguistic aspects of the judgments delivered by the Court. The “linguistic 
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make-up” of ECtHR’s case-law is indeed the leading thread of this volume. How-
ever, before moving on to the linguistic aspects, a brief review of the develop-
ment of human rights in Europe and of the ECtHR is considered beneficial for a 
better understanding of the linguistic regime adopted by the Court.
1.2 The protection of human rights: Historical background
The European Court of Human Rights is a supranational court based in Stras-
bourg, France, which was established on a permanent basis to ensure observance 
of the engagements undertaken by the forty-seven Contracting Parties to the 
European Convention on Human Rights. The establishment of the Court is set 
forth in Article 19 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Section II of 
the Convention, which comprises Articles 19-51, is entirely devoted to the ECtHR. 
Although the Convention entered into force in 1953, it was not until 1959 that 
the Court was set up or, more precisely, that the first members of the Court were 
elected by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, now known as 
Parliamentary Assembly, and that the Court’s first session was held. In the same 
year, the Rules of Court, i.e. the rules regulating the functions and internal or-
ganisation of the Court and its Registry, were also adopted, while in 1960 the 
Court delivered its first judgment in the case of Lawless v. Ireland2. Since then, the 
Court has passed more than 10,000 judgments regarding the alleged violation of 
the European Convention on Human Rights by the Contracting Parties.
Although the ECtHR has operated uninterruptedly since its establishment, 
both its original composition and its structure have not remained unchanged. 
To ensure the protection of the fundamental rights set forth by the Convention, a 
two-tier system was originally introduced which involved two organs: the Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights3. 
The European Commission of Human Rights, whose members worked for it 
part-time, was responsible for receiving, examining and deciding on the admis-
sibility of applications, trying to secure a friendly settlement between the parties 
and referring certain cases to the European Court of Human Rights. The main 
role of the Commission was to serve as a sort of “barrier” (Maringele 2014: 40) 
or to perform a “filtering function” (European Court of Human Rights 2017b: 10) 
to discard inadmissible applications. Indeed, the Commission’s first tasks were 
to consider whether the application met the admissibility requirements and to 
make a decision4 on this question (Rainey et al. 2017: 8). When an application 
2 Lawless v. Ireland (Application no. 332/57), 1 July 1961. 
3 For an overview of the functions of the two bodies, election procedures of their members, 
qualifications required for membership, and procedure adopted within the two bodies, see van 
Dijk and van Hoof (1998).
4 From a terminological perspective, it is interesting to note that the decisions made by the 
former European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights on 
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was declared admissible, but a friendly settlement was impossible to reach, the 
Commission investigated the merits of the case. It then drew up a report where it 
established the facts and expressed an opinion on the complaint, which was not 
legally binding. The report was then forwarded to the Committee of Ministers, 
i.e. the political organ of the Council of Europe comprising one representative 
from each Contracting Party to the European Convention on Human Rights, usu-
ally the Foreign Secretary of each government. The final decision on an admis-
sible case was then made by either the Committee of Ministers, which originally 
also had judicial powers, or the European Court of Human Rights. The latter op-
tion was only available if the Contracting State had recognised the Court’s juris-
diction, which was not compulsory. For a case to be decided upon by the Court, 
the application had to be referred – within three months of the transmission of 
the report to the Committee of Ministers – to the Court by the Commission, the 
respondent State or the Contracting Party whose national was the alleged victim. 
Individual applicants were not allowed to refer a case to the Court unless the 
respondent State had ratified Protocol no. 9. If this was the case, the application 
first had to be examined by a panel of three judges who had a further filtering 
function: they “could decide unanimously that the application should not be con-
sidered by the Court because it did not raise a serious question affecting the in-
terpretation or application of the Convention” (Rainey et al. 2017: 9). 
Like the European Commission of Human Rights, the European Court of Hu-
man Rights was a part-time organ. It was originally conceived as a judicial body 
whose task was to decide on the cases received by the Commission. Judges re-
ceived no regular salary but rather a daily allowance paid by the Council of Europe.
When a case was not referred to the Court within three months of its trans-
mission by the European Commission to the Committee of Ministers, under 
former Article 32 of the Convention, the Committee “had the power to decide, 
by a two-thirds majority, whether there had been a violation of the Convention” 
(Foster 2011: 46). However, “the practice of the Committee of Ministers was to 
endorse the Commission report without any further investigation of the merits 
of the case” (Rainey et al. 2017: 9).
The original system for protecting human rights illustrated so far had multi-
ple disadvantages, which were well summarised by Rowe and Schlette (1998: 5):
The most obvious weakness of the old system was its extraordinary complexity: three 
organs worked together in a protracted, multi-phase procedure. There was consider-
able overlap between the competencies of the various organs, which meant that work 
was often duplicated. Nor was the interplay of the Commission, Court and Committee 
the only difficult matter: the structure of the review system and the mixed judicial and 
political character of the decision-making organs made the internal decision-making 
process a complicated affair. In sum, the review system was ponderous, expensive and 
difficult for the complainant to understand. There was a considerable risk that the 
admissibility are called “decisions”, while the decisions on the merits of the case are referred to 
as “judgments”. 
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various organs would reach different decisions in substantially similar cases – as hap-
pened on several occasions in decisions of the Commission and Court.
In other words, the first drawback was that a fundamental role in the decision-
making process was played by an organ that was not judicial, i.e. the Commit-
tee of Ministers. Secondly, the jurisdiction of the Court was not obligatory, but 
subject to specific declaration by the Contracting Parties (Mikaelsen 1980: 16). 
Thirdly, individuals were entitled to bring an action against a State under Article 
25 of the Convention, which represented a great innovation under international 
law. However, for an individual complaint to be admissible, a declaration by the 
Contracting Party involved to accept the competence of the Commission of Hu-
man Rights over individual cases was required.
The procedures to apply to the ECtHR have certainly not remained unchanged. 
For instance, the right of individual petition has undergone a complete transfor-
mation by being “no longer dependent on the optional recognition by the State” 
(Lemmens 2018: 33) and thus becoming an obligatory right entitling individuals 
to bring a case before the Court rather than the Commission5. In what follows, an 
overview of the main changes that have led to the current way of functioning of 
the ECtHR is provided, with a focus on those aspects that have a major impact on 
the linguistic dimension of the Court’s activity. 
1.3 The ‘old’ and the ‘new’ Court: Protocol No. 11
Since its adoption, the European Convention on Human Rights has undergone 
several major amendments through the so-called “protocols”. The most signifi-
cant changes to the ECHR relating to the judicial bodies that enable the enforce-
ment of the principles set forth in the Convention and to their functioning were 
introduced by Protocol No. 116. The need for a fundamental reform in the struc-
ture and the functioning of the ECtHR lay primarily in the increasing number 
of applications. From 1955 to 1998, 45,000 applications were allocated to a judi-
cial formation and 837 judgments were issued (Dothan 2011: 128, footnote 28). 
In 1997 only, “the Commission received 14,166 applications, 703 of which were 
declared admissible, and the Court handed down 106 judgments” (Tomuschat 
2009: 11). After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the European Convention of Human 
Rights experienced a wide enlargement towards the East, with Eastern countries 
– such as Russia, Serbia, Azerbaijan and Armenia – becoming Contracting Par-
ties. At that time, enlargement was seen as a possible cause of an exponential 
5 For a detailed account of the various steps of this metamorphosis, see Kjeldgaard-Pedersen (2010).
6 The full title of the Protocol is Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, restructuring the control machinery established thereby, Strasbourg, 
11.V.1994, European Treaty Series No. 155, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Library_Col-
lection_P11_ETS155E_ENG.pdf (accessed 26/02/2018).
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increase in the number of applications submitted to the Commission and the 
introduction of a new control mechanism to cope with the growing caseload was 
thus considered necessary. 
The year in which Protocol No. 11 entered into force, namely 1998, set a mile-
stone in the history of the European Court of Human Rights, because it succeed-
ed in streamlining the Court’s workflow. Through the Protocol, the European 
Commission of Human Rights was abolished, the Committee of Ministers was 
deprived of its judicial role and the European Court of Human Rights was turned 
into a single, permanent, and full-time judicial body. However, the purpose of 
Protocol No. 11 was not limited to converting a part-time court into a full-time 
one: its aims were to simplify the system – and thus to reduce the length of pro-
ceedings – and to recognise the right of individual petition. The simplification 
of the procedure through the creation of a “new Court” contributed to both im-
proving the accessibility and the visibility of the Court and enhancing the ef-
fectiveness of the system. The need to streamline the procedure stemmed from 
a “massive influx of applications” (see, for instance, European Court of Human 
Rights 2014b: 10), which was due to the enlargement towards the East but also 
to the increasing number of applications brought against States that were Con-
tracting Parties before the enlargement (Steering Committee for Human Rights 
2009: 692). This was true because “[t]he 1980s witnessed an explosion of activity 
under the Convention”, with all 22 ratifying states having accepted the right of 
individual petition and consented to the jurisdiction of the Court by the end of 
the decade (Janis et al. 2008: 22).
However, the introduction of this new system, combined with other solu-
tions adopted to cope with an excessive caseload, such as the adoption of pilot 
judgments7, neither reduced nor limited the number of applications, which con-
tinued to grow until 2013 (European Court of Human Rights 2017b: 5). Therefore, 
other measures were necessary to stem the Court’s burgeoning caseload8, among 
which Protocol No. 149 is worth mentioning, given that its aim is to guarantee 
the long-term efficiency of the ECtHR. 
1.4 The structure of the new European Court of Human Rights: Protocol No. 14
As seen above, Protocol No. 11 has played a fundamental role in creating the so-
called “new European Court of Human Rights” and granting individuals the right 
7 See, for instance, European Court of Human Rights (2009); Haider (2013); Zwaak et al. (2018: 
212–219).
8 For a detailed account, see Steering Committee for Human Rights (2009: 692–695).
9 The full title of the Protocol is Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, amending the control system of the Convention, Strasbourg, 13.V.2004, 
Council of Europe Treaty Series No. 194, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Library_Col-
lection_P14_ETS194E_ENG.pdf (accessed 31/05/2018).
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to apply directly to it. While Protocol No. 11 dramatically changed the structure of 
the supervisory mechanisms of the Convention, “Protocol No. 14 made no radi-
cal changes to the control system” (Lemmens 2018: 34). The changes introduced 
by Protocol No. 14 “related more to the functioning of the system rather than to 
its structure” (Lemmens 2018: 34). Indeed, save for a couple of exceptional recent 
years in which the number of correctly completed applications received by the 
ECtHR was lower than previous years, e.g. 2014 and 2015 (European Court of Hu-
man Rights 2017b: 5), the number of applications to be dealt with by the ECtHR 
has always been on the increase. Since the ECtHR was called upon to solve many 
cases simultaneously, the system had to be improved by giving the Court the 
procedural means and flexibility it needed to process all applications in a timely 
fashion, while allowing it to concentrate on the most important cases that re-
quire in-depth examination” (Lemmens 2018: 34). Therefore, Protocol No. 14 es-
tablished rules that allow to quickly filter or process applications of limited inter-
est, introduced a new admissibility criterion to reduce the number of cases to be 
dealt with, and adopted new measures for dealing with repetitive cases (Caflisch 
2006: 408; Lemmens 2018: 34; Lemmens and Vandenhole 2005).
1.5 The European Court of Human Rights: Judicial formations
How does the European Court of Human Rights deal with such a heavy caseload? 
After the entry into force of Protocol No. 14 in 2010, from an administrative point 
of view the ECtHR is organised into five Sections. The ECtHR counts a total of 
47 judges, one from each Contracting State, who are selected by the Parliamen-
tary Assembly of the Council of Europe from a list of three candidates proposed 
by each Contracting State. Every judge is assigned to one of the Sections by the 
Plenary Court on the basis of the geographical origin, the gender of the judge, 
and the legal system of the Contracting State. Each Section is presided over by a 
President (assisted by a Vice-President), has a varying number of judges and is 
assisted by a Section Registrar and a Deputy Section Registrar. Every three years 
the composition of the Sections changes. 
The division into Sections has a mere administrative function: for an applica-
tion to be dealt with, it must be referred to the most appropriate judicial formation 
among the available ones. The Court may sit in four distinct judicial formations, as 
provided for in Article 26 of the Convention: single judges, Committees, Chambers 
or the Grand Chamber (Schabas 2015: 689–695; Rainey et al. 2017: 18–20).
Single judges were introduced by Protocol No. 14 to streamline the procedure 
before the ECtHR. In fact, the Protocol abolished the Commission and referred 
its filtering function to the Court. The single judges’ role is thus to deal with indi-
vidual applications that are clearly inadmissible because they do not meet all the 
admissibility criteria. Single judges are assisted by non-judicial rapporteurs with 
knowledge of the language and the legal system of the respondent State. Single 
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judges can either declare an application inadmissible or strike it out, but if they 
do not do so, they forward it to a Committee or to a Chamber for further examina-
tion. The decisions taken by single judges are final and cannot be challenged. To 
avoid any bias, single judges are not allowed to examine any application against 
the Contracting Party in respect of which they have been elected.
Committees of three judges are responsible for declaring applications inadmissible 
or striking them out when no further examination is needed. However, they also 
play an important role in relation to so-called “repetitive cases”, i.e. admissible and 
well-founded cases raised by individuals, usually deriving from systemic or struc-
tural problems within a national legal order. Before the adoption of Protocol No. 14, 
these cases significantly contributed to the inflation of the Court’s caseload and un-
dermined the effectiveness of the ECtHR. Since in repetitive cases the case-law of 
the Court was already well-established, Protocol No. 14 provided for Committees of 
three judges to rule both on the admissibility and the merits of these cases. Again, 
the decisions taken by Committees, which must be unanimous, are final.
When an application is not clearly inadmissible or the case at issue is not the 
subject of well-established case-law of the Court, then the case is to be allocated to a 
Chamber, which is composed of seven judges under Rule 26 of the ECtHR’s Rules of 
Court. Chambers also deal with all inter-State applications. Each Chamber includes 
the President of the Section to which the case was assigned, the so-called “national 
judge”, i.e. the judge with the nationality of the Contracting State against which 
the application was lodged, and five other judges designated by the President of 
the Section. The Chamber may declare the case either inadmissible or admissible: 
in the latter case, the Chamber examines it and decides on its merits. Before deliv-
ering its decision, the Chamber informs the Contracting State concerned of the ex-
istence of the application and allows them time to submit their observations. The 
decisions taken by the Chambers, either unanimously or by a majority, are final.
The highest judicial formation available at the ECtHR is the Grand Chamber, 
which is composed of seventeen judges, including the President of the Court, the 
Vice-Presidents, the Presidents of the five Sections, the national judge and other 
judges chosen in accordance with the rules of the Court. The number of cases 
heard by the Grand Chamber is limited if compared to the number of cases dealt 
with by the other ECtHR formations. Unlike what happens with other judicial 
formations, cases are never allocated directly to the Grand Chamber. In fact, to 
reach the Grand Chamber, a case must be either relinquished to it by a Chamber 
(Article 30 of the Convention) or referred to it by any party to the case (Article 43 
of the Convention). If one of the parties requests that the case be referred to the 
Grand Chamber, then a panel of five judges of the Grand Chamber will accept the 
request if the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or ap-
plication of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general impor-
tance: only then will the Grand Chamber decide the case. Both relinquishment 
of jurisdiction and referral to the Grand Chamber are possible when the case at 
issue raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the 
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Convention or its Protocols. Relinquishment is also possible where the resolu-
tion of a question before the Chamber might have a result inconsistent with a 
judgment previously delivered by the Court.
1.6 The European Court of Human Rights: Jurisdiction
Article 32 of the European Convention on Human Rights addresses the issue of 
the Court’s jurisdiction10. However, as is well explained by Schabas (2015: 715ff.), 
this Article is the result of the historical development of the Court. In its current 
version, it provides that the Court’s jurisdiction “shall extend to all matters con-
cerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the Protocols 
thereto which are referred to it as provided in Articles 33, 34, 46 and 47”, which 
deal with inter-State cases, individual applications, the binding force and execu-
tion of judgments and advisory opinions respectively. 
The only possible way to bring a case before the European Court of Human 
Rights is by submitting an application. In other words, the ECtHR cannot start 
cases of its own motion, but has jurisdiction to hear cases concerning alleged vio-
lations of the European Convention on Human Rights upon receiving individual 
or inter-State applications. As has been said earlier, the European Convention 
on Human Rights has undergone several modifications. One such modification 
concerns the right of individuals to bring an action against one of the Contract-
ing Parties. Until the entry into force of Protocol No. 11, Article 25 of the Conven-
tion gave individuals the possibility to lodge a complaint with the former Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights rather than with the ECtHR, provided that 
the Contracting Party expressly granted such a right to individuals by making a 
declaration under the same Article. Therefore, States “had the option to allow or 
disallow individual application by their citizens” (Miller 1998: 12). The new Arti-
cle 34 introduced by Protocol No. 11 involved radical changes in the right to indi-
vidual petition, which is “a key feature of the European system, a victory slowly 
won, and one that is unique in the world” (Costa 2009: 14). Article 34 removed 
the States’ discretion in granting the right of petition to individuals and, since 
the Commission ceased to exist, it allowed individuals to bring cases directly be-
fore the Court, without going through a filtering institution. 
The right of individual petition could have contributed to a further increase 
in the number of applications submitted. For this reason, Article 35 of the Con-
vention sets forth admissibility criteria, which can be summarised as follows: 
all available domestic remedies must have been exhausted and the application 
must be submitted within six months of the final decision in domestic courts. 
When an individual application is submitted, it shall not be anonymous and 
10 For an exhaustive discussion of the jurisdiction of both the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, see Janis et al. (2008: 47–49) and Schabas 
(2015: 715–722).
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shall not be substantially similar to a matter that has already been examined by 
the Court or by another international investigative body. Individual applications 
shall not be incompatible with the provisions of the Convention or its Protocols 
nor manifestly ill-founded and shall not constitute an abuse of the right of indi-
vidual application. Furthermore, individual applications are inadmissible when 
“the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for hu-
man rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an 
examination of the application on the merits and provided that no case may be 
rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic tri-
bunal” (Article 35(3)(b), introduced by Protocol No. 14). Therefore, since Proto-
col No. 11, direct referral to the Court can be pursued by two types of applicants, 
i.e. Contracting States and individuals, an umbrella term including “any person, 
non-governmental organisation or group of individuals” (Article 34). 
On the contrary, the respondent can only be one or more Contracting States. 
An interesting fact to note in this regard is that when the application is submit-
ted by an individual claiming to be the victim of a violation of the rights set forth 
in the Convention or one of its Protocols by one of the Contracting Parties, the 
applicant does not have to be a citizen of a Contracting Party. On the other hand, 
all the applications submitted to the Court must concern alleged violations com-
mitted by a Contracting Party to the Convention. 
1.7 The procedure before the European Court of Human Rights
The procedure before the European Court of Human Rights consists in a series of 
steps to be performed by the applicant, the respondent State and the Court itself. 
Given their importance for understanding the structure of the judgments deliv-
ered by the Grand Chamber, which are the subject of this volume, these steps are 
briefly outlined below11.
1.7.1 Submission and handling of applications
After the entry into force of Protocol No. 11, both inter-State and individual appli-
cations alleging a breach of one of the Convention rights by a Contracting Party 
may be lodged directly with the ECtHR. However, once the ECtHR receives an 
application, before dealing with the merits of the case it first needs to establish 
whether the application is admissible. To do so, applications are allocated to dif-
ferent judicial formations.
Individual applicants who wish to apply must send their application by post 
to the ECtHR’s Registry. The Registry, as it is nowadays conceived and structured, 
11 For a thorough account of the steps of the procedure before the ECtHR, see Leach (2011) and 
Rainey et al. (2017: 17–56).
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is the result of the merger of the Secretariat of the Commission and the Registry 
of the “old” Court under Protocol No. 11 (Berger 2006: 12). Once the application 
is received by the ECtHR, it is “examined by a Registry lawyer who makes the 
first assessment as to its importance and admissibility” (Garlicki 2009: 393) and 
assigns it to a Section. Given that applicants can apply in either English, French 
or one of the 38 official languages of the Contracting Parties of the Council of Eu-
rope, “the Registry has several units corresponding either to single countries or 
to groups of similar countries” (Garlicki 2009: 393). There are currently 33 legal 
divisions within the Registry. Once an application is assigned to a Section, it is 
then allocated either to a single judge, a Committee or a Chamber depending on 
the type of applicant and the fulfilment of the admissibility criteria. 
As seen above, individual applications that are clearly inadmissible are referred 
to single judges. The decisions taken by single judges, which are final, are actually 
prepared either by or under the responsibility of a non-judicial rapporteur (Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights 2010: 70). Individual applications where well-estab-
lished case-law can be applied are referred to a Committee, which either delivers a 
unanimous judgment on the merits of the case or refers the case to a Chamber. The 
judgments delivered by a Committee are final and cannot be appealed to either a 
Chamber or the Grand Chamber. The processing of cases initiated by means of an 
individual application is schematically summarised in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1. Simplified case-processing flow chart by judicial formation for individual applications12.
12 Flow chart retrieved from https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Case_processing_Court_
ENG.pdf (accessed 07/05/2018). Permission to reproduce the figure granted by the ECtHR.
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Both individual applications that are neither clearly inadmissible nor repetitive 
and inter-State applications are allocated to a Chamber, which decides by a majori-
ty. In this case, “[e]ach application is assigned to the case-lawyer (who must have a 
command of both the language of the application and the legal system of the State 
in question)” (Garlicki 2009: 393) and “the Section President (acting together with 
the Section Registrar) appoints the Judge Rapporteur” (Garlicki 2009: 393). 
The judge rapporteur is responsible for submitting a report on admissibility 
when the written observations of the Contracting Parties concerned have been 
received as well as drafts and other documents that may assist the Chamber and 
its President in carrying out their functions. The judge rapporteur is thus “celui 
qui normalement connaît le mieux l’affaire” (Costa 2017: 153) and his or her name 
“n’est pas connu à l’extérieur … pour raisons de sécurité” (Costa 2017: 152, footnote 
2, emphasis in the original). When a case is considered by a Chamber, the judge 
rapporteur generally corresponds to “the national judge since he/she has the 
highest expertise in the national law and in the national context” (Garlicki 2009: 
393). Yet, while the national judge “doit siéger, comme member de droit, lorsque 
cet État est partie au litige” (Costa 2017: 156, emphasis in the original) when the 
case is discussed by a Chamber, he or she cannot be the judge rapporteur in cases 
heard by the Grand Chamber: “[a]u sein de la Grande Chambre, un usage veut 
que le « juge national » ne soit jamais le rapporteur de l’affaire” (Costa 2017: 161, 
footnote 9). The importance of being familiar with the national legal system of 
the State involved in the case at issue is highlighted by former President Jean-
Paul Costa (2017: 154), who states that when the task of judge rapporteur is per-
formed by the national judge, then his or her role is simpler, because “il connaît 
bien les traditions et le système de son pays, souvent même mieux que le juriste 
chargé de l’assister, même si celui-si ou celle-ci a la même nationalité, car souvent 
le juriste, s’il fait carrière à la Cour, peut avoir quitté son pays depuis longtemps”. 
Costa (2017: 157) also stresses the fundamental role played by the national judge 
in preserving the image and credibility of the Court: “il peut et doit expliquer, 
lors du délibéré, les particularités et les raisons historiques de telle ou telle rè-
gle ou institution de son pays, évitant ainsi, parfois difficilemant, les contre-sens 
et les malentendus. Un arrêt contenant des erreurs sur le droit national est peu 
credible et nuit à l’image de la jurisdiction”.
1.7.2 Third-party intervention
Article 36 of the Convention provides for three types of intervention in proceed-
ings before a Chamber or the Grand Chamber by third parties. The first type, i.e. 
“intervention as of right” (Schabas 2015: 791), is provided for in paragraph 1, which 
establishes that a Contracting State one of whose nationals is an applicant has the 
right to submit written comments and to take part in hearings. The second type, 
i.e. “intervention with leave” (Schabas 2015: 792–94), is set forth in paragraph 2 of 
the same Article and entitles the President of the Court to invite, in the interest of 
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the proper administration of justice, any Contracting Party which is not a party 
to the proceedings or any person concerned who is not the applicant to submit 
written comments or take part in hearings. Finally, the third type is enshrined in 
paragraph 3, which establishes that the Council of Europe Commissioner for Hu-
man Rights may submit written comments and take part in hearings.
The detailed account of the procedure to be followed for a third party to be 
able to intervene in the proceedings before a Chamber or the Grand Chamber is 
considered unnecessary for the purposes of this volume. The reader is thus re-
ferred to Rainey et al. (2017: 26), Schabas (2015: 788–795), and Zwaak et al. (2018: 
176–179). However, it must be borne in mind that the intervention of a third 
party may leave its traces in the text of the judgment delivered by the Court, as is 
discussed in Section 3.4.
1.7.3 Decision on the merits
If an application is declared admissible, the relevant decision is communicated 
by the Registrar to the applicant, the Contracting Party (or Parties) and any third 
party involved. The next step requires the examination of the merits of the case. 
However, it should be pointed out here that the ECtHR encourages, at any stage 
of the proceedings, a confidential “friendly settlement of the matter on the basis 
of respect for human rights as defied in the Convention and the Protocols there-
to” (Article 39(1) of the Convention) to be conducted through the Registrar (Kel-
ler et al. 2010). In this respect, the ECtHR reports that, between 1999 and 2009, 
3,381 applications were struck out of its list of cases following either a friendly 
settlement or a unilateral declaration by the respondent State, while in the same 
period approximately 344,000 applications were allocated to a judicial forma-
tion (European Court of Human Rights 2010: 70).
If no friendly settlement can be reached, then the merits of the case must be 
examined by a Chamber or, in case of referral or relinquishment, by the Grand 
Chamber. The procedure before the ECtHR is largely a written procedure, and 
oral hearings are held in a small minority of cases. To examine the merits, the 
Court first needs to establish the facts, but since in most cases this has already 
been done by domestic courts, the ECtHR’s task is “limited to examining these 
facts to assess compliance with the Convention” (Rainey et al. 2017: 27). If need-
ed, the Chamber may obtain evidence to clarify the facts, carry out further inves-
tigations, and hear witnesses and experts. 
Once a decision on the merits has been reached, the Chamber delivers a judg-
ment, which becomes final: “(1) when the parties declare that they will not re-
quest that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber; or (2) three months after 
the date of judgment, if reference of the case to the Grand Chamber has not been 
requested; or (3) when the panel of the Grand Chamber rejects the request to re-
fer the case to the Grand Chamber” (van Dijk et al. 2006: 208).
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1.7.4 Proceedings before the Grand Chamber
What has been illustrated so far refers to Chamber proceedings, i.e. to cases heard 
by a judicial formation composed of seven judges within one of the ECtHR’s five 
Sections. The procedure followed in Grand Chamber proceedings, in which the 
most difficult and complicated cases are generally heard, is usually more com-
plex as compared to Chamber proceedings. The composition of the Grand Cham-
ber also reflects the severity and relevance of the cases discussed: indeed, it is 
made up of seventeen judges and at least three substitute judges (Rule 24, Rules 
of Court), including the Court’s President and Vice-Presidents, the Section Presi-
dents, and the national judge.
As mentioned above, the Grand Chamber cannot be seized directly, but has 
competence with regard to both inter-State and individual applications in cases 
of referral and relinquishment of jurisdiction (Articles 30 and 43 of the Conven-
tion). Furthermore, the Grand Chamber has also competence to decide in two 
other circumstances: first, when issues regarding Contracting Parties that refuse 
to abide by the Court’s final judgments are referred to it by the Committee of 
Ministers in accordance with Article 46(4) (Article 31(b) of the Convention), and 
second, when requests for advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the 
interpretation of the Convention and its Protocols must be considered (Article 47 
of the Convention, see also Schabas 2015: 874–883).
Relinquishment of jurisdiction is regulated by Rule 72 of the Rules of Court 
and occurs in two cases (Article 30 of the Convention), namely either when a case 
pending before a Chamber raises a serious question affecting the interpretation 
of the European Convention on Human Rights or its Protocols or when the reso-
lution of a question before a Chamber may lead to a result that is inconsistent 
with a judgment previously delivered by the Court (Zwaak et al. 2018: 204). In 
both circumstances, one of the parties to the case must not have objected in ac-
cordance with paragraph 4 of the same Rule 72. 
On the contrary, referral to the Grand Chamber (Article 43 of the Convention 
and Rule 73 of the Rules of Court) is possible within a period of three months 
from the date of the judgment of the Chamber, i.e. before the judgment becomes 
final. In this period, any party to the case may request that the case be referred 
to the Grand Chamber, but only in exceptional cases, i.e. when the case raises 
a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the European 
Convention on Human Rights or its Protocols or a serious issue of general im-
portance. The party’s request is subject to examination by a panel of five judges 
of the Grand Chamber solely on the basis of the existing case file. If the case is re-
ferred to the Grand Chamber, then the panel of judges does not include any of the 
judges who decided on the case in the Chamber which first examined the case.
When a case reaches the Grand Chamber, its President designates the judge 
rapporteur(s) (one for individual applications and more than one for inter-State 
applications). As seen above, the judge rapporteur of the Grand Chamber never 
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corresponds to the national judge elected in respect of the respondent State. As 
in Chamber proceedings, Grand Chamber proceedings are mainly in writing, but 
oral proceedings may also be held. Although a case reaches the Grand Chamber 
after having been examined by a Chamber, the Grand Chamber must assess the 
facts from scratch and deal with the case afresh. The Grand Chamber may also re-
examine objections to the admissibility of an application. Therefore, judgments 
delivered by the Grand Chamber sometimes address the admissibility of the ap-
plication before proceeding to the merits of the case.
1.7.5 Binding force and execution of judgments
Final judgments delivered by a Chamber or the Grand Chamber are binding on 
the respondent State(s) concerned, but are not “directly enforceable in a manner 
similar to that of judgments of domestic courts” (Schabas 2015: 861). Contracting 
States have discretion to decide how to abide by the Court’s judgments, but this 
is generally done by either legislative or administrative amendments to national 
legislation. 
The responsibility for supervising the execution of the Court’s judgments lies 
with the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. To fulfil this obliga-
tion and supervise the terms of friendly settlements, the Committee of Minis-
ters adopted a set of Rules (see Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
2006/2017). In fact, the Committee of Ministers performs various tasks: (i) it in-
vites the Contracting Parties found in violation of the ECHR to inform it of the 
measures which they have taken or intend to take in consequence of the judg-
ment; (ii) it examines whether any just satisfaction awarded by the Court has 
been paid, including default interest; (iii) it verifies whether individual meas-
ures have been taken to ensure that the violation has ceased and that the injured 
party is put, as far as possible, in the same situation as that party enjoyed prior 
to the violation of the Convention; and (iv), it verifies whether general measures 
have been adopted, preventing new violations similar to that or those found or 
putting an end to continuing violation (Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe 2006/2017: Rule 6).
Now that the historical background and the functioning of the European 
Court of Human Rights and of its Grand Chamber in particular have been illus-
trated, the time has come to delve into the specificities of the ECtHR’s linguistic 
regime, which are explored in Chapter 2.
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The European political, economic and legal scenario is characterised by the pres-
ence of various supranational and international organisations. To guarantee a 
proper functioning, these organisations have always faced and tried to solve 
challenging linguistic problems in different ways. The purpose of this chapter is 
to shed light on the solution adopted by the European Court of Human Rights to 
overcome the challenges posed by the variety of official languages of the member 
States of the Council of Europe.
2.1 ECtHR’s official languages
The language regime of the European Court of Human Rights can be said to have 
failed to attract much academic interest, as is well summarised in Weston’s obser-
vation (2010: 77) that “[m]any people in Europe know about the European Court 
of Human Rights, but probably few of them have given any thought to the fact 
that an international court has to deal with the practical problems of language(s) 
across frontiers – translation – as well as law”. When comparing the European 
Union and the Council of Europe, the organisation from which the ECtHR has 
derived its language regime, it is impossible not to agree with Weston (1988: 
679) that “[u]nlike a number of other international organisations, the Council of 
Europe has the considerable economic advantage of having only two official lan-
2 The European Court 
of Human Rights and 
its language regime
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guages – English and French”. With its forty-seven member States, the Council of 
Europe is “the widest organization bringing together all European democracies” 
(Turner 2013: 37), but it has only two official languages, as established in Article 
12 of its Statute1, which also provides that “[t]he rules of procedure of the Com-
mittee of Ministers and of the Consultative Assembly shall determine in what 
circumstances and under what conditions other languages may be used”.
Founded under the auspices of the Council of Europe, the ECtHR, based in 
Strasbourg, adopted a language regime identical to the one in force at the Coun-
cil. According to Weston (2005: 448), such a language regime does not make the 
ECtHR “in any official sense a multilingual institution”, though it certainly is a 
multinational institution. Despite the fact that the language regime of the Coun-
cil of Europe – and thus of the ECtHR – has remained unchanged over time, the 
way in which the two official languages are used by the ECtHR has been modified 
since the establishment of the Court in 1959. The gradual gathering of momen-
tum by the Convention system has led to a “Court which has greatly advanced 
human rights in Europe and elsewhere”, but is also “inundated by the inflow of 
applications”, which makes it “a victim of its success” (Directorate General of Hu-
man Rights and Rule of Law – Council of Europe 2014: 77). Indeed, all judgments 
and decisions were originally translated from English into French and vice versa, 
since “[a]t the Strasbourg Court […], judgments may be drafted in either English 
or French” (Weston 2005: 449). However, the increasing number of applications 
and thus of decisions taken by the ECtHR has brought about an increasing need 
for translation. Considering that “in the old Court all judgments were delivered 
in both English and French and the relevant drafts were translated at all stages” 
(Weston 2010: 77) and that the translation work of the ECtHR used to be “split 
between the Council of Europe’s central translation service (which handled the 
non-confidential material only) and the two native English-speaking and two 
French-speaking lawyers in the Court’s Registry” (Weston 2005: 448, footnote 
6), the translation workload became almost unsustainable. Therefore, “in 1986 
a request by the Registry for the creation of two posts of senior translator (one 
into English and one into French) was granted, and since 1987 further posts have 
been created to cope with the ever-growing workload” (Weston 2010: 77). At the 
time of writing, the Language Department, which is coordinated by the head of 
the Language Department, consists of two divisions, i.e. the French Language 
Division, with five translators, one reviser and four language checkers, and the 
English Language Division, with four translators, two revisers and nine language 
checkers. However, not all translation work is done in-house: documents that are 
not confidential, such as the referral request and the (third) parties’ observations, 
are usually outsourced (regardless of the source language), while confidential 
documents are translated internally (Brannan 2018: 176– 177).
1 Statute of the Council of Europe, London, 5th May 1949, available at https://www.coe.int/en/
web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/0900001680306052 (accessed 10/11/2017).
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Although the ECtHR has always had only two official languages, in the context 
of the 1998 reform a proposal was made for the inclusion of a third official lan-
guage, i.e. Russian. This change in the language regime of the Court would have 
facilitated communication and the dissemination of ECtHR case-law in post-
Soviet countries. However, this proposal did not get far, especially for fear that 
other States might make similar requests (Brannan 2009: 27; Cohen 2016: 506; 
Malinverni 2000: 543). Therefore, no other official language has been added to 
English and French, despite the ECtHR’s interest in disseminating its case-law in 
other languages, which is confirmed by the major investments in translation in 
non-official languages (see Section 2.6). Before discussing the role of translation 
in non-official languages, however, a description of how the Court has regulated 
the use of English and French – as well as other languages, when need be – is 
provided below. In this regard, it is interesting to notice that while much has 
already been written on both the European Convention on Human Rights and 
the procedure to be followed to bring a case to the ECtHR2, the same abundance 
of literature cannot be found concerning the internal working practice of the 
ECtHR3, especially as regards the use of languages for the drafting of ECtHR judg-
ments and decisions. The same can also be said of the use of languages by judges 
in the decision-making process. The literature available on the subject is rela-
tively scarce and produced mainly by (former) ECtHR’s personnel, from judges to 
registrars and employees of the language divisions4.
2.2 ECtHR’s official languages and translation in the Rules of Court
The use of languages at the ECtHR is provided for in Rule 34 of the Rules of 
Court, which are the rules adopted by the ECtHR itself to regulate all the practi-
cal aspects related to the Court’s procedure. These aspects range from the inter-
nal organisation of the Court (e.g. judges, Registry, composition of Sections and 
Chambers) to the actual procedure before the Court (e.g. lodging of applications, 
admissibility, hearings).
Rule 34 sets forth that “[t]he official languages of the Court shall be English and 
French”. However, Rule 34 also provides for cases in which other languages may be 
used. In particular, this Rule specifies the circumstances under which applicants 
and Contracting Parties are allowed to use their own language. While the general 
2 See, for instance, Arold (2007: 41–65), Council of Europe (2014), Tochilovsky (2008), Margué-
naud (2012), and Berger et al. (1999).
3 In this regard, see, for instance, Costa (2017).
4 The main authors who have published on the working method at the ECtHR are Vincent Berg-
er, former Jurisconsult of and former Section Registrar at the ECtHR, James Brannan, Senior 
Translator at the ECtHR, Lech Garlicki and Giorgio Malinverni, former Judges of the Court, and 
Martin Weston, former Head of the English Language Division in the Registry of the Court. 
(See references below.)
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rule requires the use of the Court’s official languages, applicants may communi-
cate with the Court and submit their application and oral or written submissions 
in the official language of a Contracting Party and the President of the Chamber 
may grant leave for the continued use of this language (Rule 34, § 3(a)). In this 
case, translation is mentioned for the first time in the Rules of Court. In particular, 
the Rule specifies that “the Registrar shall make the necessary arrangements for 
the interpretation and translation into English or French of the applicant’s oral 
and written submissions respectively, in full or in part, where the President of the 
Chamber considers it to be in the interests of the proper conduct of the proceed-
ings” (Rule 34, § 3(b)). However, the applicant may be exceptionally required to 
“bear all or part of the costs of making such arrangements” (Rule 34, § 3(c)). The 
possibility to lodge an application in a language other than English or French af-
firms a fundamental democratic principle, since it grants applicants equal access 
to the ECtHR, regardless of their mother tongues (see also Brannan 2018: 170–171).
On the other hand, Contracting Parties which are parties to the case are not 
considered as vulnerable to discrimination as individual applicants due to a lack 
of knowledge of either English or French. Therefore, they are subject to more 
restrictive rules. They are expected to use one of the Court’s official languages 
both to communicate with the Court and to send oral and written submissions, 
while they may be granted leave to use one of the Contracting Party’s official lan-
guages for oral and written submissions by the President of the Chamber (Rule 
34, § 4(a)). In such a case, it is the responsibility of the requesting Party “(i) to file 
a translation of its written submissions into one of the official languages of the 
Court within a time-limit to be fixed by the President of the Chamber. Should 
that Party not file the translation within that time-limit, the Registrar may make 
the necessary arrangements for such translation, the expenses to be charged to 
the requesting Party; (ii) to bear the expenses of interpreting its oral submissions 
into English or French. The Registrar shall be responsible for making the neces-
sary arrangements for such interpretation” (Rule 34, § 4(b)).
Translation is also an integral part of Rule 34, § 4(c), under which “[t]he Presi-
dent of the Chamber may direct that a Contracting Party which is a party to the 
case shall, within a specified time, provide a translation into, or a summary in, 
English or French of all or certain annexes to its written submissions or of any 
other relevant document, or of extracts therefrom”. Under Rule 34, § 4(d), the 
same shall apply to third party intervention regulated by Rule 44 and to the use 
of a non-official language by a third party. Furthermore, “[t]he President of the 
Chamber may invite the respondent Contracting Party to provide a translation 
of its written submissions in the or an official language of that Party in order to 
facilitate the applicant’s understanding of those submissions” (Rule 34, § 5).
As regards witnesses, experts or other persons appearing before the ECtHR, 
they may use their own language if they do not have sufficient knowledge of ei-
ther English or French, and the Registrar shall make the necessary arrangements 
for interpreting or translation (Rule 34, § 6).
332 the european court of human rights and its language regime
The ECtHR’s language policy reflects what is well summarised by Brannan (2009: 27):
La langue ne doit pas constituer un obstacle à l’accès effectif à la justice. Il serait parfois 
trop onéreux pour un requérant de faire traduire ses observations à ses propres frais 
ou de payer un interprète lors d’une audience. Par contre, les gouvernements peuvent 
plus facilement se faire assister par des juristes maîtrisant l’anglais ou le français.
Malinverni (2000: 545–546), in turn, expresses himself in the same sense:
Cette solution […] paraît raisonnable. En effet, même si plusieurs Etats d’Europe cen-
trale et orientale se trouvent dans une situation financière difficile, l’ont voit mal que 
le Conseil de l’Europe doive, pour cette seule raison, prendre à sa charge les frais de 
l’ensemble des Etats, y compris de ceux qui sont parfaitement en mesure de les as-
sumer eux-mêmes.
Translation is also explicitly mentioned in Rule 70, which provides for the mak-
ing of the verbatim record of a hearing by the Registrar under the President of the 
Chamber’s direction. This record must include the composition of the Chamber, 
a list of those appearing before it, the text of the submissions made, questions 
asked, and replies given, and the text of any ruling delivered during the hear-
ing. Given that all or part of the verbatim record may be made in a non-official 
language, the Registrar shall arrange for its translation into one of the official 
languages (Rule 70, § 2). A similar provision also applies to Rule A8 in the Annex 
to the Rules concerning investigations, which provides that “[a] verbatim record 
shall be prepared by the Registrar of any proceedings concerning an investiga-
tive measure by a delegation” (§ 1), and that if such verbatim record is entirely or 
partially “in a non-official language, the Registrar shall arrange for its translation 
into one of the official languages” (§ 2).
However, linguistic issues which require translation also emerge elsewhere 
in the Rules of Court. Rule 9A provides for the Court’s Bureau, whose task is “to 
assist the President in carrying out the functions of the office with respect to the 
Court’s work and administration” (Schabas 2015: 683) and which is composed of 
the President of the Court, the Vice-Presidents of the Court and the Section Presi-
dents. § 7 of the same Rule sets forth that “[a] record shall be kept of the Bureau’s 
meetings and distributed to the Judges in both the Court’s official languages”, 
which means that the record needs to be translated from French into English or 
vice versa.
Rules 57 and 76, on the other hand, regulate the language of ECtHR’s deci-
sions and judgments respectively. They provide that all decisions and judgments 
delivered by a Chamber must be given in either English or French, unless the 
Court decides that a decision or a judgment is given in both official languages, 
thus suggesting the possible presence of translation. Further confirmation is 
provided by §§ 2 of the same Rules, which lay down that the publication of such 
decisions and judgments in the official reports of the Court, i.e. the official col-
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lection of the ECtHR’s leading judgments, decisions and advisory opinions, shall 
be done in both official languages of the Court, therefore requiring translation. 
2.3 Languages and translation at the ECtHR
Although the use of languages and translation are covered in a relatively limited 
number of Rules of Court, they play a fundamental role in the daily practice of 
the ECtHR. Such a role is aptly acknowledged by Popović, a judge of the Court 
in the period 2005-2015. He derives the ECtHR’s vital need for translation from 
the comparative method adopted by the Court to unravel the intricacies of the 
Contracting States’ legal systems and to apply the law established by the Con-
vention. What Jean-Paul Costa (2017: 157), President of the ECtHR from 2007 to 
2011, encapsulates in a single statement, i.e. “[l]a Cour se nourrit de droit com-
paré”, is linked to the unavoidable need for translation in the following passage 
by Popović (2007: 373):
La pluralité des ordres juridiques des États membres exige inévitablement l’appel au 
droit compare et à l’application de la méthode comparative.
En remplissant sa tâche et au cours de ses travaux quotidiens, la Cour doit faire face à la 
nécessité de comprendre une certaine règle ou institution d’un ordre juridique donné, 
et ensuite de l’interpréter, afin de pouvoir mettre en œuvre une règle de la Conven-
tion. Cela se fait en traduisant un texte vers l’une des deux langues officielles de la 
Cour. C’est bien la raison pour laquelle la traduction juridique représente un travail de 
première importance parmi les activités quotidiennes de la Cour, sur laquelle s’érige 
l’édifice de la protection des droits de l’homme. 
The same idea is stressed repeteadly by Popović, for example in this other asser-
tion: “[l]a traduction fait partie de ce qu’on peut appeler la technique journal-
ière de la Cour” (Popović 2007: 373–374). Although the comparative method in 
ECtHR’s everyday practice has received criticism, since it has been considered 
“dangerous in that it may lead the Court to draw inspiration from legislation 
and practices which could worsen and not improve the protection of individu-
als” (Ost 1992: 308), it has also been recognised that “[t]he Court cannot adopt an 
entirely autonomous interpretation for fear of detaching itself from legal real-
ity nor can it simply adopt an international consensus view which is difficult 
to discover and which may be below the standard required for the protection of 
individual rights” (Ost 1992: 308). The comparative method is closely related to 
the methods adopted by the Court for the interpretation of the European Con-
vention and goes beyond the scope of this volume, but it is interesting to notice 
how an interpretative method adopted by the Court and discussed by both for-
mer judges of the Court and legal scholars brings to the fore practical aspects that 
concern the use of one or more languages and the need for translation.
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2.4 The role of the Registry in the drafting of ECtHR case-law
As mentioned in relation to the submission and handling of applications, indi-
vidual applicants must send their application to the ECtHR’s Registry. The Reg-
istry is “the body of staff that provides the Court with legal and administrative 
support in its judicial work” and “is made up of lawyers, administrative and 
technical staff and translators” (European Court of Human Rights 2014b: 4). It 
currently counts about 640 staff members (European Court of Human Rights: 
n.a.), who are “highly qualified lawyers, linguists, administrative and technical 
staff from the various Contracting States, acting independently in the service of 
the judges, few of whom could fail to appreciate the invaluable assistance they 
receive” (Dollé and Ovey 2012: 544, footnote 2). 
Applicants can apply to the ECtHR in one of the two official languages of the 
Council of Europe, i.e. French and English. However, they can also apply in an 
official language of any Member State of the Council of Europe, which is what 
happens in most cases. As seen above, individual applications and inter-State ap-
plications that meet the admissibility criteria and that are allocated to a Chamber 
are assigned to a case lawyer, who must have a command of the language of the 
application and the legal system of the State involved. For every case, one or more 
judge rapporteurs are then designated (Rules 48 and 49 of the Rules of Court) 
who examine the application and have slightly different functions depending 
on the application being an inter-State or an individual application. However, 
in both cases the judge rapporteurs submit reports on admissibility, drafts and 
other documents and may assist the Chamber (or the Committee) and its Presi-
dent in carrying out their functions. Under Rule 50, also in Grand Chamber pro-
ceedings one or more judge rapporteurs are designated by the President of the 
Grand Chamber. Judge rapporteurs must have a thorough knowledge of the le-
gal system(s) of the State(s) involved in the case. However, their linguistic skills 
are equally relevant: “[l]es connaissances linguistiques devront également être 
l’un des critères du choix du juge rapporteur. Celui-ci devra d’abord avoir une 
maîtrise suffisante de la langue de l’Etat défendeur” (Malinverni 2000: 546, but 
see also Cohen 2016: 504–506 for a discussion of the knowledge of English and 
French by ECtHR lawyers). 
Linguistic skills are fundamental also in the choice of the Registry lawyer. The 
judge rapporteur and the Registry lawyer work closely together and their rela-
tionship must be based on mutual trust: “la confiance, au sein de ce tandem que 
constituent à Strasbourg le juge rapporteur et le juriste qui travaille avec lui sur 
une affaire, est indispensable” (Costa 2017: 155). Any case dossier is first assigned 
to a Registry lawyer “en fonction de sa familiarité avec la matière et de ses con-
naissances linguistiques et juridiques” (Costa 2017: 153), because in most cases 
neither the applicant nor the respondent State are English- or French-speaking. 
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As Weston (2005: 449) pointed out, “all decisions5 in cases in which the respond-
ent member State is not an English- or French-speaking one […] are drafted in a 
language which is not that of the national legal system and thus incorporate a 
substantial amount of ‘covert’ translation from a third language”. Brannan (2018: 
178) refers to this language as a “‘hidden’ third (non-official) language”. Further-
more, in most cases the drafters are not English- or French-native speakers (Wes-
ton 2005: 457), which implies that draft judgments usually undergo a linguistic 
check during the drafting process.
As concerns the role of the Registry, Berger (2006: 16) highlights “la richesse 
et la variété des missions confiées au greffe de la Cour” and stresses that “[l]e 
greffe fournit un soutien logistique, intellectuel et rédactionnel à la Cour et à ses 
membres”. Here the relevance in the drafting process emerges clearly. Berger 
identifies three main tasks in which the drafting comes to the fore: the prepara-
tion of the case, the writing of draft decisions and judgments, and the drafting of 
the final decisions and judgments. During the preparation of the case, the Reg-
istry lawyer writes a report, under the supervision of the judge rapporteur, on 
the procedure and the facts, but also on the relevant law (Berger 2006: 13–14). 
Even though the actual drafting of either a decision or a judgment comes at a 
later stage, it is important to remember that the language of the relevant national 
law may very likely not be English or French. This may prove particularly bur-
densome when it comes to translating the provisions of national law – be they 
constitutional, legislative or jurisprudential – into the official languages of the 
ECtHR, especially because they will later appear in the decisions or judgments 
of the Court (Berger 2006: 13; Brannan 2018: 178). The draft of the decision or 
judgment on both admissibility and the merits is prepared by case lawyers, who 
always act “with the clearance of the head of the unit and of the Section Regis-
trar/Deputy Registrar” (Garlicki 2009: 393), or, rather, by the Registry lawyer. In-
deed, as Berger (2006: 14) exquisitely puts it, “[l]a plupart du temps, le jurist ou 
référendaire chargé du dossier est la « plume » du juge rapporteur”. In Dollé and 
Ovey’s words (2012: 544, footnote 2), “[i]t is a little acknowledged fact that it is 
actually the members of the Court’s Registry who draft most of the Court’s texts”. 
The draft is then submitted to the judge rapporteur for acceptance. If the judge 
rapporteur is ready to sign the draft, it is submitted to the deliberation of the Sec-
tion (or Grand Chamber).
Given that all judgments are adopted by a formal vote and that unanimity is 
not a sine qua non for a verdict to be reached, under Rule 74, § 2, of the Rules of 
Court “[a]ny judge who has taken part in the consideration of the case by a Cham-
ber or by the Grand Chamber shall be entitled to annex to the judgment either a 
separate opinion, concurring with or dissenting from that judgment, or a bare 
statement of dissent”. In this case, the text of the separate opinion is written by 
the dissenting or concurring judges themselves.
5 Note that Weston uses “decisions” as a superordinate of admissibility decisions and judgments.
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2.4.1 Specific features of Grand Chamber judgments
In Grand Chamber proceedings, “[t]he case is, at first, prepared by the Judge 
Rapporteur (who is always a different person from the national judge), assisted 
by an experienced Registry lawyer” (Garlicki 2009: 394). While oral hearings are 
rare at the Section level (Garlicki 2009: 394), they are a rule in Grand Chamber 
proceedings. Oral hearings are “followed by the first deliberation, during which 
the JR [Judge Rapporteur] presents his/her oral report and initial proposal as to 
the judgment” (Garlicki 2009: 394). After the national judge has taken the floor, 
the discussion is opened and led by the President, who appoints a drafting com-
mittee after the vote has been held. This committee always includes both the 
judge rapporteur and the national judge and is responsible for adopting and sub-
mitting the full draft of the judgment. However, the text is usually drafted by 
the Registry lawyer and discussed with the judge rapporteur and the Registrar 
assigned to the case. In a similar way as in Chamber cases, after the judge rappor-
teur accepts the text, the drafting committee discusses it, accepts it and submits 
it to the second deliberation. During the second deliberation, the judgment is 
read out and accepted or amended by the Grand Chamber. In rare cases, the draft 
may be returned to the drafting committee for more significant or “invasive” 
amendments and then submitted for a third deliberation (Garlicki 2009: 394).
2.5 The role of translation in drafting ECtHR case-law
As seen so far, the drafting of decisions and judgments can be considered a col-
legial activity in which certain professional profiles, especially Registry lawyers 
and judge rapporteurs, have a more prominent role than others. Although the 
drafting itself seems more of a customary practice than an activity regulated by 
the Rules of Court (indeed, no specific Rule provides for these practicalities), 
some information on it can be found in the literature. Translation, on the other 
hand, plays a rather marginal role in the Rules and seems to have been almost 
completely neglected in the literature.
Translation from English into French and vice versa is provided for by the 
Rules of Court as regards the lodging of the application and of oral and written 
submissions. However, the Rules of Court do not mention the details of the trans-
lation process or those of the drafting process. There is, for instance, no mention 
of the translator as a professional profile involved in the production of judg-
ments and decisions. From a historical perspective, two facts are worth recalling 
in this regard. The first is that the ECtHR had no internal translators until 1987 
(see Section 2.1). The second is that judgments and decisions were drafted in both 
English and French until 1998. Since then, under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, 
all judgments are given either in one or the other language, unless the Court de-
cides otherwise. In these cases, which represent a minority, translation is needed 
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and, when judgments are translated, “usually because of their significance for 
case-law, the translation will be produced before delivery when both language 
texts are to be authoritative (as is the case for Grand Chamber judgments), or oth-
erwise after delivery purely for publication on the on-line HUDOC database and 
more rarely in printed reports” (Brannan 2013: 910). However, it should not be 
forgotten, especially for the purposes of a linguistic analysis of case-law such as 
that presented in this book, that as regards judgments, “il convient de distinguer 
la langue dans laquelle ils sont rendus et celle dans laquelle ils sont publiés” (Ma-
linverni 2000: 547).
2.6 The role of translation in disseminating ECtHR case-law
While the role of translation in the drafting of ECtHR judgments and decisions 
and its most practical aspects seem to have gone unnoticed both in the ECtHR’s 
Rules of Court and in academic literature, the same cannot be said about the 
role of translation in the dissemination of the Court’s most relevant cases. An 
important translation project and a number of publications that accompanied it 
confirm the great importance attributed by the ECtHR to the translation of key 
judicial texts into non-official languages.
In the years 2010, 2011 and 2012, three high-level conferences on the future of 
the European Court of Human Rights were held in Interlaken, İzmir, and Bright-
on. In line with the resulting declarations, one of the Court’s core objectives was 
the improvement of both the accessibility and the understanding of leading Con-
vention principles and standards, which would facilitate the implementation of 
these principles and standards at national level. This could be achieved through 
clear and consistent case-law. To be more accessible and more easily understand-
able, ECtHR case-law needed to be translated also into non-official languages. The 
European Court of Human Rights (2014a: 3) itself acknowledged that:
Ensuring that the Court’s leading cases are made available in all official languages of 
the member States would enable judges, prosecutors, legal practitioners, public offi-
cials and civil society to better understand the leading Convention principles, thereby 
reinforcing the principle of subsidiarity. In addition, such translations would be of 
assistance when considering the conclusions to be drawn from a judgment finding a 
violation of the Convention by one State, where the same problem of principle exists 
in other member States as well. 
For this reason, in April 2012 the Registry’s Case-Law Information and Publica-
tions Division launched an ambitious four-year project entitled “Bringing Con-
vention standards closer to home: Translation and dissemination of key ECHR 
case-law in target languages”, which was supported by the Human Rights Trust 
Fund (HRTF) and ended in March 2016. The aims of the project were to commis-
sion the translation of key ECtHR case-law and ensure its dissemination to le-
392 the european court of human rights and its language regime
gal professionals and civil society in “those member States where neither of the 
Court’s official languages is sufficiently understood” (European Court of Human 
Rights 2015: 4), i.e. Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Geor-
gia, Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Turkey, and Ukraine.
With a total funding of 1.6 million euros, the HRTF allowed the Court’s Reg-
istry to outsource, on a framework-contracting basis, the translation of ECtHR 
case-law into twelve target languages to 70 freelance translators who had passed 
the required test. This translation project produced 3,500 translations of case-
law of Europe-wide significance, which mainly included the cases selected by 
the Court’s Bureau for publication in the official series Reports of Judgments and 
Decisions (about 30 cases per year). Apart from these translations, the translation 
project also served as “a catalyst for an ongoing inventory and sharing of case-
law translations produced in member States” (European Court of Human Rights 
2016: 7). Indeed, in addition to the translations commissioned by the HRTF, the 
Court’s Registry invited Governments, judicial training centres, associations of 
legal professionals, NGOs, publishers, and other partners to provide it with any 
case-law translations to which they had the rights. In this way, the Registry col-
lected about 17,000 translations in around 30 languages other than English and 
French, which were then made available through the HUDOC portal. The consid-
erable number of non-official translations provided by Governments and other 
partners gives further confirmation to the strong interest in the principles and 
standards established in the Convention and in ECtHR case-law and in the need 
for their dissemination in languages other than English and French. Further-
more, the results of stakeholder surveys carried out in 2013 and 2016 are encour-
aging, since they both showed that 90% of the respondents were satisfied with 
the quality of the translations and that 80% and well over 90% of respondents 
respectively had already had the opportunity to use the translations in legal prac-
tice, education and training (European Court of Human Rights 2014a: 2, 2017a: 2).
However, it is also worth noting that the bodies interested in the transla-
tions of ECtHR case-law also have an interest in other types of textual material 
related to the Court for their own needs, such as case-law guides, factsheets, le-
gal summaries, or the Rules of Court. For this reason, they have commissioned 
the non-official translations of this material or produced them themselves and 
then made them available on the Court’s website6. Furthermore, languages also 
play a relevant role in improving the user-friendliness of the HUDOC interface, 
which is now available not only in the two official languages, but also in Turkish, 
Russian, and Spanish. In order to facilitate communication and knowledge dis-
semination through social media, in 2015 the Court’s Registry launched a new 
6 See, for instance, the Rules of Court available in Italian, Russian, and Turkish at https://
www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=basictexts/rules&c=#n1347875693676_pointer, and 
the practice directions available in 30 languages at https://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.
aspx?p=basictexts/rules/practicedirections (both accessed 05/06/2018).
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multilingual Twitter account7 in addition to the existing account administered 
by the Press Unit8. The latter account is used to publish tweets containing di-
rect links to the Court’s press releases available on the HUDOC portal, while the 
new account is used to publish updates on the latest publications in different 
languages, translations added to the HUDOC database, and other information 
about ECtHR case-law.
Despite the substantial investment in translation into non-official languages 
made in the past and the fundamental role of translation in the dissemination 
of ECtHR case-law, the Court itself stressed, on occasion of its very first confer-
ence on its own future held in Interlaken in 2010, that “it is first and foremost 
the responsibility of the States Parties to guarantee the application and imple-
mentation of the Convention” (Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of 
Law – Council of Europe 2014: 35). While translation is essential for fulfilling this 
task, the costs of translating the Court’s case-law in non-official languages have 
never been intended to be covered on a permanent basis by the Court’s ordinary 
budget. Under the Brussels Declaration9, after the Court’s judgments States Par-
ties are called upon to
promote accessibility to the Court’s judgments, action plans and reports as well as to 
the Committee of Ministers’ decisions and resolutions, by: 
– developing their publication and dissemination to the stakeholders concerned (in 
particular, the executive, parliaments and courts, and also, where appropriate, Na-
tional Human Rights Institutions and representatives of civil society), so as to involve 
them further in the judgment execution process; 
– translating or summarising relevant documents, including significant judgments of the 
Court, as required; […] (Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law of the 
Council of Europe 2015: 142, emphasis added).
What clearly emerges from this Declaration is that the future of non-official 
translations at the ECtHR depends on the national authorities and also on part-
ner institutions designated in each member State to organise and carry out this 
activity rather than on the Court’s direct investment in this field.
Chapter 2 has explored how the two official languages of the ECtHR, i.e. Eng-
lish and French, are used in the drafting process of the Court’s case-law and the 
role of translation in both its drafting and dissemination. The next chapter is 
devoted to framing ECtHR judgments as a legal genre and illustrates the macro-
structure of Grand Chamber judgments.
7 Available at https://twitter.com/echrpublication (accessed 04/06/2018).
8 Available at https://twitter.com/ECHR_Press (accessed 04/06/2018).
9 High-level Conference on the “Implementation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, our shared responsibility”, Brussels Declaration, 27 March 2015, available at https://
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Brussels_Declaration_ENG.pdf (accessed 29/06/2018). 
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The language used in ECtHR judgments would, without any doubt and probably 
without even the need to delve into the analysis of its features, be simply described 
as legal language. This is so for the simple fact of it being used in judgments by 
an international court. However, this intuitive guess is not enough when a more 
thorough linguistic understanding of ECtHR judgments is pursued. Indeed, to 
understand the role played by the ECtHR judgments in the vast landscape of legal 
language and its peculiarities, legal language must first be characterised through 
the lens of those who have already described it. For this reason, an overview of 
the main classifications proposed by scholars in different academic disciplines is 
provided here.
The range of available classifications is wide because of the multiple perspec-
tives that can be adopted when observing the interaction between language and 
law. For instance, some scholars concentrate on legal language, others on legal 
genres, while others still on legal texts. The terminological uncertainty is well 
accounted for in Kurzon (1997: 123), who acknowledges that a “sea of terms” has 
been used to classify the language that is connected to the law, such as “sublan-
guage”, “variety”, “register”, “genre”, and “discourse”, and that even these terms 
may be assigned different meanings by different scholars. It will suffice to recall 
the following passage by Cao (2007: 9), where “variety” is used to explain what 
“register” is in relation to “legal language”: 
3 Legal language and 
ECtHR judgments
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Legal language is a type of register, that is, a variety of language appropriate to differ-
ent occasions and situations of use, and in this case, a variety of language appropriate 
to the legal situations of use. Legal texts refer to the texts produced or used for legal 
purposes in legal settings.
By looking at how the different terms have been used, Kurzon’s final conclusion 
is that, among all the terms available, “legal discourse” should be the preferred 
superordinate term.
Another problematic aspect is that legal language and legal texts are intrin-
sically linked to the legal system they are used in, or at least to the legal family 
they belong to. Therefore, a distinction should be made between general classi-
fications and system- or family-bound classifications. Furthermore, as any other 
form of communication, legal discourse is a multidimensional phenomenon in 
which several factors are at play. Thus, multiple classification criteria exist and 
the choice of one or more of them leads to different results. A survey of the vari-
ous classifications developed within the field of translation studies is provided, 
for instance, by Valderrey Reñones (2004, cited in Gutiérrez Arcones 2015: 148), 
who identifies six criteria: branch of law, discursive categories, communicative 
situation, type of legal language, function, and genre. In what follows, a review of 
existing classifications in two fields, i.e. legal linguistics and translation studies, 
is presented. This is then followed by a description of ECtHR judgments in the 
light of the GENTT genre characterization template, with a particular attention 
to the communicative situation and the macro-structure.
3.1 Classifications of legal language in legal linguistics
Classifications of legal language have been provided by several scholars and ac-
cording to diverse sets of criteria. One of the most frequently quoted classifica-
tions dates from 1965 and is found in Kalinowski (1965, cited in Tiscornia 2007: 
191), who adopts one main criterion which is text-external, i.e. it does not de-
pend on linguistic features, and corresponds to the text producer. According to 
Kalinowski’s classification, a distinction is to be made between the “language of 
Law”, i.e. the language used by the legislator to express a legal rule, and the “lan-
guage of Jurists”, i.e. the language used in legal literature and legal science. As 
regards the latter category, Kalinowski stresses the fact that the term “Jurists” is 
used to encompass whoever speaks about the law. This category also includes ex-
perts other than legal scholars (e.g. historians, sociologists, psychologists) as well 
as legal practitioners, such as legal counsels, judges, prosecutors, businesspeople, 
etc. In Kalinowski’s classification, “legal language” can thus be seen as a superor-
dinate term that includes both the language of the law and the language of jurists. 
However, other criteria can be used when tracing the boundaries of legal lan-
guage. In his seminal work entitled The Language of the Law, Mellinkoff (1963: 3) 
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offers an “expanded definition of the language of the law”. What is of particular 
interest here is that, despite the seemingly all-embracing title of this work, the 
“language of the law” (or “law language”, the second term being used as a short 
form by the scholar himself) is defined as “the customary language used by law-
yers in those common law jurisdictions where English is the official language” 
(Mellinkoff 1963: 3). This means that the extension of this definition is restricted 
through three criteria, namely the natural language the language of the law be-
longs to (English), the jurisdictions where this language is used (common law 
jurisdictions), and the users of this language (lawyers). This definition thus im-
plies that the language of the law comprises both the language of statute law and 
the language of case-law. Later in the same chapter on the characteristics of the 
language of the law (Mellinkoff 1963: 11–23), it emerges that the main focus is on 
written language, while the spoken language plays a marginal role in his volume 
and is restricted to the description of the historical development of legal English.
From Mellinkoff ’s classification it can be inferred that a single classification 
criterion is insufficient to provide a thorough description of legal language and 
that the criteria selected produce different classifications. Another classification 
of legal language based on multiple criteria is the one proposed by the sociologist 
Brenda Danet. Her starting point is the recognition that legal language, which is 
used in different situations by different users, can perform different functions. 
Danet’s aim is to study the relationship between language and the functions of 
law in society. In her work, a definition of “legal language”, which corresponds to 
legal English, is not provided, but two basic functions of law are acknowledged, 
i.e., “the ordering of human relations and the restoration of social order when it 
breaks down” (Danet 1980: 449), and related to legal language. By doing so, Danet 
is not only able to distinguish between the language used for the ordering of so-
cial relations (1980: 463ff.) and the language used in the dispute process (1980: 
490), but she is also able to describe the features of language used for these two 
purposes in different settings. Despite recognising these two basic functions of 
legal language, in her visual representation of legal English, Danet (1980: 471, 
based on Joos 1967; see Figure 2) prefers using “situations” to “functions” and 
adds further classification criteria, i.e. the mode, which can be either written, 
spoken-composed, or spoken-spontaneous, and the style, which ranges from fro-
zen through formal and consultative to casual.
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Mode Style
Frozen Formal Consultative Casual
Written Documents:
Insurance 
policies
Contracts
Landlord-tenant 
leases
wills
Statutes
Briefs
Appellate 
opinions
Spoken-
composed
Marriage 
ceremonies
Indictments
Witnesses’ oaths
Pattern 
instructions
Verdicts
Lawyers’ 
examinations of 
witnesses in trials 
and depositions
Lawyers’ 
arguments, 
motions and trials
Expert witnesses’ 
testimony
Lay witnesses’ 
testimony
Spoken-
spontaneous
Lawyer-client 
interaction
Bench 
conferences
Lobby 
conferences
Lawyer-lawyer 
conversations
Figure 2. Danet’s typology (1980: 471) of situations in which legal English is used, based 
on “style” and “mode”.
Another attempt to classify “the language of the law” is the one made by Bha-
tia, whose work relies on the notion of legal genres, which can be identified by 
adopting multiple criteria. In Bhatia’s words (1987: 227), the language of the law
encompasses several usefully distinguishable genres depending upon the commu-
nicative purposes they tend to fulfil, the settings or contexts in which they are used, 
the communicative events or activities they are associated with, the social or profes-
sional relationship between the participants taking part in such activities or events, 
the background knowledge that such participants bring to the situation in which that 
particular event is embedded and a number of other factors. 
By taking a closer look at this definition, it can be said that Bhatia spells out the 
factors allowing to distinguish one legal genre from another, while the same fac-
tors may be considered implicit in other classifications. For instance, Danet and 
Bhatia put the function and the purpose of legal language – which can be seen as 
largely overlapping notions – first, and most of the factors explicitly mentioned 
by Bhatia can be subsumed under “function” (e.g. the communicative setting de-
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pends on the function, the relationship between the participants depends on the 
setting and the function, etc.). 
Bhatia’s classification is the most fine-grained among those presented so far. 
The first aspect to be emphasized is that Bhatia uses the term “language of the 
law” as a hypernym. This contrasts with the terminology proposed by Mellinkoff 
(1963), whose “language of the law” can be said to correspond to Bhatia’s juridical 
and legislative language and to exclude other forms of legal language. Further-
more, Bhatia proposes a multi-level classification, in which the first criterion to 
classify legal genres is the medium and the second is the setting in which legal 
communication occurs. The first distinction is thus made between spoken and 
written language of the law. Within these two broad categories, pedagogical, 
academic, and professional settings are envisaged for the spoken medium, while 
academic, juridical, and legislative settings require the written medium. In Bha-
tia’s classification, some of the major distinctions within the language of the law 
are also represented graphically (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Bhatia’s classification (1987: 227) of the language of the law.
Another essentially bipartite classification scheme is adopted by Kurzon (1989: 
283), who first comments on the relationship between the “language of the law” 
and “legal language”. (Once again, he mainly focusses on legal English.) He points 
out that lawyers and linguists have erroneously used the terms as synonyms. He 
rejects this view and offers two alternative views: according to the first one, the 
language of the law is included in, and is thus a sublanguage of, legal language, 
while according to the second view, which is the one he supports, the language of 
the law and legal language are to be considered separately on the basis of various 
pragmatic criteria. From this second perspective, the language of the law is “the 
language or the style used (or the sublanguage used) in documents that lay down 
the law, in a very broad sense” (Kurzon 1989: 283–284). The definition is thus 
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general enough to include both legislation and private law documents such as 
contracts, wills, and deeds. Legal language, on the other hand, is defined as “the 
language used when people talk about the law” (Kurzon 1989: 284), and is thus 
meant to comprise the language used in legal textbooks, lawyers’ speech and cor-
respondence, and by judges when giving their decisions. At this point, Kurzon 
acknowledges that it may be controversial to include judges’ decisions in legal 
language as he defines it, since such decisions also lay down the law, especially 
in the common law systems where the doctrine of stare decisis applies. Although 
Kurzon admits that the judge’s actions are open to multiple interpretations, he 
considers that the judge’s main function is to declare the law rather than to create 
it. Consequently, for him judicial decisions are instances of legal language rather 
than of the language of the law. 
Kurzon also recognises that criteria other than pragmatic ones may be applied 
to distinguish the language of the law from legal language. He therefore men-
tions formal, syntactic criteria that allow him to discriminate between frozen 
documents (e.g. contracts, wills, and deeds) and formal documents (e.g. statutes) 
within the language of the law. Kurzon’s definition of legal language also allows 
him to include in this category what he calls “law talk”, i.e. the “spoken language 
in the context of law” (Kurzon 1989: 287). Law talk is to be considered as a separate 
subcategory because of the specific classificatory criteria needed to analyse spoken 
language, and it is to be divided into spoken formal and spoken informal language. 
Kurzon also mentions rhetorical techniques as viable criteria to distinguish the 
two sublanguages, stating that “[d]ocuments in language of the law primarily do 
three things: command, permit and prohibit”, while “[t]exts in legal language […] 
have a wide variety of rhetorical techniques, as with all academic texts, especially 
techniques connected with argumentation” (Kurzon 1989: 288). He then argues 
that, by taking a broader viewpoint, the language of the law can be seen as a pri-
mary language, legal language being the metalanguage used to discuss it.
In a later work recognising, and trying to overcome, a “substantial amount of 
terminological uncertainty” as regards the term “legal language” (Kurzon 1997: 
119), Kurzon presents his classification through a diagram, which is reproduced 
in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Kurzon’s classification (1997: 120, adapted) of “legal ---”.
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As Kurzon himself admits, “legal language” and the “language of the law” have no 
defined superordinate, and the hypernym therefore corresponds to the incom-
plete label “legal ---“. Regardless of the most appropriate term to refer to the pri-
mary node in this classification, of particular relevance for the purposes of this 
volume is that Kurzon is one of the first scholars to acknowledge that the features 
of judicial decisions make them difficult to classify. As already mentioned, given 
the function they perform, judicial decisions fall within legal language rather 
than the language of the law, but it is hard to consider them as metalanguage in 
the same way as textbooks, so much so that Kurzon (1989: 288) admits that “[t]
here is no doubt that legal language is a metalanguage (apart from the various 
pragmatic considerations […] in relation to the judge’s decision)”.
Another interesting classification is the one proposed by Maley (1994), who 
speaks about “legal discourses” rather than legal language. In her view, four legal 
discourses can be identified, namely judicial discourse, which includes the lan-
guage of both spoken and written judicial decisions; courtroom discourse, which is 
“interactive language, peppered with ritual courtesies and modes of address’’ (Ma-
ley 1994: 13); the language of legal documents or legislative discourse, which partly 
corresponds to Kurzon’s language of the law; and the discourse of legal consulta-
tion, which takes place between lawyer and lawyer or between lawyer and client.
A different point of view is expressed by Trosborg (1997), who mainly concen-
trates on written legal language, and on written legal English in particular. From 
her standpoint, studying the lexical and syntactic features of legal language is 
not enough to understand its distinctive characteristics, thus other dimensions 
of linguistic analysis should be taken into account. She admits that studies of 
pragmatic aspects and communicative functions of legal language in relation to 
specific domains and subdomains were gaining momentum in the late 1980s 
and that legal language is “a specific field of Language for Specific Purposes (LSP)” 
(Trosborg 1997: 15), a notion that is nowadays hardly denied. However, in con-
trast with Kurzon, Trosborg sees “legal language” as the superordinate category 
including all the sublanguages within the legal domain and the “language of the 
law” as one of these sublanguages. In order to distinguish one sublanguage from 
another within the same domain, Trosborg draws on the concept of “context of 
situation” and explains it in terms of field, tenor and mode in the wake of Halli-
day and Hasan (1989) and Hatim and Mason (1990). However, Trosborg develops 
a model with four dimensions: field, which corresponds to the domain/subdo-
main; interactional tenor, which concerns the relationship between the sender 
and the receiver; functional tenor, which relates to the communicative functions 
realized through speech acts; and mode, which corresponds to the medium used 
to communicate (Trosborg 1997: 18). When discussing the field of legal discourse, 
Trosborg (1997: 20) highlights that “[t]he language of the law is distinguished 
from other domains of legal language, as, for example, the language used in the 
courtroom, the language of legal textbooks, the language used to communicate 
about the law (‘law language’) in a formal, as well as an informal setting”. She rep-
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resents her classification of legal language “according to external factors pertain-
ing to the situation of use” in the diagram here reproduced in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Trosborg’s classification (1997: 20, adapted) of legal language.
However, Trosborg (1997: 24) admits that “[c]lassifying texts according to criteria 
such as field of discourse amounts to little more than a statement of subject mat-
ter”, a classification criterion used for example by Cavagnoli (2008; see below). Fur-
thermore, Trosborg affirms that field, tenor, and mode describe the speech situa-
tion, but in order to understand a text within a register, three functions of a text 
must be taken into account, namely the ideational, the interpersonal, and the tex-
tual function. Following Halliday and Hasan (1976), the ideational function relates 
to the “expression of content”, the interpersonal function concerns “the speaker’s 
motive in saying something […] and the way this is realized in the particular role 
relationship between sender and receiver”, and the textual function “pertains to 
the structure, cohesion, mode and medium of the text” (Trosborg 1997: 25).
Despite the fact that his seminal work is entitled Legal language, Peter Tiers-
ma’s (1999) book again focuses on legal English. The different types of legal 
language are discussed in the chapter entitled “Variation”. Tiersma (1999: 133) 
acknowledges that legal English is not “a unitary system”, or, as he puts it, that 
legal English is “far from uniform”. Although not directly relevant to the main 
topic of this volume, it is worth noticing that Tiersma first takes into considera-
tion diatopic variation by dealing with the historical development of legal Eng-
lish into distinct legal dialects or varieties.1 What emerges is a major interest in 
the differences between national varieties of legal language used in the various 
English-speaking countries, such as in the UK, the USA, New Zealand, Australia, 
and other former British colonies. The focus is thus on the legal English used in 
national legal systems, while the supranational and international settings in 
which English native and non-native speakers communicate in English are com-
pletely neglected in his original discussion2. The second type of variation con-
1 Controversial as it may nowadays seem, Tiersma uses “dialect” and “variety” interchangeably.
2 In Recent developments and additions to Legal Language, Tiersma states that “[a]n important 
variety or dialect of legal English that has been developing in the past years is sometimes called 
International English. The English language is increasingly being used for drafting interna-
tional agreements, even when neither of the parties are native English speakers or in English-
language jurisdictions”. http://www.languageandlaw.org/LEGALLANG/CORRECT.HTM (last 
updated 21/09/2011, accessed 14/08/2018).
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sidered by Tiersma relates to the mode. Like other scholars before him, Tiersma 
distinguishes between spoken and written legal language. Despite mentioning 
the existence of different degrees of formality, syntactical complexity, and lexi-
cal density of the two modes, Tiersma does not indulge in a more detailed clas-
sification of legal language, save for two informal “varieties” of legal English, i.e. 
“telegraphic speech” and “legal slang” (Tiersma 1999: 136–139). The former “oc-
casionally occurs in written language”, such as in the form of the order follow-
ing the opinion of a court or in lawyer-judge communication in courts, while 
the latter refers “mainly to individual lexical items or phrases”. The third type of 
variation covered in Tiersma’s analysis, which is also more central to the present 
research, relates to genre.
The definitions of “genre” are almost as numerous as the individual scholars 
who work or have worked in the field, all of whom approach the topic from a differ-
ent angle. According to Tiersma (1999: 139), “genre refers to a category of composi-
tion; the members of a category usually share a particular structure as well as level 
of formality”. By taking this definition as a starting point, Tiersma identifies three 
classes of documents based on their function, i.e. “operative legal documents”, “ex-
pository documents”, and “persuasive documents”. Operative documents, such as 
pleadings, petitions, orders, statutes, contracts, and wills, are those that “create or 
modify legal relations” and do so through “legal performatives” (Tiersma 1999: 
139). In terms of Danet’s view, Tiersma’s operative documents perform both pri-
mary functions of the law. Explanatory documents, on the other hand, “typically 
delve into one or more points of law with a relatively objective tone” (Tiersma 
1999: 139). These can be likened to Kurzon’s metalanguage. Finally, Tiersma brief-
ly mentions persuasive documents, which include “briefs that are submitted to 
courts and memoranda of points and authorities” (Tiersma 1999: 141).
Of particular note is Tiersma’s characterisation of judicial opinions, which 
represents a step forward from the difficulties of classification acknowledged 
by Kurzon with respect to this particular type of document. Tiersma recognises 
judicial opinions as instances of expository documents “to the extent that the 
judge expresses what the law is”, but acknowledges that “opinions typically also 
contain a judgment or order at the end that constitutes the actual disposition of 
the case” and that “such an order is operative” (Tiersma 1999:139). Furthermore, 
Tiersma points out that judicial opinions, despite their supposed objectivity, also 
have a persuasive function, since “a judge actually aims to persuade the reader 
that her decision was correct, but the objective tone suggests that the outcome is 
the only rational conclusion in light of the law and the facts” (Tiersma 1999: 139).
Another scholar drawing on the concept of genre is Gotti. Despite not pro-
posing a classification of legal language or legal genres of his own, Gotti’s con-
tribution is relevant in so far as he affirms that, just like in other specialised 
domains, in the legal domain there are multiple factors that determine the dif-
ferences between one genre and another, such as “the communicative purposes 
they [genres] aim to fulfil, the settings or contexts in which they are employed, 
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the communicative events or activities they are associated with, the professional 
relationships existing between the people taking part in such activities or events, 
and the background knowledge of each participant”, as well as “the matter they 
cover” (Gotti 2012: 61–63).
A yet different perspective is adopted by Gémar (2002: 167) who, rather 
than trying to define legal language and classifying it, starts by asking himself 
“Qu’est-ce qu’un « texte juridique » ?”. He limits the extension of “texte” to writ-
ten texts and observes that the first problem lies in the polysemy of the adjec-
tive “juridique”. To solve this problem, he draws on Cornu’s definition of legal 
discourse (2005: 21), according to which “est juridique tout discours qui a pour 
objet la création ou la réalisation du droit”. Therefore, his classification is limited 
to texts that create or enforce the law (corresponding to the first function identi-
fied by Danet) and, more specifically, he takes the text producer as the criterion 
for his classification. The text producers he considers are the legislator, the judge, 
and “les gens de loi”. The choice of this criterion leads him to state that “le texte 
juridique présente trois caractéristiques qui le distinguent des autres : il s’agit 
d’un texte normatif disposant d’un style et d’un vocabulaire particuliers” (Gémar 
2002: 166, emphasis in the original).
A similar approach is adopted by Mattila (2006: 4–5), who does not provide 
a definition of legal language, but uses the sub-groups of lawyers (legal authors, 
legislators, judges, administrators, and advocates) as the main criterion to divide 
legal language into sub-genres, each of which possesses particular characteristics 
in terms of vocabulary and style. Mattila (2006: 4) explicitly recognizes that “[t]he 
division of legal language into sub-genres is a relative matter”. He also admits 
that other classification criteria can be used, such as the branches of law, which 
have a great impact on the terminology used, and notes that “scores of terms” can 
be found in criminal law that are almost never used in texts on the law of prop-
erty or constitutional law” (Mattila 2006: 5).
3.2 Classifications of legal language in translation studies
Legal language has also been extensively examined within Translation Studies. 
Although not specifically devoted to legal language, Sager’s book Language Engi-
neering and Translation: Consequences of Automation contains a particularly inter-
esting remark on laws and regulations in his section entitled “Choice of purpose 
(Intention + Expectation)” (Sager 1993: 67ff.) In this section, five purposes for 
a speech act are identified, i.e. the social, informative, directive, discursive, and 
evaluative function. The description of these purposes within Sager’s framework 
of communicative theory for translation is beyond the scope of the present work, 
but one of the categories is worth mentioning here. Indeed, according to Sager 
(1993: 70), “[d]irective messages are reader-oriented”, since “if readers respond 
in the expected way, or more specifically, do what they have been told, the com-
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munication has been successful”, but “[t]he directive purpose may apply to a 
limited number of readers only, as in laws and regulations where the purpose is 
informative for the general reader and directive for the specific group of people 
listed, or falling into the categories set out”.
Another translation studies scholar who has classified legal texts according to 
their function is Šarčević. In her view, a bipartite system in which legal language 
has only two primary functions, i.e. regulative (also known as “prescriptive”) and 
informative (or “descriptive”), as proposed by Trosborg (see Section 3.1) or Wies-
mann (2011: 1, following Kelsen 1979: 76), is insufficient to describe the whole 
spectrum of existing legal texts. For this reason, drawing on Bocquet (1994: 2), 
Šarčević (1997: 11) opts for dividing legal texts into three groups according to their 
function, i.e. “primarily prescriptive”, “primarily descriptive but also prescrip-
tive”, and “purely descriptive” texts. Primarily prescriptive texts (i.e. laws, regula-
tions, codes, contracts, treaties and conventions) and purely descriptive texts (i.e. 
texts written by legal scholars, such as legal opinions, textbooks, and articles) re-
semble categories already mentioned by other authors. Primarily descriptive but 
also prescriptive texts, on the other hand, are “hybrid texts”, and the example pro-
vided by Šarčević (1997: 11) herself is “judicial decisions and instruments to carry 
on judicial and administrative proceedings such as actions, pleadings, briefs, ap-
peals, requests, petition, etc.”. On reflection, this observation is very much in line 
with Tiersma’s characterisation of judicial opinions illustrated above, although 
the classifications proposed by the two authors differ considerably.
Borja Albi and Hurato Albir (1999) limit their analysis to the British and Span-
ish legal systems and concentrate on the discursive situation (“situación discur-
siva”), while still considering the primary and secondary functions (“función 
dominante y secundaria”) of legal texts. They identify six genres or categories 
(Borja Albi and Hurtado Albir 1999: 156), based on the typology of legal texts pro-
posed by Borja Albi (1998). In their classification, the factors determining the 
communicative situation are the sender (“emisor”), the receiver (“receptor”), the 
register (“tono”), the mode (“modo”), and the purpose (“finalidad”), while the pos-
sible functions are instructive (“instructiva”), argumentative (“argumentativa”), 
explanatory (“expositiva”), and other, unspecified functions. Each of the six re-
sulting categories contains a range of genres for English and Spanish, and some 
of the English genres are reported in brackets: i) normative texts (“textos nor-
mativos”; acts, statutes, bills, norms), ii) judicial texts (“textos judiciales”; writs 
of summons, acknowledgment of service, claims, pleadings, judgments, orders, 
injunctions), iii) jurisprudence (“jurisprudencia”; legal judgments recorded in 
Law Reports), iv) works of reference (“obras de referencia”; dictionaries, ency-
clopedias, templates), v) scholarly texts (“textos docrinales”; textbooks, manuals, 
casebooks), and vi) public and private texts for the application of law (“textos de 
aplicación del derecho (públicos y privados)”; contracts, wills, legal briefs, deeds). 
The expressed aim of this typology is to lay the basis for a critical comparison 
of British and Spanish legal genres, which is necessary in the teaching-learning 
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process of English-Spanish legal translation. However, this typology is particu-
larly interesting in that it is more detailed than the classifications mentioned so 
far and in that it considers “jurisprudence” as a separate genre.
Cavagnoli (2008: 289–291) proposes two possible classifications of legal texts, 
one based on text types (“classificazione di testi giuridici per tipologia testuale”) 
and the other based on the topic (“classificazione di testi giuridici per argomen-
to”) or, in other words, the relevant branch of law. The topic-based classification 
is reproduced in Table 1.
Public law Private law International and EU law
Constitutional law
Administrative law
• general part
• special part (environment, 
energy, law enforcement…)
Fiscal law
Civil law
– family
– succession
– ownership/law of property
– obligations
Employment law
Commercial law
Criminal procedural law
EU law
Public international law
Private international law
Criminal law
• general part
• special part (offences)
Criminal procedural law
Table 1. Cavagnoli’s (2008: 291, my translation) classification of legal texts based on topic.
With regard to Table 1, two remarks can be made. The first is that the subfields 
included in the columns on public law and private law are closely related to the 
Italian legal system and thus reflect the typical distinction made in this specific 
national context. The second remark is that, as Cavagnoli (2008: 291) herself ad-
mits, although this classification is simpler and more clear-cut compared to the 
classifications that take other criteria into account (such as her own alternative 
classification based on text types), it is of little help to both legal practitioners and 
legal linguists. This is in line with the view expressed by Trosborg (1997: 24) on 
the of limited relevance of the subject matter as a classification criterion (see Sec-
tion 3.1). However, for the purposes of this work, it is interesting to notice that 
Cavagnoli recognizes that judgments cannot be matched with one single topic 
presented in the Table but are rather spread across various categories.
Drawing on the work carried out by numerous scholars, and in particular by 
Mortara Garavelli (2001), Cavagnoli starts by affirming that legal texts can be 
divided on the basis of their function into three groups: normative texts, inter-
pretative texts, and applicative texts. Though recognizing that, as in any other 
classification, there are many cases in which the functions of a text overlap (Cav-
agnoli 2008: 289), she keeps this tripartite model and further groups different 
text types under the three headings, as shown in Table 2.
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Normative texts Applicative texts (praxis)
Interpretative texts 
(legal doctrine)
Ø	 Laws
Ø	 Legally binding acts
Ø	 Codes of practice
Ø	 International and 
supranational rules
Ø	 Procedural acts
Ø	 Pre-procedural acts
Ø	 Appeals
ï Judgments
Ø	 Textbooks
Ø	Monographs
Ø	 Conference proceedings
Ø	 Articles in scientific journals
Ø	 Essays
Ø	 Legal commentaries
Ø	 Preparatory texts for laws
Ø	 Notes to judgments
ð
Ø	 Contracts, obligations
Ø	 Administrative acts
Table 2. Cavagnoli’s classification (2008: 291, my translation) of legal texts based on text types.
Two other scholars in translation studies who concentrate on legal English and 
are interested in the notion of “genre” are Alcaraz Varó and Hughes (2002). Ac-
cording to them, a genre is “each of the specific classes of texts characteristic of a 
given scientific community or professional group and distinguished from each 
other by certain features of vocabulary, form and style, which are wholly func-
tion-specific and conventional in nature” (Alcaraz Varó and Hughes 2002: 101). 
Their interest in the notion of genre stems from its relevance for the theory and 
practice of specialised translation, given their belief that “[t]he identification of 
genre is of great assistance to translators since it helps them focus on the particu-
lar needs and functions being catered for in a given original, and to look further 
and deeper into the nature of the particular texts they are dealing with” (Alcaraz 
Varó and Hughes 2002: 103). The relationship between genre and translation is of 
little concern here and the scholars do not provide a classification as systematic 
as the ones discussed above. However, they offer further evidence of the termi-
nological uncertainty depicted by Kurzon by affirming that “[b]y ‘genre,’ or ‘text 
type’, we mean each of the specific classes of text characteristic of a given sci-
entific community or professional group and distinguished from each other by 
certain features of vocabulary, form and style, which are wholly function-specific 
and conventional in nature” (Alcaraz Varó and Hughes 2002: 101). In their work, 
“genre” and “text type” are thus used interchangeably, a standpoint which is not 
shared by many scholars, such as Borja Albi (2007: 142–143). However, two points 
are worth mentioning. The first is that, while Alcaraz Varó and Hughes are in line 
with some previous authors in considering both written and oral genres, they 
also include what they call “legal English in popular fiction” in their analysis, i.e. 
“the fictional representation of the law commonly found in popular novels of the 
detective story or thriller type” (Alcaraz Varó and Hughes 2002: 149), which is not 
considered a prototypical legal genre.3 The second point is that, in their review 
3 For instance, Vegara Fabregat (2006) also includes legal fiction as a genre in the macrocatego-
ry of legal texts. However, this is in stark contrast with the position held by Sacco (1992: 490), 
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and discussion of legal genres, which is addressed at trainees in legal translation, 
they deal with law reports and judgments separately, although they recognize 
a high degree of similarity between the two genres. Furthermore, they make a 
distinction – though implicitly – between sub-genres of judgments based on the 
topic (in particular, they mention “divorce judgements, debt judgements, judge-
ments in default, judgements on appeal” (Alcaraz Varó and Hughes: 2002 101).
The last translation studies scholar who deals with legal language and legal 
translation mentioned here is Cao (2009: 415). According to her, legal transla-
tion is “a type of specialist or technical translation, a translational activity that 
involves a special language use, that is, language in a legal context” (Cao 2009: 
415). This language goes beyond what she calls “language of the law” and also 
includes “the language about the law” and “the language used in other legal com-
municative situations”.
3.3 ECtHR judgments as a text genre
As discussed above, many different classifications of legal language(s) have been 
proposed and they are based on various sets of criteria. Judgments, which have 
always resisted classification on the basis of either subject matter or function, 
occupy different positions in them. In this section, a closer look is taken at the 
judgments delivered by the ECtHR considered as a legal genre. 
Generally speaking, it can be said that judgments as a text genre have been 
studied by two groups of authors. The first, numerically larger, group includes 
scholars that analyse judgments passed by national judicial authorities. Within 
this group, authors can be found who concentrate on one legal system and thus 
on one language only (see, for instance, Ondelli 2006; Vázquez-Orta 2010, 2013) 
and authors who conduct contrastive analyses (see, for instance, Alcaraz Varó 
and Hughes 2002; Goźdź Roszkowski and Pontrandolfo 2013; Pontrandolfo 2011, 
2016; Rega 1997; Scarpa and Riley 1999). The second group comprises authors 
interested in judgments delivered by international and supranational courts. 
Most of the studies belonging to this group are about the case-law of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice (ECJ). Indeed, the literature on ECJ judgments is vast and 
focuses on various interrelated linguistic aspects like the relationship between 
law and language in the production of ECJ case-law (Berteloot 2000; McAuliffe 
2011, 2013a; Sousa Domingues 2017), multilingualism (Łachacz and Mańko 2013; 
McAuliffe 2012; Paunio 2013; Wright 2018) and translation (McAuliffe 2008, 
2009; Mulders 2008) at the ECJ. However, despite such abundance, research on 
the linguistic (i.e. textual, terminological, phraseological, stylistic, etc.) features 
who believes that the techniques used to translate legal fiction may significantly differ from the 
techniques used in proper legal translation. 
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of ECJ case-law still seems limited (see, for instance, the studies by Ioriatti Ferrari 
2014; Jopek-Bosiacka 2013; Trklja 2017, 2018).
Within the research on international and supranational case-law, the linguis-
tic studies carried out on the judgments rendered by the ECtHR can be consid-
ered even more peripheral than those focussing on ECJ judgments. As already 
mentioned, the present work intends to contribute to the efforts in this research 
field by shedding light on some linguistic features of the judgments delivered 
by the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR. To do so, these judgments are considered 
as a legal genre following the multidimensional approach adopted by the GENTT 
research group4. According to this group, “genre is conceived as a notion that in-
cludes formal aspects (conventionalised forms), sociocultural aspects (social oc-
casions) and cognitive aspects (purposes of the participants)” (Borja Albi 2013: 
36). In this regard, it is worth noting that the GENTT group recognises that “both 
the intrinsic complexity and variation of genres from one culture to another 
sometimes make it difficult to establish the limits of a genre” (Borja Albi et al. 
2009: 62), an aspect that emerges clearly in contrastive studies on national case-
law. However, the texts examined in this work are produced by a judicial body 
which is not national. This has several consequences. In the work of the ECtHR 
at least two cultural and legal layers interplay, i.e. the supranational and the na-
tional layer. In other words, the ECtHR is called upon to solve legal disputes in the 
light of supranational law, which is the expression of a shared, negotiated inten-
tion or, in other words, compromise. This, however, does not occur in a cultural 
or legal vacuum, but rather on a nation-bound cultural and legal substratum that 
belongs to the single States involved. The resulting judgments are therefore to be 
considered as a genre, but the set of elements characterising them is not linked 
to a traditionally conceived nation-bound culture, but rather to a “compromise 
culture”, in our case, the shared European culture of human rights. On this basis, 
the model of genre analysis proposed by the GENTT group for translation pur-
poses is considered as providing a suitable framework for describing the judg-
ments rendered by the ECtHR, although with minor adjustments. 
The “genre characterization system” proposed by the GENTT group (Borja Albi 
et al. 2009: 65) was developed as the starting point in the methodology for the or-
ganization of doctoral research in specialized translation. It comprises the seven 
blocks of data presented in Table 3. 
4 The GENTT (Géneros Textuales para la Traducción/Textual Genres for Translation) group is a 
research group of the Department of Translation and Communication at Universitat Jaume I, 
Castellón de la Plana, Spain. It is directed by Isabel García-Izquierdo. More information can be 
found on www.gentt.uji.es (accessed 25/06/2019).
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1. GENRE Denomination in the different working languages
2. SUBGENRE If applicable
3. COMMUNICATIVE SITUATION Register: socio-professional field, mode, level of formality; 
participants: sender(s), receiver(s); and function
4. FORMAL ISSUES Grammatical cohesion (connectors, metadiscursive ele-
ments, collocations, deixis, ellipsis, etc.); Lexical cohesion 
(terminology, phraseology, semantic fields, etc.). Includes 
contrastive aspects
5. MACRO-STRUCTURE Identification of the fundamental parts of the text, of the 
moves
6. RELATION TO OTHER GENRES Systems of genres, Bazerman (1994)
7. COMMENTS Bibliographical references, interesting websites, etc.
 
Table 3. GENTT genre characterization template (Borja Albi et al. 2009: 65).
The sections devoted to “genre” and “subgenre” are briefly discussed below, while 
the “communicative situation” and the “macro-structure” are subjected to a more 
in-depth examination in Sections 3.4 and 3.5. The “formal issues” and the last two 
sections in the GENTT template (“relation to other genres” and “comments”) are 
not considered relevant for the purposes of this work.
3.3.1 The genre and sub-genre of ECtHR Grand Chamber judgments
On the basis of the GENTT genre characterization template, the texts used to 
compile the corpus described in Section 5.1.5 can be said to belong to the genre 
“judgment”, which is a “conventional denomination of the genre” (Borja Albi et 
al. 2009: 65). The first section can be divided into sub-genres and, given the ex-
amples provided by the authors of the template, this sub-categorisation is made 
on the basis of the topic and purpose of the genre (the authors give sales agree-
ment, licence agreement, and franchising agreement as examples of sub-genres 
of “agreement”). 
In the case of ECtHR judgments, the sub-genre may be identified by applying 
two criteria which, however, may overlap with some of the aspects included in 
the communicative situation. In particular, one possible way of identifying sub-
genres may be to consider the judicial formation delivering the judgment. In this 
way, three possible sub-genres could be established, i.e. judgments rendered by 
Committees, Chambers, or the Grand Chamber. In this regard, it must be noted 
that the ECtHR can also sit also in a single-judge formation (see Section 1.5); the 
judge in this case does not pass a judgment but rather declares an application 
inadmissible. Another possible way of identifying sub-genres could be that of 
considering the Article(s) of the European Convention on Human Rights that the 
respondent State has allegedly violated.
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While the communicative situation may be considered invariable in all the 
resulting sub-genres, these two criteria can determine differences in the formal 
features of the sub-genres, especially as regards terminology, given that the Ar-
ticles of the Convention deal with specific rights (e.g. right to life, prohibition 
of torture, right to liberty and security, just to name a few). As is further illus-
trated in Section 5.1.4 on the text selection criteria for the corpus used for the 
present study, the sub-genre considered consists in the judgments rendered by 
the Grand Chamber only for the alleged violation of Articles 6, 7, or 8 of the ECHR. 
Therefore, the information provided in the following subsections is limited to 
this sub-genre and is not meant to describe other ECtHR judgments.
3.4 The communicative situation of ECtHR Grand Chamber judgments
The communicative situation section of the GENTT genre characterization tem-
plate gathers data that can be subsumed under three subheadings, namely reg-
ister, participants, and function. According to the GENTT template, in analysing 
the register three aspects need to be taken into account, i.e. the socio-profes-
sional field, the mode, and the level of formality. In their discussion on the ben-
efits of carrying out research activities by applying this template, Borja Albi et 
al. (2009: 70) provide an example concerning “judicial decisions”, i.e. the type 
of text analysed here. They note that a judicial decision “is produced within the 
socio-professional field of law”; as regards mode and level of formality, all ECtHR 
judgments can be characterised as written and highly formal.
With reference to the participants in the communicative setting, in the same 
example on judicial decisions Borja et al. (2009: 70) indicate that “the sender is the 
court and the receiver is the citizen affected by the decision”. However, based on 
what has been illustrated in Sections 1.1 and 2.6 with regard to the need of dissem-
inating the Court’s most relevant cases and the principles of the ECHR through 
them, this view seems not to fit the sub-genre under examination. Indeed, the 
communicative situation of ECtHR judgments is characterised by a plurality of 
participants. To understand such a plurality, the function of the sub-genre must 
be considered and cannot be simplified as in Borja et al. (2009: 70), who state that 
“the function is to impose a path of action on someone”. The link between the par-
ticipants and the function of the text clearly emerges from Trosborg’s four-dimen-
sional model (1997: 18, see Section 3.1), in which tenor is subdivided into interac-
tional tenor (concerning the relationship between the sender and the receiver) 
and functional tenor (relating to the communicative functions realized through 
speech acts). This link is particularly relevant in the analysis of ECtHR judgments, 
since we need to consider the participants in the communicative situation in or-
der to understand what the functions of these judgments are, and vice versa. 
The “sender” of an ECtHR judgment is the Grand Chamber, i.e. a panel of sev-
enteen judges. This is particularly interesting because it brings us back to the 
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complexity of the drafting process described in Chapter 2. Although the sender is 
the ECtHR in the form of one of its possible formations, this sender actually con-
sists of a panel. Therefore, when a decision is reached unanimously, the sender 
delivers a judgment that expresses a shared view. However, when the decision is 
not unanimous, a degree of polyphony emerges, which may have a direct impact 
on the macro-structure of the judgment, with separate – concurring or dissent-
ing – opinions being written by individual judges and published in a separate 
section of the judgment (see Section 3.5.7). 
The “receivers” of ECtHR judgments are the parties to the case. These are al-
ways States in the case of inter-State applications, while in individual applications 
the parties are States as respondents and a variable number of individuals – in 
most cases natural persons, but companies as well – as applicants. The parties 
have a direct interest in the outcome of the case, and the main function of a Grand 
Chamber judgment, as well as any other judgment delivered by other judicial for-
mations of the ECtHR, “is to elaborate the ‘minimal standards’ in respect to rights 
and liberties protected under the convention and to impose those standards upon 
the Member States” (Garlicki 2009: 396). In practical terms, this means that the 
ECtHR’s task is to rule on whether the civil and political rights set out in the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights have been violated or not. Therefore, the 
ECtHR scrupulously examines each of the questions as to the facts, the law, and 
the practice (administrative or judicial) involved. This gives rise to a full legal de-
bate on the terms of the Convention to be applied (Ost 1992: 284), which is reflect-
ed in the text of the judgment. If, after such a debate, the ECtHR finds that either 
the Convention or its Protocols have been violated, then it grants the remedies 
available under its law, namely just satisfaction, individual measures, or general 
measures. Therefore, in the case of a violation, Grand Chamber judgments have at 
least two main functions, i.e. to declare the violation and to grant remedies.
However, it must be borne in mind that, under Article 36 of the ECHR, in all 
cases before a Chamber or the Grand Chamber third parties may submit writ-
ten comments and take part in the hearings. These parties may be a High Con-
tracting Party one of whose nationals is an applicant; any High Contracting Party 
that is not a party to the proceedings; other international institutions, such as 
the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, the European Commis-
sion, and the OSCE; national human rights institutions, such as the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission for England and Wales and the European Group of 
Human Rights Institutions; NGOs with an interest in the protection of human 
rights, such as the AIRE Centre and Amnesty International; bar associations; and 
participants in academic litigation projects, such as the Human Rights Centre 
of Ghent University and the Human Rights Centre and the Transitional Justice 
Network at the University of Essex. Given their interest in the cases, third parties 
should be considered as indirect receivers of ECtHR judgments.
In the same vein, since “[t]he national courts must realize that both the text of 
the Convention and the ECtHR’s case law are binding on all member-states” (Gar-
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licki 2009: 397), the decisions taken by the ECtHR should also affect the other 
member States that are not parties to the case. It follows that the functions of 
Grand Chamber judgments are not limited to holding that there has (not) been a 
violation of the Convention or its Protocols and, if need be, grant the appropriate 
remedies. In fact, the additional function of these judgments is to contribute to 
the dissemination and enforcement of the principles enshrined in the ECHR and 
of the ECtHR case-law beyond the boundaries of the States directly involved in 
the cases at stake.
The variety of direct and indirect participants in the communicative situa-
tion under examination and the characteristics of the supranational arena where 
this communication takes place contribute to the complexity of the factors that 
need to be accounted for when analysing this legal genre. The cases discussed be-
fore the ECtHR move from a national cultural and legal dimension to a suprana-
tional dimension. This change of setting involves not only reliance on a different 
type of law, but also a change in the linguistic regime, with a shift from national 
languages to the two official languages of the ECtHR. And, given that in most 
cases neither all the parties to the case nor all the judges at the ECtHR are na-
tive speakers of either English or French, the vast majority of direct and indirect 
participants in the communicative situation are native speakers of languages 
other than the languages in which ECtHR judgments are published, an aspect 
that should not be overlooked when either drafting or studying ECtHR case-law.
This aspect can also be related to the possible levels of vertical variation in-
volved in specialised discourse, which distinguishes levels of communication on 
the basis of the senders’ and receivers’ levels of education and therefore on the 
basis of the degree of specialisation. To address this point, Cloître and Shinn’s 
(1985) model may be useful. In their model, the following four levels of scientific 
communication are envisaged: (i) intra-specialist communication (from special-
ist to specialist in same field), (ii) inter-specialist communication (from special-
ist to specialist across fields), (iii) didactic/pedagogical communication (from 
specialist to non-specialist, e.g. pupil, trainee, student), (iv) popular communica-
tion (from specialist to laypeople, i.e. the largest audience possible). When try-
ing to match the participants in the communicative situation described above 
with the levels proposed by Cloître and Shinn, however, some caution should 
be exercised. This is because of the great variety of participants and of the types 
of legal and judicial sources involved in ECtHR case-law. The most apparently 
straightforward way to describe this communicative situation would be to asso-
ciate it with intra-specialist communication, given that the sender is a court and 
the direct receivers are States and/or applicants assisted by their legal counsels. 
Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that the participants may have variable 
degrees of knowledge and that the human rights legal field is not a homogeneous 
legal domain but rather applies to several branches of law and layers of law.
Starting with the sender, i.e. the Grand Chamber, it can be said that it is the 
most knowledgeable specialist in the field of European human rights. However, 
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in order to deliver its judgments, it also needs to acquire the necessary knowl-
edge in the national legal aspects relevant to the case to be decided upon; in this 
regard, some judges forming the panel may be considered, at least at the time 
when the case reaches the ECtHR, more knowledgeable than others (see Section 
2.4). As for the direct receivers, both the States and the legal counsel assisting 
the applicants are expected to be well-acquainted with both the national and the 
supranational legislation and case-law. Once an ECtHR judgment is delivered, 
the direct receivers are also supposed to have no difficulties in interpreting its 
content and recognising the elements in it which are embedded in the national 
legal and/or judicial system, although the judgment may be drafted in a language 
different from the national one. On the contrary, as regards indirect receivers in 
the form of other member States to whom ECtHR case-law aslo applies, the same 
degree of knowledge of the national legal and/or judicial system of the respond-
ent State cannot be taken for granted. Therefore, the presence of elements point-
ing at the foreign national system may consitute an obstacle to communication. 
However, the ECtHR often adopts a number of strategies to facilitate the un-
derstanding of “alien” elements and thus contribute to the dissemination of its 
own principles. Still, despite the use of these strategies, the resulting texts could 
hardly be considered comprehensible for the non-legally educated, which means 
that, although the principles enshrined in ECtHR case-law apply to a population 
of around 800 million, in order for them to be shared efficiently other forms of 
dissemination and mediation should be implemented.
3.5 The macro-structure of ECtHR Grand Chamber judgments
ECtHR judgments follow a formulaic, prefabricated structure, divided into 
sections and subsections. An explanation for such a structure can be found in 
Driedger (1982: 78), according to whom dividing a text into ordered sections and 
subsections “provides a visual aid to comprehension by breaking up solid blocks 
of type; it delivers the sentence in packages, so to speak, making it easier for the 
mind to grasp the whole. It does visually what the reader would do mentally 
without it.” 
Drawing on the general structure models of ECtHR judgments provided by 
Caliendo (2004: 297–298) and White (2009: 3–4), Table 4 below reproduces the 
division into sections and subsections that can be found in judgments rendered 
by the Grand Chamber. This structure model has been developed by taking into 
consideration the judgments analysed in Chapters 5 and 6 and listed in Appen-
dix 1 and contains both the headings of sections and subsections and some exam-
ples of formulaic parts and phrases that are recurrent in each section and subsec-
tion. However, given the limited number of judgments included in the corpus, 
the model does not preclude the existence of other recurrent parts and formulaic 
phrases in ECtHR case-law. 
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Logo
GRAND CHAMBER
Opening 
section
CASE OF XXX v. MEMBER STATE
(Application no. XXX/XX)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
date
In the case of surname/initials v Member State,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:
(title,) name and surname, President,
(titles,) names and surnames, judges,
and (title,) name and surname, XXX Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on date(s),
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on (the last-mentioned) date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. XXX) against Member State lodged with the 
Court/the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) under Article no. 
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the 
Convention”) by no. national(s), Mr/Ms surname (“the applicant(s)”), on date.
2. The applicants (applied to the Court through Mr/Ms surname and) are represented 
by Mr/Ms XXX, a barrister practising in XXX/of the XXX Bar. The XXX Government (“the 
respondent Government/the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr/Ms 
XXX, and by their co-Agent, Mr/Ms XXX/assisted by Mr/Ms XXX, Deputy Co-Agent.
3. The applicant(s) alleged a violation of Article XXX of the Convention/alleged that 
there had been a breach of Article XXX of the Convention on account of XXX/complained 
in particular of a violation of Article XXX of the Convention, as a result of XXX.
4. The application was allocated to the XXX Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the 
Rules of Court). 
[…]
X. On date the (XXX) Government (and the applicant) requested, in accordance with 
Article XXX of the Convention and Rule XXX, that the case be referred to the Grand 
Chamber. On date a panel of the Grand Chamber accepted that request.
X. The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions 
of Article 27 §§ 2 and 3 of the Convention and Rule 24.
X. A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on date 
(Rule 59 § 3).
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the (respondent) Government
Mr/Ms XXX, deputy co-Agent/Co-Agent;
Mr/Ms XXX, Adviser; 
(b) for the applicant(s)
Mr/Ms XXX, of the XXX Bar/Lawyer, Counsel;
Mr/Ms XXX, Adviser;
(c) for the third-party intervener
Mr/Ms XXX, Third-party intervener,
Mr/Ms XXX, of the XXX Bar/Lawyer, Counsel.
(d) for the Government of XXX
Mr/Ms XXX, Agent, 
Mr/Ms XXX, Adviser(s).)
The Court heard addresses by XXX. […]
Procedure 
section
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THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
In case of one applicant:
X. The applicant was born in year and lives in place (country).
In case of more than one applicant:
X. The no. applicants are citizens of country. [For every applicant the year of birth and 
the place and country of abode are specified afterwards.]
[…]
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
[can be further subdivided into subsections]
X. OTHER RELEVANT PROVISIONS
Facts 
section
THE LAW
(I. THE GOVERNMENT’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION)
[can be further subdivided into subsections]
(I. ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION)
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE no. OF THE CONVENTION (TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION 
WITH ARTICLE no.)
(…)
The parties’ submissions
The Court’s assessment
(XX. ARTICLES 46 AND 41 OF THE CONVENTION / APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 46 AND 
41 OF THE CONVENTION / APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION)
A. Article 46 of the Convention
B. Article 41 of the Convention
Law 
section
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT (UNANIMOUSLY)
X. Joins to the merits, unanimously, the respondent Government’s preliminary objection 
with respect to the applicability of Article 6 of the Convention;
X. Declares, unanimously, the remainder of the application admissible;
X. Holds, unanimously, that Article 6 of the Convention is applicable in the instant case 
and, consequently, dismisses the respondent Government’s preliminary objection;
X. Holds, by ten votes to seven, that there has been no violation of Article 6 of the 
Convention.
X. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
X. Dismisses the Government’s preliminary objection;
X. Dismisses the Government’s preliminary objection;
Operative 
part of the 
judgment
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In case the judgment is delivered at a public hearing:
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights 
Building, Strasbourg, on date.
name surname                                   name surname 
(Deputy) Registrar                            President
In case the judgment is notified in writing:
Done in English and in French, and notified in writing on date, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 
and 3 of the Rules of Court.
name surname                                   name surname 
Deputy) Registrar                           President
In case the judgment contains separate, concurring or dissenting opinions:
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of 
Court, the concurring opinion(s) of Judge(s) XXX is/are annexed to this judgment.
initials
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of 
Court, the following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:
(letter) concurring opinion of Judge XXX (joined by Judge(s) XXX);
(letter(s))
(letter) dissenting opinion of Judge XXX (joined by Judge(s) XXX).
initials
Closing 
section
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE SURNAME (JOINED BY JUDGE(S) XXX)
(Translation)
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE XXX (JOINED BY JUDGE(S) XXX)
(Translation)
Separate 
opinions 
section
Table 4. Structure model of ECtHR Grand Chamber judgments derived from the analysis 
of the judgments listed in Appendix 1.
3.5.1 Opening section
The opening section, which is also referred to as the “introductory unit”, compris-
es the logo, “the title of the judgment, the case application number and date of 
delivery, followed by the list of judges composing the Chamber” (Caliendo 2004: 
298). It is interesting to notice here that despite “[a]ll judgments are drafted in a 
manner that allows the identification of the names and the position taken by all 
participating judges”, the ECtHR differs from some constitutional and supreme 
courts in not disclosing the name of the judge rapporteur in the text of the judg-
ment (Garlicki 2009: 396). When the case is to be heard by the Grand Chamber, 
the panel is made of seventeen judges, all the names and surnames of whom are 
listed in the opening section and usually preceded by the relevant title. 
64
3.5.2 Procedure section
The Procedure section is the first section in ECtHR judgments to contain num-
bered paragraphs. It provides information on the parties involved (identity and 
nationality of the applicant and denomination of the respondent State), as well 
as information on their representatives and advisers. In this section, the number 
of the application lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights is 
repeated and the number of the relevant Article(s) of the Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is referred to.
A short form of the designations of bodies, parties and legal instruments in-
troduced for the first time in this section, or an alternative reference for them, is 
usually provided in brackets and then used consistently throughout the remaining 
parts of the judgment, as can be seen in the following example (emphasis added):
1. The case originated in an application (no. 64890/01) against the Italian Republic 
lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) under 
former Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Italian national, Ms Angelina Apicella 
(“the applicant”), on 29 October 1998. (Case of Apicella v. Italy)
The following paragraphs in the Procedure section describe the legal history of 
the case within the ECtHR, i.e. “the proceedings that have taken place up to the 
adoption of the judgment: lodging of the application (and a brief summary of the 
applicant’s complaints); allocation of the case to a Chamber/the Grand Chamber; 
exchange of pleadings (‘memorials’); hearing, if any” (Weston 2005: 452). In the 
cases brought before the Grand Chamber, in the Procedure section the allocation 
of the cases to one of the Sections of the Court and their subsequent relinquish-
ment or referral to the Grand Chamber is always mentioned.
3.5.3 Facts section
According to Caliendo (2004: 298), the Facts section comprises two subcatego-
ries, i.e. the “circumstances of the case” and “relevant domestic law”. However, 
a closer look at the judgments under examination reveals that a further subcat-
egory dedicated to “other relevant provisions” is not infrequent.
In the “circumstances of the case” subsection, further information on the 
applicant(s) may be provided (e.g. year of birth, place of abode), the events that 
led to the legal action before a national court are described diachronically, and 
the legal proceedings before the domestic courts are summarised, as can be seen 
in the example below (emphasis added):
7. The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Italy.
A. The judicial decisions concerning the applicant
8. The applicant was placed in detention on 23 December 1993.
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9. Several sets of criminal proceedings were brought against him, as a result of which 
he was sentenced to terms of imprisonment for, among other offences, membership 
of a mafia-type criminal organisation, drug trafficking and illegal possession of fire-
arms. On 27 December 2001 the public prosecutor at the Milan Court of Appeal or-
dered that the applicant’s sentences be aggregated and fixed the overall term at thirty 
years. (Case of ENEA v. Italy)
In the subcategory on domestic law, the relevant legal provisions of the respond-
ent State are specified. This subsection generally opens with the recollection of 
domestic legislation, which can range from constitutional legislation to ordinary 
laws and from national codes of procedure to regional legislation, such as in the 
following examples (emphasis added):
32. Article 112 of the Italian Constitution provides:
“The public prosecutor’s office has a duty to prosecute.”
33. Article 589 of the Criminal Code lays down that the penalty for involuntary man-
slaughter is imprisonment of between six months and five years. (Case of Calvelli and 
Ciglio v. Italy)
47. Section 39 of Law no. 2359/1865 provided that, where land was expropriated, the 
compensation to be paid should correspond to its market value at the time of the ex-
propriation. (Case of Scordino v. Italy)
15. The allowance for the families of disabled civilians is governed by Article 26 of Re-
gional Law no. 11 of 15 March 1984, the relevant parts of which provide:
“For three years after the entry into force of the present Law, local public health ser-
vices shall be authorised to grant an allowance to families who undertake to provide 
direct care for persons suffering from mental or physical disabilities who are incapa-
ble of attending to their own primary needs and require constant assistance.
The allowance shall be granted in pursuance of the following objectives:
(a) returning to their families disabled people formerly in full-time institutional care;
(b) encouraging the practice of caring for disabled children within the family ...;
(c) socialising the disabled person and improving his relations with those around him;
(d) improving the lives of the families of disabled persons;
(e) creating a favourable environment for the life of the disabled person;
...
The amount of the family carers’ allowance shall be 25% of the daily charge for attend-
ance on persons hospitalised full-time.” (Case of Mennitto v. Italy)
However, this section is not limited to statutory sources of law, since it often 
contains also extracts from case-law. In cases against Italy, these are mainly ex-
tracts from judgments and orders, as illustrated in the following example (em-
phasis added): 
1. The departure from precedent of 2004
22. On appeal from decisions delivered by the courts of appeal in “Pinto” proceedings, 
the Court of Cassation, sitting as a full court (Sezioni Unite), gave four judgments (nos. 
1338, 1339, 1340 and 1341) on 27 November 2003, the texts of which were deposited 
with the registry on 26 January 2004, quashing the appeal court’s decision and remit-
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ting the case for a rehearing. It held that “the case-law of the Strasbourg Court is bind-
ing on the Italian courts regarding the application of Law no. 89/2001”.
In its judgment no. 1340 it affirmed, inter alia, the principle that
“the court of appeal’s determination of non-pecuniary damage in accordance with sec-
tion 2 of Law no. 89/2001, although inherently based on equitable principles, must be 
done in a legally defined framework since reference has to be made to the amounts 
awarded, in similar cases, by the Strasbourg Court. Some divergence is permissible, 
within reason.” (Case of Apicella v. Italy)
 
As can be inferred from the short selection of examples provided, in the “rele-
vant domestic law” subsection references to national law are made in two differ-
ent ways: the relevant source may be invoked and its content summarised (see 
dashed underlined text in the examples above), or extracts of the invoked source 
are quoted in inverted commas (see underlined text in the same examples). Since 
this aspect is recognised as being relevant for the discussion of creativity in the 
language of the ECtHR, it will be further elaborated in Chapter 6.
The third subsection contains – as its heading suggests – other relevant pro-
visions, the variety of which is extensive, going beyond legislative and judicial 
sources, and depends on the case at hand. For instance, in the cases examined 
for the present work, recurrent reference is made to documents published by 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, such as the Third annual 
report on the excessive length of judicial proceedings in Italy for 2003 (adminis-
trative, civil and criminal justice) (CM/Inf/DH(2004)23), the Interim Resolution 
ResDH(2005)114 concerning the judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights, and documents produced by the European Commission for the efficiency 
of justice (CEPEJ). In the same subsection, international legislative instruments 
may also be referred to, especially when such sources were relied on by the ap-
plicants in the domestic courts. One such example are the Protocols Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. As regards the reference method, 
this subsection is similar to the “relevant domestic law” subsection, since it com-
bines quotations and summaries.
3.5.4 Law section
This section is divided into a variable number of subsections according to the 
peculiarities of the case at hand, but its content is entirely based on the provi-
sions of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms. For instance, some of the judgments analysed start with the 
description of the Government’s preliminary objection, followed by the Court’s 
assessment of the admissibility of the application. All the judgments contain a 
subsection devoted to the alleged violation of at least one Article of the Conven-
tion as claimed by the applicant and, where appropriate, a subsection devoted to 
the application of Articles 46 (Binding force and execution of judgments) and 41 
(Just satisfaction) of the Convention. 
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Since the Law section is the part of the judgment that contains the grounds 
for the Court’s decision expressed in the following operative part, i.e. the Court’s 
legal reasoning and argumentation, and given its strong dependence on the spe-
cific circumstances of the case, it is impossible to identify a fixed structure for 
it that would suit any and all ECtHR judgments. However, as a general rule, it 
can be stated that this section contains the parties’ submissions, where “parties” 
includes not only the applicant(s) and the respondent Government, but also the 
so-called “intervening parties”, i.e. third parties which are entitled or have leave, 
under Article 36 of the ECHR, to submit written comments and to take part in 
hearings. The parties’ submissions are then followed by the Court’s assessment 
of every issue raised. It begins by summarising or developing the relevant prin-
ciples from its case-law, before applying those principles to the case at hand. The 
final part of this section contains the Court’s assessment of any damages and the 
costs and expenses claimed by the applicant and the relevant default interest.
In the Law section, the ECtHR’s explicative way of drafting judgments comes 
to the fore in its full expression, since “the main idea is to show what legal norms 
(precedents) are governing the outcome of the case and how those norms (prec-
edents) find application to the facts of the case” (Garlicki 2009: 395). Given that “[t]he 
Court is of the opinion that consistence of its jurisprudence constitutes one of 
the legitimizing factors for its – sometimes quite extensive – interpretation of 
the Convention”, it “always attempts to place its new judgments within the con-
text of the already existing case law” (Garlicki 2009: 395). However, new judg-
ments, especially those delivered by the Grand Chamber, are frequently meant 
to develop, or at least to clarify and consolidate, the existing case-law. It follows 
that in such cases “the Court’s preference is to apply the technique of distinguish-
ment, i.e., while confirming earlier precedents to indicate new (factual or legal) 
elements of the case that allow reformulation of the Court’s position”. Only ex-
ceptionally does it decide to overrule a precedent (Garlicki 2009: 395).
3.5.5 The operative part of the judgment
The operative part of the judgment, also known as the “dispositif” (White 2009: 
4), opens with the standardised formula “For these reasons, the Court”, which 
may or may not be followed by the adverb “unanimously” in accordance with 
the decisions taken by the judges in the panel. The range of verbs that follow this 
formula is rather limited, with the three most common verbs in the judgments 
analysed here being “dismisses”, “holds”, and “joins to the merits”, followed by 
“declares”, “decides”, and “refuses”.
Where there is no unanimity on all the issues covered in the operative part, 
the voting on each issue is specified using the expression “by [no.] votes to [no.]”. 
This brings to mind the fact that, while the identity of the judges is always dis-
closed in the opening section, the information on the votes cast by the individual 
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judges remains anonymous. However, judges are entitled to submit separate 
opinions, which are published at the end of the judgment, after the Closing sec-
tion, which may reveal their vote.
Although not directly linked to the study presented in this work, an observa-
tion made by Garlicki (2009: 396) is worth quoting in full: 
The level of unanimity cannot have any impact on the binding effect of judgments. 
It may, however, influence their persuasive authority: a judgment adopted by a tiny 
majority indicates that there are divergent positions within the Court. That is why, 
particularly on the Grand Chamber level, there is a clear preference for drafts that are 
able to attract a clear majority of participating judges. On the other hand, if the Con-
vention is seen as a ‘living instrument,’ the process of its development must also show 
more dynamics and divergences.
Furthermore, it should be emphasised that the issues to be decided upon vary in 
relation to the case at hand. However, one issue on which the Court must always 
express its final decision is whether there has been a violation of the Article(s) 
invoked by the applicant(s). If the Court is satisfied that there has been a viola-
tion, it may need to decide also on the issue of just satisfaction under Article 41 
ECHR and shall order the respondent State to pay the applicant(s) an amount in 
respect of pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage, any costs and expenses and pos-
sibly interests within a specified period of time. 
3.5.6 Closing section
The Closing section of ECtHR judgments is, again, very formulaic. According to 
the method of delivery of the judgment, two versions of the closing sentence 
that precedes the names and surnames of the Registrar and the President can 
be found. When the judgment is delivered at a public hearing, the date and the 
place of such delivery are specified (i.e. Human Rights Building, Strasbourg), 
while when the judgment is notified in writing, the date and the relevant Rule of 
Court are indicated (i.e. Rule 77, §§ 2 and 3). Both versions, however, mention the 
language in which the judgment was done; since the judgments analysed for the 
purposes of this work were all rendered by the Grand Chamber, all of them were 
done in both official languages of the ECtHR, i.e. in English and in French.
In case the decisions set forth in the operative part of the judgment were not 
taken unanimously, a further sentence is added to specify that separate (concur-
ring or dissenting) opinions are annexed to the judgment and the relevant pro-
visions are referred to (Article 45, § 2 of the Convention, and Rule 74, § 2 of the 
Rules of Court). When there are separate opinions, this sentence is followed by 
the initials of the President and the Registrar.
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3.5.7 Separate opinions
Separate opinions, whether concurring or dissenting, are typical of Grand 
Chamber judgments. Their presence is first inferred from the operative part of 
the judgment and then enunciated in the final part of the Closing section. They 
are annexed to the judgment, with concurring opinions generally preceding dis-
senting opinions. In contrast to what precedes the separate opinions, which, in 
the case of a Grand Chamber judgment, is said to be done in English and French, 
the texts of separate opinions are written by the judges issuing them in either 
English or French. As a consequence, when these opinions are translated, this is 
specified in brackets immediately after the heading of the opinion.
Since separate opinions express the view of single judges rather than the 
ECtHR and are drafted individually rather than by a panel of judges following a 
fixed structure, they are not considered for the purposes of the study presented 
in Chapters 5 and 6. However, on a different note, it is worth mentioning what 
Ost (1992: 284) observed with regard to the reception of judgments containing 
separate opinions:
It is sometimes submitted that individual opinions undermine the authority and 
credibility or the judicial decision: on the contrary, they reinforce them especially if 
the obligation to give reasons for a decision is fulfilled properly and the authority of 
a judgment derives from its intrinsic rationality rather than from an ‘argument’ of 
authority.
The possibility to express a separate opinion is considered particularly relevant, 
since it allows majority opinions to “suffer to a lesser extent from the need to 
reach an agreement with all judges, which might result in vague and opaque rea-
soning” (Senden 2011: 21). Moreover, a difference in style and tone can be noticed 
between majority opinions (mainly expressed in the Law section) and separate 
opinions. Since in the latter judges are “not constrained by trying to find agree-
ment with fellow judges”, the tone is often much more personal than in the ma-
jority opinions (Senden 2011: 21).
In this chapter, an overview of existing classifications of legal language in 
legal linguistics and translation studies has first been presented with a view to 
providing the theoretical background for considering ECtHR case-law as a legal 
genre. In the second part of the chapter, the GENTT genre characterization tem-
plate has been introduced and applied. The aim was on the one hand to elucidate 
the details of the communicative situation underlying ECtHR case-law, with a 
focus on participants, and, on the other, to delineate the macro-structure of the 
judgments, which has been subdivided into seven sections. The next chapter is 
a discussion of system-bound elements (SBEs) as a particular type of culture-
bound elements (CBEs) and serves as an introduction to Chapters 5 and 6, where 
an empirical study on Italian SBEs in ECtHR judgments is presented.
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As stated in the Introduction, the purpose of the study presented in Chapters 5 and 
6 is to start shedding some light on the presence of elements belonging to national 
statute law and case-law in the judgments delivered by the European Court of Hu-
man Rights. These national legal and judicial elements are hereinafter referred to 
as “system-bound elements” (SBEs) and their presence is believed to imply a pro-
cess of recontextualisation: elements originally embedded in a national legal and 
judicial system migrate from their natural context into a different environment. 
This process implies a change in the target audience: while in their natural envi-
ronment the readers are supposed to have a shared knowledge of the underlying 
system, in the new environment the readership is expected to be much broader 
(potentially the whole population of the member States of the Council of Europe) 
and to have a different background legal knowledge. Furthermore, during such 
a migration, when the language of the national legal and judicial system is not 
the same as the language used to express supranational law, SBEs are frequently 
deprived of their original linguistic form and assume a new one in the other lan-
guage. However, despite this change, they maintain a close relationship with their 
original environment and no “legal transplant”1 (Watson 1974) is involved.
1 Please note that here “legal transplant” is intended as the moving of a legal notion, a rule or a 
system of rules from a legal system to another rather than from a country to another, as origi-
nally proposed by Watson.
4 From culture-bound to 
system-bound elements
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This is essentially the same as what happens when a so-called “culture-bound 
element” (CBE) is found during the translation process: by way of simplification, 
it could be said that, unless the circumstances require otherwise, the translator 
should try to make the CBE comprehensible in the target language while main-
taining the reference to the source culture. In the present work, a strong cor-
relation is posited between CBEs and SBEs. More precisely, SBEs are considered 
a type of CBEs. Since the investigation in the field of CBEs has a long tradition 
in translation studies, in what follows an overview of how these elements have 
been defined and classified in translation studies is provided, so as to lay the 
foundation for further discussion of SBEs. Given that SBEs are usually designated 
by terms, a brief overview of what has been written so far about the terminology 
in ECtHR case-law is then provided.
4.1 Culture-bound elements in translation studies: Definitions
The term “culture-bound elements” seems to have a self-evident meaning. How-
ever, ever since the “cultural turn in translation studies” (Bassnett and Lefevere 
1990: 1–13), culture-bound elements have received considerable attention in 
translation studies. This resulted in a remarkable proliferation of studies on 
the topic, which were mainly focused on the possible solutions to the problems 
posed by the need to transfer CBEs from one language and culture into another 
language and culture. Given the abundance of authors working in this area of 
research and the diverse perspectives from which it can be approached, it should 
come as no surprise that there is neither a shared, universal definition of what 
culture-bound elements are nor a single term to refer to them. In fact, in transla-
tion studies a vast array of terms has been used to refer to culture-specific ele-
ments, namely “cultural words” (Ivir 1987: 36; Newmark 1988), “cultural catego-
ries” (Newmark 1988: 95), “culture-specific concepts” (Baker 1992: 21, although 
she also uses “culture-specific items” and “culture-specific words”), “cultural 
references” (Mailhac 1996; González Davies and Scott-Tennent 2005), “culture-
specific items” or “CSIs” (Aixelá 1996; Cómitre Narváez and Valverde Zambrana 
2014), “culture-bound terms” (Díaz-Cintas and Remael 2007: 200; Harvey 2000; 
Schäffner and Wiesemann 2001: 32), “culture-bound or culture-specific phenom-
ena and terms” (Schäffner and Wiesemann 2001: 32), “realia” (Robinson 2003; 
Florin 1993; Leppihalme 2001), “culturemes” (Whithorn 2014: 160; Nord 1997: 
34; Katan 2009: 79), “cultural referents” (Santamaria 2010), “culture-bound ele-
ments” (Hagfors 2003), “allusions” (Leppihalme 1997), and “extralinguistic cul-
ture-bound references (ECRs)” (Pedersen 2005: 2). All of the terms reported seem 
well-founded, but in this volume “culture-bound elements” (CBEs) is preferred. 
The reason for this preference lies in the fact that it allows to avoid the need to 
distinguish between the concept (or the referent) and the terminological unit or 
other form of linguistic expression used to designate them.
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Despite this abundance of designations, Aixelá (1996: 57) notes that “when 
speaking about ‘cultural references’, ‘socio-cultural terms’, and the like, authors 
avoid any definition, attributing the meaning of the notion to a sort of collective 
intuition”. According to the same author, defining these elements may result in 
a slippery activity, since “in a language everything is culturally produced, begin-
ning with language itself” (Aixelá 1996: 57, emphasis in the original). This is in 
line with Tomaszczyk’s remark (1984: 289) that, while only those items which 
represent objects, ideas, and other phenomena that are truly unique to a given 
speech community should be included in the set of culture-bound lexical units, 
“it is relatively easy to argue not just that the boundary between culture-bound 
and universal is a very fuzzy one, but that in fact there is no such thing as non-
culture-specific or universal vocabulary, and that culture-specificity is merely 
a matter of degree”. These views notwithstanding, some attempts have in fact 
been made to develop a definition capable of encompassing the full spectrum of 
aspects that allow an element to be considered as culture-bound. For instance, 
in 1969 Vlahov and Florin (1969, quoted in Ranzato 2016: 53) defined “realia” as 
“words or composed locutions typical of a geographical environment, of a cul-
ture, of the material life or of historical-social peculiarities of a people, nation, 
country or tribe and which, thus, carry a national, local or historical colouring 
and do not have precise equivalents in other languages”. Almost fifteen years 
later, Florin (1993: 122) defined “realia” as “those elements […] in the original that 
are intimately bound up with the universe of reference of the original culture”. 
Mailhac (1996: 133–34), in turn, stated that a “cultural reference” is “any reference 
to a cultural entity which, due to its distance from the target culture, is character-
ized by a sufficient degree of opacity for the target reader to constitute a prob-
lem”, a definition that led to the distinction between opaque and transparent 
cultural references.
In her seminal work on functionalist approaches to translation, Nord (1997: 
34) defined “cultureme” as “a cultural phenomenon that is present in culture X 
but not present (in the same way) in culture Y”. Following Vermeer (1983, in Nord 
1997: 34, and Nord 2000: 204), Katan (2009: 79) described “culturemes” as “formal-
ized, socially and juridically embedded phenomena that exist in a particular form 
or function in only one of the two cultures being compared”, a definition that is 
particularly interesting here given its specific reference to the juridical sphere.
“Cultural references” is the designation used by Olk (2001: 30), who defines 
them as “those lexical items in a source text which, at a given point in time, re-
fer to objects or concepts which do not exist in a specific target culture or which 
deviate in their textual function significantly in denotation or connotation from 
lexical equivalents available in the target culture”. The same designation is used 
by González Davies and Scott-Tennent (2005: 166) in their discussion of the type 
of training undergraduate students should receive to improve their transla-
tion competence in relation to items embedded in the source culture. For them, 
cultural references are “[a]ny kind of expression (textual, verbal, non-verbal or 
74
audiovisual) denoting any material, ecological, social, religious, linguistic or 
emotional manifestation that can be attributed to a particular community (geo-
graphic, socio-economic, professional, linguistic, religious, bilingual, etc.) and 
would be admitted as a trait of that community by those who consider them-
selves to be members of it”. In their view, “[s]uch an expression may, on occa-
sions, create a comprehension or a translation problem” (González Davies and 
Scott-Tennent 2005: 166). 
A different standpoint is offered by Pedersen (2005: 2), who concentrates on 
subtitling and is the first to expressly include the target audience rather than the 
target culture in his discussion. In his view, an “extralinguistic culture-bound 
reference (ECR)”2 is a “reference that is attempted by means of any culture-bound 
linguistic expression, which refers to an extralinguistic entity or process, and 
which is assumed to have a discourse referent that is identifiable to a relevant 
audience as this referent is within the encyclopedic knowledge of this audience”. 
Pedersen (2005: 2) also specifies that ECRs cause what he names “translation cri-
sis points”. The choice of the adjective “extralinguistic” in his designation is no 
coincidence, since “ECRs are expressions pertaining to realia, to cultural items, 
which are not part of a language system” (Pedersen 2005: 2) and thus exclude so-
called “intralinguistic culture-bound references”, i.e. idioms, proverbs, slang, and 
dialects. On their part, Díaz-Cintas and Remael (2007: 200) also emphasise the 
extralinguistic aspect when defining “culture-bound terms” as “extralinguistic 
references to items that are tied up with a country’s culture, history, or geogra-
phy, and tend therefore to pose serious translation problems”.
The definitions surveyed so far highlight different aspects of culture-bound 
elements, but in translation studies consensus seems to have been reached on the 
fact that these elements are linguistic items referring to concepts – in the broad 
sense of the term – that are “so heavily and exclusively grounded in one culture 
that they are almost impossible to translate into the terms – verbal or otherwise 
– of another” (Robinson 2003: 186). As can be noted from the definitions pro-
vided above, recurrent emphasis in translation studies is posed on two aspects. 
The first is the relationship between a source text item and the relevant source 
culture on the one hand and the target text item and the relevant target culture 
on the other. The second aspect, which is inextricably intertwined with the first, 
consists in the possible translation problems arising from such a relationship. 
As Newmark (1988: 94) put it, “[f]requently where there is cultural focus, there 
is a translation problem due to the cultural ‘gap’ or ‘distance’ between the source 
and target languages”. The same idea is also expressed by Aixelá (1996: 58), who 
sees culture-bound elements as “textually actualized items whose function and 
connotations in a source text involve a translation problem in their transference 
to a target text, whenever this problem is a product of the non-existence of the 
2 For a critical stance on the shortcomings of using the adjective “extralinguistic” to refer to 
these elements, see Ranzato (2016: 57).
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referred item or of its different intertextual status in the cultural system of the 
readers of the target text”, but highlights the fact that the source text-target text 
relationship is always to be seen as dynamic. Indeed, Aixelá (1996: 57) claims that 
“in translation a CSI does not exist of itself, but as the result of a conflict arising 
from any linguistically represented reference in a source text which, when trans-
ferred to a target language, poses a translation problem due to the nonexistence 
or to the different value (whether determined by ideology, usage, frequency, etc.) 
of the given item in the target language culture”. Katan’s definition of culturemes 
may be said to be in line with Aixelá’s standpoint: although not focussing on the 
linguistic rendering of culturemes explicitly, in Katan’s definition the need to 
compare two cultures for an element to be considered a cultureme clearly emerg-
es. In other words, to identify an originally innocuous element as a potentially 
problematic one, comparison is key.
4.2 Culture-bound elements in translation studies: Classifications
 
As has been seen so far, much has been said on culture-bound elements in trans-
lation studies. It must thus be expected that, beyond various definitions, several 
classifications have also been developed. The reasons for this abundance lie in 
the selection of different classification criteria, the particular field of application 
within translation studies, and the wide range of elements that can be consid-
ered culture-bound. This aspect clearly emerges from Finkel’s observation (1962: 
112, cited in Ranzato 2016: 53) that these elements “stand out from the common 
lexical context, they distinguish themselves for their heterogeneity, and conse-
quently they require a reinforcement of attention in order to be decoded”. Like-
wise, Aixelá (1996: 57) acknowledges the variety of elements that may fall within 
this category by noting that “[t]here is a common tendency to identify CSEs with 
those items especially linked to the most arbitrary area of each linguistic system 
– its local institutions, streets, historical figures, place names, personal names, 
periodicals, works of art, etc. – which will normally present a translation prob-
lem in other languages”. 
The most frequently cited classification is the one proposed by Newmark 
(1988: 103ff., adapted from Nida 1945), who distinguishes five groups of CBEs, 
namely “ecology” (i.e. geographical features typical of a culture’s homeland, flora, 
fauna, etc.), “material culture (artefacts)” (i.e. food, clothes, housing, transport), 
“social culture – work and leisure”, “organisations, customs, activities, proce-
dures, concepts”, which is further subdivided into political and administrative, 
religious and artistic, and “gestures and habits”. In line with Katan’s broad defini-
tion of culturemes, the fifth category in Newmark’s classification includes CBEs 
that are not necessarily expressed by linguistic means. A similar aspect emerges 
also in Chiaro’s definition of culture-specific references in relation to audiovisual 
translation. According to Chiaro (2009: 156), “CSRs [culture-specific references] 
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are entities that are typical of one particular culture, and that culture alone, and 
they can be either exclusively or predominantly visual (an image of a local or 
national figure, a local dance, pet funerals, baby showers), exclusively verbal or 
else both visual and verbal in nature”. As noted by Ranzato (2016: 58), however, 
while being noteworthy for emphasising the significant visual element in CBEs, 
this definition has the drawback of being limited to a single culture, whereas “on 
many occasions cultural elements may belong to more than one culture”.
Following an approach similar to Newmark’s, Florin first proposes a themat-
ic classification based on the material or logical groups to which realia pertain 
and then suggests two other possible classifications, namely a temporal and a 
geographical classification. The thematic classification includes ethnographical 
realia, which “belong to everyday life, work, art, religion, mythology, and folk-
lore” (Florin 1993: 123), and social and territorial realia. As far as the geographi-
cal classification is concerned, Florin (1993: 123) himself states that “geographical 
categories are obvious”, while as regards the temporal classification, he acknowl-
edges that “realia may be most conveniently divided into the modern and the his-
torical categories” (Florin 1993: 123, emphasis in the original).
Another classification attempt is provided by Gudavičius (1985, as quoted in 
Staskevičiūtė and Baranauskienė 2005: 203), whose scheme combines different cri-
teria and consists of three categories, i.e. things denoting material culture (every-
day life and work realia, specific agricultural work and geographic realia, endemic 
clothes and footwear, national cuisine and musical instruments); things and phe-
nomena denoting spiritual or intangible culture (national dances and songs, folk 
feasts, national folk customs and habits and mythological notions); and historical 
realia (domestic objects, social and political realia, and religious words. 
Nedergaard-Larsen’s classification (1993: 210–211) is also thematic and groups 
realia into four main categories under the following headings: geography, his-
tory, society and culture, each of which is further divided into subcategories. In-
terestingly enough, in her classification culture is considered separate from, for 
instance, history and society, while in most classifications put forward by other 
scholars culture is an overarching notion embracing these fields.
In the first decade of the new millennium, other taxonomies were proposed, 
such as the one by Ramière (2004: 104), who focuses on subtitling and dubbing 
and subdivides CBEs in extralinguistic geographical, historical, and socio-cultur-
al references. Largely drawing on Grit’s classification (2004), according to which 
CBEs are subdivided into historical, geographical, private institutional, public in-
stitutional, unitary, and socio-cultural concepts, Díaz-Cintas and Remael (2007: 
201) devise a taxonomy comprising three main groups, namely geographical, 
ethnographic, and socio-political references. Given its further subdivision into 
more specific categories, the latter is considered, together with Grit’s classifica-
tion, one of the most detailed taxonomies developed up to now.
Although the main aim of the classifications listed so far is to provide a scheme 
capable of including any CBE, it is generally recognised that “exhaustive classifica-
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tion is not feasible” (Leppihalme 2011: 127), since “[t]ypologies of realia as a rule re-
flect the type of textual material examined: realia in a contemporary institutional 
text will differ from those in an 18th century comedy or a television soap opera”.
4.3 System-bound elements as a type of culture-bound elements
The illustration of CBEs in the sections above makes it clear that a wide range 
of elements may fall within this category and that they can be found in transla-
tion-mediated communicative settings as diverse as child literature, audiovisual 
translation, and media interpreting. When describing CBEs as items that come 
to the fore because of the translation difficulties they may pose, the reason for 
such difficulties has been said to lie in the differences between the source and 
target languages and, more importantly, cultures.
The attempts to define the notion of “culture” proposed to date are almost 
countless3 and the purpose here is certainly not to add a further definition. The 
backdrop of the following discussion on the relationship between CBEs and 
system-bound elements are the “traditional” definitions of “culture” provided by 
two translation studies scholars. The first is Larson (1984: 431), who defines cul-
ture as “a complex of beliefs, attitudes, values, and rules which a group of people 
share”, while the second is Newmark (1988: 94), according to whom culture is a 
“way of life and its manifestations that are peculiar to a community that uses a 
particular language as its means of expression”. In the former definition a broad 
term such as “rules” is used, which can be expected to contain any type of rule 
accepted and shared by a group of people, including legal rules. The latter defi-
nition does not contain an express reference to rules, but when identifying the 
categories that can be considered culture-bound, Newmark explicitly mentions 
legal items in his fourth category, namely “organisations, customs, ideas”. This is 
in line with the examples of “cultural elements and systems” that “frequently do 
not match between any two cultures” listed by Bugarski (1985: 159), who explic-
itly mentions law among other elements. Similarly, Mayoral Asensio and Muñoz 
Martín (1997: 144), who deal with “segmentos del texto original marcados cul-
turalmente” (“culturally-marked source-text segments”), maintain that the spec-
trum of items that fall within this category is wide and, among others, specifical-
ly mention institutional names and legal and administrative concepts. Likewise, 
Katan (2009: 79) includes “juridically embedded phenomena” in his definition of 
cultureme, while Whithorn (2014: 161) talks about “legal culturemes”.
There is indeed no doubt that law constitutes part of a culture. In Mattila’s 
words (2006: 105), since law is “entirely created by humans”, it is “always linked 
to the culture of any particular society: it therefore constitutes a social phenom-
enon”. Considering that legal concepts and norms are human constructions that 
3 As far back as 1952, Kroeber and Kluckhohn compiled a list of 164 definitions of “culture”.
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are bound to a specific legal system and that such a legal system is, in turn, the 
product of a specific culture, three conclusions of a very general nature can be 
drawn. The first is that legal concepts differ from legal system to legal system. 
The second is that there are variable degrees of comparability of legal systems 
in general and of legal concepts in particular, depending on the relationship 
between the legal systems and the respective legal families and their historical 
development. The third is that this variability affects the translatability of the 
legal terms used to refer to legal concepts. In other words, due to the inextricable 
connection between a culture and its legal system, the legal terms of each legal 
system are also a type of culture-bound element. However, these conclusions re-
flect the traditional view of legal systems as the product of national cultures. It 
should not be overlooked that legal systems other than national ones exist, with-
in which new forms of legal culture develop, and that nowadays national and 
supranational legal and judicial systems are in a state of constant interaction and 
interrelation. Therefore, in line with the designation chosen for “culture-bound 
elements”, in this work legal terms and concepts that, in a context requiring com-
parison, appear to be embedded in one legal system, be it national, regional, or 
international, are referred to as “system-bound elements” (SBEs).
So far, and especially in Section 4.1, the word “term” has been used several 
times to refer to the linguistic facet of SBEs. This is no coincidence, since they are 
generally designated by specialised terminological units. For this reason, in the 
following section, the literature on the legal terminology that can be identified 
in ECtHR case-law – to our knowledge extremely scarce – is summarised. As illus-
trated below, the role of SBEs in such literature is only marginal. However, on the 
basis of the empirical study presented in Chapters 5 and 6, it can be anticipated 
that SBEs may go beyond what is generally considered a term. 
4.4 Legal terminology in ECtHR case-law
Terminology is considered “the most visible and striking linguistic feature of 
legal language as a technical language” (Cao 2007: 53). Given the difficulties 
posed by terminology to legal translators, in translation studies the body of lit-
erature devoted to legal terminology is extensive. However, academic attention 
has generally been directed to terminological issues deriving from the com-
parison of national legal systems, while leaving “decision-making on legal ter-
minology at international organizations, despite its relevance for institutional 
translation quality, […] largely unexplored” (Prieto Ramos and Guzmán 2018: 
81). Moreover, most research in this field has been conducted on the Europe-
an Union, i.e. the “largest and most multilingual supranational entity in the 
world” (Prieto Ramos 2018: 1), with special emphasis on law-making. Nonethe-
less, multilingual institutional communication is far from being a prerogative 
of the EU and does not concern law-making only. On the contrary, it includes a 
794 from culture-bound to system-bound elements
wide array of forms of communication, ranging from legislative acts through 
judicial decisions4 to informative texts on institutional powers and activities 
meant for the general public. 
One of the first scholars to venture outside EU-related aspects of legal transla-
tion and terminology was Prieto Ramos (2014), who identified three categories 
of terms generally included in the terminology management systems of interna-
tional organisations. These categories somehow show a degree of similarity with 
the categories of terms found in ECtHR judgments, as discussed below. The first 
group of terms in this typology consists in “terms designating shared concepts 
created in the international system and recognized as established terminology 
within the specific scope of competence of a particular organization” (Prieto Ra-
mos 2014: 128). In other words, these terms designate concepts developed within 
the international legal system. The second group comprises “terms previously 
existing in some jurisdiction or legal tradition and borrowed to be used with a 
shared meaning in the international system”. This means that a legal transplant 
occurs, which not only is the result of the recontextualization of the term, pos-
sibly through secondary term formation (Sager 1990: 80; for an example in the 
EU context, see Peruzzo 2012), but may also imply a change in the underlying 
concept, since it may be adapted to the new legal setting, usually through the 
addition of “a new legal layer of legal content to the original term” (Prieto Ramos 
2014: 128). Finally, the third group consists in “terms designating culture-bound 
or system-specific concepts to be identified as such in the international context” 
(Prieto Ramos 2014: 129). The third category in Prieto Ramos’s typology includes 
terms referring to concepts and institutions whose relation with the original 
national legal system must remain evident even when they are used in texts 
produced by international institutions. As in the previous category, the transfer 
from their original context expressed in one language to an international con-
text, possibly expressed in another language, may require translation.
In addition to this attempt to categorise legal terminology in international 
institutional settings, the legal terminology specifically used by the ECtHR has 
also been marginally addressed in the literature. Brannan (2013: 923), who ap-
proaches the subject from an insider translator’s perspective, acknowledges that 
“[t]he legal terminology used by an international court will necessarily be adapt-
ed to its specific features”. In the case of the ECtHR, the factors affecting termi-
nological choices are manifold, i.e. the Court’s “role of supervising human rights 
protection under the 1950 Convention, with the right of individual petition, its 
broad territorial jurisdiction covering diverse legal systems, and of course the 
use of its limited number of official languages” (Brannan 2013: 923). Broadly 
speaking, Brannan (2013: 909) states that the terminology ECtHR translators 
deal with in judgments and decisions can be subdivided into two categories, i.e. 
4 Please note that here the term “decision” is used to refer to any type of judicial act delivered 
by any international court, regardless of the judicial formation, the type of proceedings and the 
purpose of the proceedings.
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“terms that would be used by a national practitioner in the relevant language”, 
and “the supranational language that has evolved in general international law 
or that is specific to the Court itself, being enshrined in its basic texts or case-
law”. Despite recognising these two broad categories, in Brannan’s works the fo-
cus is on the “supranational terminology”, which “transcends domestic realities” 
(Brannan 2013: 911). In his view, this category is not to be seen as unitary, since it 
may contain four different types of terminological units, as shown in Table 5 and 
further discussed below.
Types of terms Sub-types of terms Examples
Supranational terms Convention-specific terms 
– terms that are not used in 
other legal contexts
– terms that are used in other 
legal contexts but designate 
“autonomous concepts”
just satisfaction
criminal charge
jurisprudential creations margin of appreciation
linguistic precedents legitimate aim
generic terms pre-trial detention
National terms civil party
Table 5. Classification of terminology possibly found in ECtHR case-law proposed by Bran-
nan (2013: 909ff.). 
The first type of supranational terms is derived from the European Convention 
on Human Rights and is thus made of so-called “Convention-specific terms” 
(Brannan 2013: 913). The examples provided by Brannan himself are “just satis-
faction” (Article 1 ECHR), “abuse of the right of individual application” (Article 35, 
§ 3 ECHR), and “exhaustion of domestic remedies” (derived from the wording of 
Article 35, § 1 ECHR5). However, since the Convention may be amended by pro-
tocols, it should be borne in mind that these terminological units may not have 
been present in the original version of the Convention. Moreover, this category 
also contains terminological units that exist at the national level but have been 
developed in such a way as to “come to designate ‘autonomous concepts’ that are 
interpreted independently of their domestic meaning” (Brannan 2013: 914). The 
designation “autonomous concept” itself was created by the European Commis-
sion on Human Rights in 1968, when it stated that “the term ‘civil rights and obli-
5 Article 35, § 1 ECHR reads as follows (emphasis added): “The Court may only deal with the 
matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised 
rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final 
decision was taken.”
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gations’ cannot be construed as a mere reference to the domestic law of the High 
Contracting Party concerned but relates to an autonomous concept which must 
be interpreted independently, even though the general principles of the domes-
tic law of the High Contracting Parties must necessarily be taken into considera-
tion in any such interpretation”6. This phenomenon is well reported in Letsas 
(2004: 282–283), who also provides the following examples: “criminal charge”, 
“civil rights and obligations”, “possessions”, “association”, “victim”, “civil serv-
ant”, “lawful detention”, and “home”. On the other hand, the example of “reason-
able time” is given by Weston (2005: 456), who states that the Court may give “a 
supranational or non-culture bound meaning, independent of any meaning at-
tributed by a State’s national legislation or case-law” to terms in the Convention.
The second type of supranational terminological units consists in “jurispru-
dential creations” (Brannan 2013: 916), which are perceived as unfamiliar in na-
tional legal contexts. Therefore, these terms do not appear in the text of the ECHR 
but are rather created and developed in ECtHR case-law. These terminological 
units seem to be rare in ECtHR case-law (Weston 2005: 455–56; Brannan 2013: 
916) and the example generally provided is the so-called doctrine of the “margin 
of appreciation”7.
The third type comprises other terms and expressions that are commonly 
used in ECtHR case-law but are not unknown in national contexts. These terms 
and expressions constitute so-called “linguistic precedents” (Brannan 2013: 
917ff.; see also Weston 2005: 458), and the main point raised by Brannan is that 
they may pose problems both to drafters and translators, since they may not be 
properly used, while their consistency is vital to avoid any problem concerning 
the correct interpretation of ECtHR case-law. The examples provided by Brannan 
(2013: 918) are stock expressions that are expected to be used consistently (unless 
a new meaning is to be conveyed), i.e. “practical and effective”, “legitimate aim”, 
and “pressing social need”.
The fourth type refers to “generic terms” (Brannan 2013: 920), which are used 
because of their capacity to serve as umbrella terms, i.e. to cover a variety of 
(quasi-)equivalent national legal concepts. The preference in this case is to avoid, 
when possible, the use of national terminology, although the resulting term may 
sound unnatural or not particularly idiomatic to a native speaker, and the ex-
ample provided is “pre-trial detention”, with its less frequent variant “detention 
pending trial”.
In addition to supranational terminology, due to its procedure and to the 
macro-structure of its judgments (see Section 3.5), the ECtHR also has to reckon 
with national terminology. According to Brannan (2013: 922), one of the possible 
6 Twenty-One Detained Persons v Germany, EComHR (1968), available at http://echr.ketse.com/
doc/3134.67-3172.67-3188.67-3189.67-etc-en-19680406/ (accessed 22/01/2019).
7 Another example, which I owe to James Brannan (private discussion, August 2019), is “pilot 
judgment”.
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options in this case are “literal translations” and he mentions “civil party” as an 
example, but does not delve further in the terminological units referring to SBEs. 
Given that the latter are the topic of Chapters 5 and 6, the discussion of their fea-
tures is deferred to the next chapters.
The use of all these different types of terminological units in ECtHR case-
law, which may sound unusual to native speakers of the official languages of the 
ECtHR, may lead to a language that can be considered unnatural, bordering on 
the jargon. However, as Brannan puts it, “there are good reasons for using such 
terms, whether to ensure the consistency of case-law and its application erga 
omnes in a large number of States or merely to cater for the pan-European reader-
ship” (Brannan 2013: 923).
This chapter has discussed how culture-bound elements (CBEs) have been 
defined and classified in translation studies and has argued that system-bound 
elements (SBEs) are a type of CBEs. Based on the assumption that SBEs are com-
monly designated by terms, the scant literature dealing with legal terminology 
in ECtHR case-law has been surveyed to suggest that further investigation is 
needed to develop an understanding of the role of CBEs in this legal genre.
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The empirical study presented here is both corpus-based and corpus-driven 
(Biber 2009). It is corpus-based because the underlying hypothesis is that ECtHR 
judgments involving a Contracting Party as a respondent State contain elements 
referring to the national legal and judicial system of that State and thus the as-
sumption is that the investigation of a corpus made of such judgments may re-
veal the presence of system-bound elements. It is corpus-driven, on the other 
hand, because the linguistic information available so far on SBEs in ECtHR judg-
ments is so scarce that the analysis of an ECtHR corpus is seen as a sine qua non to 
unveil the linguistic forms possibly assumed by SBEs in supranational case-law. 
The first step to be taken in this type of study is thus to build an ad hoc cor-
pus. In the following sections, the text selection criteria are first illustrated, and 
the resulting corpus is then described. Given the peculiarities of the elements to 
be extracted from the corpus, a specific, non-linear methodology was devised, 
which is also described in greater detail below.
5.1 ECtHR Grand Chamber judgments: Text selection criteria
The study presented in this volume is based on a monolingual corpus made of 
sixteen ECtHR judgments listed in Appendix 1 selected on the basis of four crite-
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ria: (1) the judicial formation delivering the judgment, (2) the respondent State, 
(3) the time of delivery, and (4) the articles of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights allegedly violated by the respondent State. Each criterion is briefly 
illustrated below.
5.1.1 Criterion 1: Judicial formation
As described in Chapter 2, the ECtHR has a complex linguistic regime based on 
two official languages, and the language of its judgments depends on a number 
of factors. However, due to their relevance and the need to disseminate their con-
tent to an audience as wide as possible, Grand Chamber judgments are custom-
arily made available in both English and French (unlike the mainly monolingual 
Chamber judgments). Given that the aim of this study was to observe the be-
haviour of Italian system-bound elements in judicial texts expressed in English, 
only Grand Chamber judgments were taken into account, leaving aside all other 
forms of ECtHR judicial decisions and judgments.
5.1.2 Criterion 2: Respondent State
The second criterion relates to the respondent State, i.e. the State against which 
one or more applicants submit their application to the ECtHR. Again, since the 
aim of the study was to investigate the behaviour of Italian system-bound ele-
ments in ECtHR judgments, only cases involving Italy as the respondent State 
were selected. This does not mean that Italian SBEs are found solely in judg-
ments against Italy. In fact, the ECtHR frequently engages in comparative law 
analyses in its argumentations and thus needs to refer to national system-bound 
elements that do not belong to the legal system of the respondent State. Further-
more, the ECtHR allows so-called “third party interventions” (see Section 1.7.2). 
It follows that Italian SBEs may also be found in judgments against a respondent 
State other than Italy.1 However, their frequency in these contexts is expected to 
be considerably lower than in judgments in which Italy is actually a party. 
1 See, for instance, the following paragraph in Grand Chamber’s judgment in Rohlena v. the Czech 
Republic (Application no. 59552/08), where Italian loan words and loan words from other lan-
guages occur (emphasis added):
28. It transpires from the legal systems of the Contracting States that there is a need to distin-
guish between two situations, the second of which is in issue in the present case:
(a) a “continuing” criminal offence (trvající trestný čin, Dauerdelikt, infraction continue, reato 
permanente), defined as an act (or omission) which has to last over a certain period of time – such 
as the act of assisting and giving shelter to members of an illegal organisation, dealt with by the 
Court in the case of Ecer and Zeyrek v. Turkey (nos. 29295/95 and 29363/95, ECHR 2001II); and
(b) a “continuous” criminal offence (pokračující trestný čin, fortgesetzte Handlung, infraction 
continuée, reato continuato), defined as an offence consisting of several acts all of which contain 
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5.1.3 Criterion 3: Time of delivery of judgments
The third criterion is the period of delivery of the judgments selected, which is 
2000-2018. The reason for this choice lies in the considerable changes that the 
functioning of the ECtHR was subject to in the 1990s described in Sections 1.3 
and 1.4: in order to ensure a sufficient uniformity of the texts to be included in 
the corpus, only judgments delivered in compliance with the same rules in the 
same period were selected.
5.1.4 Criterion 4: ECHR articles allegedly violated
Finally, in order to limit the number of judgments to be included in the corpus, 
only certain articles of the ECHR allegedly violated by Italy were used as a further 
selection criterion. In particular, in the cases selected, Italy was accused of having 
violated Article 5 (Right to liberty and security), Article 6 (Right to a fair trial) or 
Article 7 (No punishment without law). The reason for choosing these articles 
is that they may all somehow be associated with criminal procedure, a field in 
which the author has developed a certain expertise in previous research projects 
(e.g. Gialuz et al. 2014, 2017; Peruzzo 2013a, 2013b, 2014a).
5.1.5 ECtHR Grand Chamber judgments: Corpus description
By applying the criteria described above to the search function available in HU-
DOC2, the official web portal where ECtHR judgments and decisions are pub-
lished, sixteen judgments were selected (see Appendix 1), for a total of 246,506 
tokens and 8,038 types3. However, the texts that were actually included in the 
corpus do not correspond to the full texts retrieved from the portal. The reason 
for this choice lies in the rigid structure of ECtHR judgments discussed in Sec-
tion 3.5. To be more precise, the Opening and the Closing sections, which contain 
the list of the judges forming the judicial panel and which provide information 
on the languages, the place and date of delivery, and the signatures respectively, 
were excluded due to their repetitiveness and the complete absence of SBEs in 
them. The same was done with the separate (concurring or dissenting) opinions 
possibly following the Closing section, although the presence of system-bound 
the elements of the same (or similar) offence committed over a certain period of time – such as 
the intentional, continuous and large-scale concealment of taxable amounts that was in issue in 
the case of Veeber v. Estonia (no. 2) (no. 45771/99, ECHR 2003I).
2 HUDOC, available at https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ (last visited 29/10/2018).
3 The data concerning the number of tokens and types provided here and further in the chapter 
were obtained by using AntConc, available at https://www.laurenceanthony.net/software.html.
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elements in separate opinions is not to be excluded completely. The reason for 
leaving out separate opinions is that they are handed down by individual judges 
rather than by the judicial panel dealing with the case at stake, so they do not 
reflect the drafting procedure used for the rest of the text of the judgment. The 
resulting corpus thus contains the Procedure, Facts, Law, and Operative part sec-
tions of the selected judgments, whose respective numbers of tokens and types 
as contained in the corpus are specified in Table 6.
Section Tokens Types
Procedure 8,097 910
Facts 82,735 5,638
Law 152,491 5,930
Operative part 3,183 344
Table 6. Number of tokens and types in the corpus of Grand Chamber judgments divided 
per section.
Before addressing the methodology used to extract Italian SBEs, it should be 
pointed out that this study is product-oriented, in so far as it considers only 
the English final versions of the judgments included in the corpus. However, it 
should not be forgotten that, in cases against Italy, Grand Chamber judgments 
have hitherto usually been first drafted in French, which is the de facto original 
language, and then translated into English. Once delivered, both language texts 
are considered authentic and official.
5.2 Extraction of Italian SBEs: Methodology
The methodology adopted to extract Italian SBEs from the ECtHR corpus de-
scribed above combines semi-automatic term extraction with “event templates” 
as developed within the field of frame-based terminology. An event template for 
ECtHR judgments was developed in order to make an educated guess as to the 
main semantic fields (hereinafter “categories”) to which the Italian SBEs in the 
corpus may belong to. Based on the so-devised categories, a list of keywords was 
used to extract SBEs and further search strings in a circular way. The presence of 
Italian expressions in the corpus then required the adoption of an ad hoc method 
to isolate them from the rest of the corpus, which is in English. 
5.2.1 Event templates
The notion of “frame”, defined as a “system of concepts interrelated in such a 
way that one concept evokes the entire system” (Faber et al. 2005, in line with 
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Fillmore and Atkins 1992), made its appearance in the study of terminology in 
the first years of the new millennium, when Faber et al. (2005) recognised its 
potential. Indeed, the notion had already been exploited in lexicology, where Fill-
more and Atkins (1992) laid the foundations for the so-called “‘frame-based’ dic-
tionary”, in which “relationships between (senses of) semantically related words 
will be linked with the cognitive structures (or ‘frames’), knowledge of which is 
presupposed for the concepts encoded by the words” (Fillmore and Atkins 1992: 
75). The idea of such a frame-based dictionary, in turn, stems from frame seman-
tics (Fillmore 1982), an approach to the study of lexical meaning based on the 
research carried out by Fillmore and his team ever since the mid-1970s.
Faber et al. (2005) noticed “an obvious affinity” between frame semantics and 
terminology, given that they apply a similar conceptual organisation to their ob-
ject of study. However, the two disciplines have devoted a different degree of at-
tention to the notion of “frame”: while frames have been extensively applied in 
lexicology, lexicography and syntax,4 the same cannot be said to have occurred 
in terminology and terminography. Building on frame semantics, Faber and her 
research group developed frame-based terminology (Faber et al. 2005; Faber et 
al. 2006; Faber et al. 2007), within which “[t]he specification of the conceptual 
structure of specialized domains is a crucial aspect of terminology management” 
(Faber et al. 2006: 191). 
In frame-based terminology, a conceptual structure is understood as a sche-
matised abstraction which should reflect – at least partially – the complexity and 
the dynamic nature of real-life events or processes. Such a conceptual structure 
represents a prototypical event or process (Faber et al. 2006: 191–192) and can be 
used as a framework to arrange the concepts – and thus the terms referring to 
them – in a terminological knowledge base (TKB). These structures assume the 
form of so-called “event templates” (Faber et al. 2006: 192)5. When designing a 
TKB focusing on a specialised domain, it must be borne in mind that event tem-
plates can vary significantly depending on the knowledge area they are applied 
to and on the degree of granularity pursued. A single, uniform, all-encompassing 
template suitable for any kind of TKB is therefore a mere illusion: a specific tem-
plate needs to be created for each domain or sub-domain. The same holds true 
when event templates are used, within terminology, for purposes other than ter-
minology management, as is the case in this study.
4 See, for instance, the International Journal of Lexicography Special Issue “FrameNet and Frame Se-
mantics”, edited by Thierry Fontenelle, which is entirely devoted to Frame Semantics and, more 
specifically, to the FrameNet project, a computational lexicography project entirely based on 
Frame Semantics and run by the International Computer Science Institute and the University 
of California, Berkeley. For other research in these fields see also Boas (2005) and Martin (2006).
5 Event templates may be intended as “larger chunks of knowledge” (Geeraerts 2010: 222), 
which are also referred to as “Idealized Cognitive Models” (Lakoff 1987) or “frames” (Fillmore 
1976; Fillmore 1985). For an in-depth examination of the differences between Lakoff ’s Idealized 
Cognitive Models and Fillmore’s frames, see Geeraerts (2010: 222–225).
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In line with the prototypical conceptual structures reproducing events or 
processes proposed by frame-based terminology, in this study event templates 
are considered particularly useful in term extraction. Event templates are the 
representation of frames which, as cognitive structuring devices, can be seen as 
a means for understanding language. A well-known example is the typical com-
mercial event, in which the whole scenario is “‘activated’ in the mind of anybody 
who comes across and understands any of the words ‘buy’, ‘sell’, ‘pay’ […]” (Fill-
more 1976: 25). The advantage of using event templates in term extraction lies in 
the highly efficient topic-related vocabulary activation capacity of frames and of 
event templates used to represent prototypical events or processes.
The idea of using backbone structures for the extraction of terms and knowl-
edge-rich contexts (Meyer 2001) from texts or corpora is not new in terminology. 
For instance, in termontography (Temmerman and Kerremans 2003) the search 
for terminological data and their subsequent classification in terminological 
records are preceded by the creation of so-called “categorisation frameworks” 
(Kerremans et al. 2003: 663), i.e. “language-independent frameworks of interre-
lated categories” (Kerremans 2004: 263) which support the gathering of relevant 
information and make it possible to establish extraction criteria (Kerremans 
2004: 268). However useful categorisation frameworks may be, they present re-
lations through glosses in one or several languages, which may seem a drawback 
compared to event templates. Indeed, in event templates a limited number of 
relations is established during the design phase, since the usage of uncontrolled 
natural language is seen as a potential risk: such a leeway may lead terminogra-
phers to create an endless list of relations even when existing relations could be 
exploited due to their affinity. Moreover, although termontography allows any 
type of intercategorial relation to be included in categorisation frameworks, it 
seems more focused on the categories themselves than on the dynamism of the 
process or event in which such categories occur. 
However, by combining the potential of event templates to represent the dy-
namism of a specific process or event with the categorisation frameworks high-
lighted in the early stages of the terminological workflow, event templates can 
be developed which can help the extraction of terminological data from a corpus 
(Peruzzo 2014b: 158). Since SBEs are generally designated by terms (see Section 
4.3), event templates have actually been exploited to extract SBEs from the corpus 
described in Section 5.1.5.
The starting point for the creation of an event template for SBE extraction has 
been the macro-structure of Grand Chamber judgments presented in Section 3.5. 
Indeed, the subdivision of ECtHR judgments into sections suggests the existence 
of a sequence of steps that lead from an initial situation to a final judicial deci-
sion. Therefore, an ECtHR judgment itself could be seen as an event whose main 
phases can be summarised in an event template. In the event template shown in 
Figure 6, the main activities carried out in each phase by the ECtHR and reported 
in the text of its judgments are succinctly described in the light grey boxes under 
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the four headings, which correspond to the four sections taken into account for 
the building of the corpus.
Figure 6. Event template developed for the extraction of SBEs from the ECtHR corpus.
A closer look at Figure 6 reveals that, in reality, such an event template hides a 
potentially infinite number of event templates, created specifically to describe 
the back story of each case separately. This is somehow represented in the two 
dark grey boxes in Figure 6.
In the Procedure section, the steps taken by the applicants to take their cases 
before the ECtHR can constitute an event template of their own, which is in any 
case established by the Court itself, since the procedure to lodge an application is 
provided for in the Rules of Court. 
On the other hand, the Facts section reveals a considerably higher degree of 
variability because every case reaching the ECtHR originates in a national con-
text and has its own peculiarities. The past events recounted in this section could 
be included in an event template of their own. Nevertheless, creating a separate 
event template for every single case was not considered a convenient solution 
for the purposes of this study, which approached ECtHR case-law from a more 
general perspective. The focus was thus centred on the shared traits of the Facts 
section rather than on the specificities of each case. Since the purpose of the Facts 
section is to illustrate the issue of legal relevance existing between the applicants 
and the respondent States, the elements that generally characterise it are the cir-
cumstances of the case and the relevant domestic law. This means that what can 
be found in this section is the following: a review of the facts occurred in the 
member State, the participants involved, the legal provisions allegedly violated, 
the complaints raised against national authorities, and an account of the pro-
ceedings before national judicial authorities. 
Keeping to the event template in Figure 6 and considering what has been 
said about the content of the four sections in Section 3.5 on the macro-structure, 
the most relevant sections in terms of presence of SBEs were expected to be the 
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Facts and Law section, while the Procedure and the Operative part section were 
considered less productive from the outset due to the fact that they are consider-
ably shorter and highly formulaic. These expected differences notwithstanding, 
this event template served as the basis for the identification of the categories of 
system-bound elements that were considered likely to be found in the corpus, 
which are described in the next section.
5.2.2 Categories of SBEs
Given the event template presented in Figure 6 and what has been said so far 
about the procedure before the ECtHR and the Court’s case-law, it shall come as 
no surprise that the first category of SBEs expected to be found in the corpus are 
elements referring to Italian judicial authorities.
On account of the alleged Article violations chosen as a selection criterion (see 
Section 5.1.4), the second category of SBEs contains expressions designating crim-
inal offences under Italian statute law. However, the presence of references to civil 
wrongs cannot be excluded, so this second category is considered broad enough to 
contain different forms of violations of both civil and criminal legislation.
The third category, which is evidently linked to the previous ones and clearly 
emerges from the event template in Figure 6, relates to the references to Italian 
legislation, be it statute law or case-law. Indeed, the ECtHR frequently recalls na-
tional legislation when describing the circumstances of the fact and the proceed-
ings before national judicial authorities, apart from the specific section devoted 
to the relevant domestic law.
Finally, the fourth category envisaged is designed to include whatever expres-
sion may have a connection with the Italian judicial procedure and is therefore 
expected to contain the highest number of SBEs of the four. The reason for iden-
tifying such a broad category is essentially practical and can be inferred from the 
event template in Figure 6: although the applicants may complain about the vio-
lation of the same Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
circumstances of the single cases and the type of proceedings conducted even 
within the same member State are considerably diverse. The specificity of every 
case would thus require the creation of several categories related to different as-
pects of national proceedings, but such a fine-grained categorization would im-
ply treating every judgment as a text in itself rather than as a part of a corpus.
5.2.3 Keywords
After identifying the four categories of SBEs expected to be found in the corpus, a 
semi-automatic term extraction procedure was adopted based on keywords and 
coding (i.e. corpus annotation).
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The coding followed a non-linear progression and was performed by means 
of QDA Miner Lite, a qualitative data analysis tool6. Based on the event template 
presented in Figure 6 and on the awareness of the macro-structure of ECtHR 
judgments illustrated in Section 3.5, a preliminary list of keywords to be used in 
the extraction process was drawn up (see Appendix 2). These keywords were used 
as search words in the Text Retrieval function of the analysis tool, which works 
like the Search function in concordancing tools such as AntConc. Within the hits 
obtained through this procedure, the terms or expressions that were considered 
instances of Italian SBEs were annotated using one of the four codes correspond-
ing to the SBE categories, i.e. “Italian judicial authorities”, “Criminal offences and 
civil wrongs under Italian law”, “Italian legislation”, and “Italian judicial proce-
dure”. This process is considered as non-linear since the hits obtained by means 
of the Text Retrieval function led to the identification of other possible keywords 
to be used to detect further interesting terms or expressions. To make these steps 
clearer, a concrete example is given below.
The first keyword used to detect terms referring to Italian judicial authorities 
was the noun [court]. This word has a very high frequency rate in the corpus, 
given that the judgments it is built of are passed by an institution that is called 
“Court” itself and that a number of different courts are generally mentioned in 
such judgments that belong to different jurisdictions, such as the Italian and the 
French Court of Cassation or the International Criminal Court. A quick look at 
the rough data indeed revealed the presence of 2,065 hits of the keyword [Court] 
(capitalised) in the corpus. Although one of the solutions to identify all the cases 
in which the keyword [court] (either capitalised or not) could have been to check 
every single hit, this option was discarded as it was considered unpractical and 
time-consuming, due to the number of hits of certain keywords (e.g. [proceed-
ings] – 547 hits). Therefore, the first step to speed up the SBE extraction process 
was to combine the first relevant results of the keyword search with the observa-
tion of the co-text and the structure of the judgment. What became evident was 
that the keyword [court] did not work as an element of a term referring to an Ital-
ian type of court in the Procedure and Operative part sections of the judgments, 
while it did so in the Facts section, where both the factual and procedural events 
occurred in Italy prior to the filing of the case before the ECtHR are recollected, 
as well as in the Law section. Taking a closer look at one of the cases included in 
the corpus (Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy), the numbers of hits of the noun [court] cor-
respond to the figures presented in Table 7 below.
6 The software used for text annotation is QDA Miner Lite, v 2.0, available at https://provalisre-
search.com/products/qualitative-data-analysis-software/ (last accessed 25/01/2019).
92
Procedure Facts Law Operative part
Number of hits referring 
to the ECtHR
4 0 19 1
Number of hits referring 
to Italian courts
0 26 8 0
Table 7. Number of hits of the keyword [court] (either capitalised or not) in Calvelli and 
Ciglio v. Italy.
In particular, the next step involved the observation of the co-text surrounding 
the keyword [court]. To show this step, in Table 8 the eight relevant hits found in 
the Law section of Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy are listed.
On 17 March 1994 E.C. appealed to the Catanzaro Court of Appeal.
bringing an action in the relevant civil court (see paragraphs 32-33 above).
made against the doctor by a civil court. However, the case file shows that in
in the civil proceedings in the Cosenza Court of First Instance, the applicants entered in
a judgment in the civil court could also have led to disciplinary action
the case, the caseload of the Cosenza Court of First Instance and the fact that
Furthermore, the proceedings before the Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation had been con-
ducted with exemplary
and ended on 17 October 1995 when the Catanzaro Court of Appeal’s judgment of 3 July 1995 
Table 8. Concordances of the keyword [court] (either capitalised or not) referring to Italian 
SBEs in the Law section of Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy.
In Table 8, the linguistic elements surrounding the keyword [court] that were 
relevant for the present study have been underlined. What can be immediately 
noticed by looking at these concordances is that the co-text provides different 
types of information. The first is that the keywords used may be just one of the el-
ements that constitute a longer expression referring to an SBE. This could some-
how have been anticipated, since in the legal and judicial domains multi-word 
terminological units are more frequent than single-word terms. In this corpus, 
examples of these SBEs are “Court of First Instance”, “Court of Appeal” and “Court 
of Cassation”. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, the expressions recog-
nised as referring to Italian SBEs were retained, while those expressions desig-
nating concepts or notions not embedded in the Italian legal and judicial system 
(e.g. “Court” meaning the ECtHR or “Court of Cassation” meaning the French 
Court of Cassation) were discarded.
 From a methodological perspective, the observation of the co-text provides 
further keywords to be used in the search for SBEs. For instance, strings such as 
[appeal to], [bring an action in], [proceedings in the], and [proceedings before the] 
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may be used to retrieve other Italian SBEs, as in the examples provided in Table 9, in 
which both the search strings and the newly detected Italian SBEs are highlighted.
Case Concordance
Markovic and Others v. Italy 
(Facts section)
No appeal to the Consiglio di Stato, sitting in its judicial capacity, 
shall lie
Markovic and Others v. Italy 
(Facts section)
first four applicants brought an action in damages in the Rome District 
Court under Article 2043 of the Italian Civil Code
Markovic and Others v. Italy 
(Facts section)
brought to an end, ipso jure, the proceedings in the Rome District Court
Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy 
(Facts section)
has not been informed of the outcome of the proceedings before the 
Court of Cassation
Table 9. Examples of co-text used as search string to identify Italian SBEs in the corpus.
The methodology illustrated so far was repeated circularly until the starting key-
words and the search strings extrapolated from the concordances yielded no new 
results in the form of SBEs. However, cases like the one in the first example pro-
vided in Table 9, where an Italian designation is used for an SBE, posed a further 
methodological issue. Indeed, the presence of expressions in the original “third” 
or “hidden” language has been accounted for, though only en passant, in the litera-
ture, with both Brannan (2013: 922; 2017: 107-111) and Weston (2005: 457, footnote 
19) acknowledging that, in case of doubt or when the term plays a particularly sig-
nificant role in the judgment, the original expression may be included in brack-
ets after the translation. However, as the example above shows, original-language 
terms are also attested outside brackets and without being accompanied by a 
translation gloss, and more instances were expected to occur in the corpus. Since 
to our knowledge no software existed which is capable of automatically extracting 
words in one language from a corpus of texts mostly written in another language 
and given that the literature on term extraction and corpus linguistics revealed 
no method that could be replicated for this purpose, an ad hoc methodology was 
devised to extract all the expressions in Italian possibly designating an SBE.
5.2.4 Ad-hoc methodology for extracting Italian expressions
For the extraction of Italian expressions from the ECtHR corpus a software pro-
gramme for corpus-linguistics analysis was used. The software was TaLTaC27, a 
programme for the automatic analysis of textual corpora which combines two 
approaches, i.e. text analysis and text mining. The tool was originally developed 
by the Università degli Studi di Salerno and the Sapienza Università di Roma for 
7 Available at http://www.taltac.it/it/index.shtml (last accessed 25/10/2018).
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the Italian language, but nowadays it can be used to analyse corpora in four other 
languages, namely English, French, Spanish, and German. TaLTaC2 comes with 
built-in so-called “statistical-linguistic resources”, which are meant to be used to 
explore user corpora and consist in lexicons of frequency, thematic or linguistic 
dictionaries, knowledge bases of various types, etc.
Despite its advanced functions, TaLTaC2 fails to support mixed-language con-
tent. Put differently, the software neither distinguishes portions of text in differ-
ent languages nor is able to extract automatically words or phrases in one lan-
guage from a corpus mainly in another language. This means that it is provided 
with no specific tool for the extraction of foreign words and phrases that do not 
belong to the vocabulary of the main language of the corpus. This shortcoming, 
however, does not overshadow one of its useful functions, namely the possibility 
to compare a corpus with a word frequency list. This function compares the rela-
tive frequency of the words in the built-in lists with that of the words in a user’s 
corpus and shows whether a word is over- or under-represented in the corpus. 
The higher the difference between the frequencies, the more peculiar the word 
to the corpus (Bolasco 1999: 223). This function can also be used to identify words 
that are exclusive of either the word frequency list or the user’s corpus.
The comparison function was considered a viable option for the extraction 
of Italian expressions8. Indeed, the linguistic peculiarities of a corpus generally 
come to the fore when the corpus itself is compared with at least one word fre-
quency list of the same language. However, since here the purpose was to iso-
late Italian expressions from an English corpus, the comparison was performed 
between the English corpus described in Section 5.1.5 and an Italian word fre-
quency list (POLIF20029). The software classifies the words in the word list and 
in the corpus into three groups, i.e. words in common to the compared sources, 
words exclusive to the user’s corpus, and words exclusive to the word frequency 
list. The assumption was thus that the Italian expressions in the English corpus 
could be found in the first group, while the two other groups of words produced 
by TaLTaC2 could be ignored.
The ad hoc methodology produced a 788-word list of Italian expressions pos-
sibly referring to SBEs. Each entry on this list was then validated manually to 
identify proper SBEs and discard the inevitable noise. At this point it should be 
noticed that each candidate had to be assessed separately to delete false positive 
results (such as homographs in the two languages, e.g. “assume”) and duplicates 
(mainly due to capitalised and non-capitalised words) on the one hand, and to 
identify possible multi-word units on the other, since the list obtained contained 
8 This methodology for the extraction of loan SBEs has already been presented in Peruzzo 
(2019). However, the results obtained for the present study have been analysed within a differ-
ent theoretical framework.
9 POLIF2002 contains over 50,000 different word forms extracted from POLIF, a corpus of both 
written and spoken samples of contemporary standard Italian of over 4 million words (Bolasco 
and Morrone 1998).
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single words only. The presence of particles such as articles and prepositions in 
the list indicated that the Italian expressions in the corpus were syntactically 
more complex units, such as multi-word terms and other formulaic expressions 
formed by at least two of the words in the list, e.g. gravi indizi di colpevolezza and se 
ritiene di non essere in grado di decidere allo stato degli atti. 
The manual validation of the list allowed for the isolation of SBEs from words 
that do not refer to notions embedded in the Italian legal or judicial systems, 
which were also present in the corpus. Examples of non-SBEs designated by 
Italian expressions are flessioni (floor exercises), opinionista (opinion column-
ist), and poltrone reclinabili (reclining seats). In the same vein, anthroponyms 
and toponyms such as Durante, Abbate, via Botteghe Oscure, and Palazzo Madama 
were excluded. A further category that was deleted relates to the press and other 
published materials (e.g. Corriere della Sera, Il Giornale, l’Espresso, Rivista diritto in-
ternazionale). Finally, culture-bound terms related to the history of Italy were also 
excluded (e.g. anni di piombo, Tangentopoli).
The extraction performed following the methodology illustrated above al-
lowed for the retrieval of 401 expressions designating Italian SBEs, the analysis 
of which is presented in Chapter 6.
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The extraction performed following the methodology illustrated in Chapter 5 
allowed for the retrieval of 401 expressions designating Italian SBEs, which are 
listed in Appendix 3. In Section 6.1 and its subsections, the frequency and distri-
bution of these instances are discussed, while a closer linguistic analysis is pro-
vided in Section 6.2.
6.1 Italian SBEs in Grand Chamber judgments: Frequency and distribution
The methodology presented in Chapter 5 produced a list of a total of 401 expres-
sions referring to Italian SBEs that fall within the categories identified through 
the use of the event template described in Section 5.2.1, i.e. “Italian judicial au-
thorities”, “Criminal offences and civil wrongs under Italian law”, “Italian legisla-
tion”, and “Italian judicial procedure”. At this stage, a terminological clarification 
is called for. So far, the word “expression” has been used to refer to the designa-
tion of an Italian SBE. This has been done deliberately, since the methodology 
adopted revealed from the outset that not all the SBEs were legal concepts or legal 
institutions designated by what most people would consider a terminological 
unit, such as “summary procedure (giudizio abbreviato)”. Indeed, in certain cases 
non-terminological units were extracted from the corpus which however are 
part of the linguistic repertoire of Italian legal experts and practitioners. Exam-
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ples are “on the ground that the offenders could not be identified (perché ignoti gli 
autori del reato)” and “objective situation effectively permitting every individual 
to be aware of the acts in question (situazione oggettiva di effettiva conoscibilità, da 
parte di tutti, degli atti medesimi)”. Therefore, when possible the words “term” or 
“terminological unit” have been avoided. However, in this chapter the word “in-
stance” is preferred to “expression”, and the reasons are explained below.
The word “instance” is used here to refer to one linguistic form or expression 
with its own frequency rate. In the corpus analysed, Italian SBEs are designated by 
either one instance (which is here referred to as “univocal instance”, see Section 
6.1.1) or more than one instance, and every instance has its own number of hits. 
Therefore, the number of instances does not correspond to the number of SBEs 
extracted from the corpus: rather, the total number of individual SBEs equals the 
total number of clusters (i.e. 170) as discussed in Section 6.1.2 (note that univo-
cal instances count as individual clusters). Two examples from the category “Ital-
ian judicial authorities” are provided here to clarify this point. In the corpus, the 
Italian SBE Commissione Tributaria Provinciale is designated solely by “District Tax 
Commission”, which means that the relevant cluster contains only one instance. 
On the other hand, the SBE giudice dell’udienza preliminare is referred to by using 
four different instances, each of which with its own frequency rate (see Table 10).
Instances No. of hits
preliminary hearings judge 15
GUP 7
preliminary hearings judge (giudice dell’udienza preliminare – “the GUP”) 1
preliminary hearings judge (giudice dell’udienza preliminare) 1
Table 10. Instances of the SBE giudice dell’udienza preliminare as extracted from the corpus 
and respective numbers of hits.
The figure 401 mentioned above thus refers to the number of instances extract-
ed from the corpus. However, it does not reflect the frequency of the instances, 
which is in turn expressed as the number of hits (see Table 11).
Categories Instances No. of hits
Criminal offences and civil wrongs 
under Italian law
69 17.21% 151 5.62%
Italian legislation 42 10.47% 682 25.37%
Italian judicial authorities 63 15.71% 807 30.02%
Italian judicial procedure 227 56.61% 1,048 38.99%
Total 401 100.00% 2,688 100.00%
Table 11. Number of instances referring to Italian SBEs extracted from the corpus ordered 
by relevant number of hits.
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A glance at the figures in Table 11 reveals (to no one’s surprise) that the highest 
number of instances and hits was found in the category “Italian judicial proce-
dure”. This is so because this category was intended as a broad repository of all 
the SBEs that have a connection with Italian judicial procedure and that cannot 
be classified into the other categories. Therefore, in this category we find SBEs as 
diverse as the formulae used to dismiss an accused person, the grounds for im-
posing precautionary measures, various types of orders, and so on. 
On the other hand, the category with the fewest hits is “Criminal offences and 
civil wrongs under Italian law”, which, however, is not the category with the few-
est instances. This is so for essentially two reasons. The first is the limited array of 
instances that may fall within the categories “Italian legislation” and “Italian ju-
dicial authorities” compared to the wide boundaries of the other two categories. 
The second is that the ECtHR needs to review all the stages of the case and the 
relevant law, which means that in the judgments references to judicial authori-
ties that have previously dealt with the same case and to legislation both occur 
with a high frequency.
However, a table only containing the number of instances and hits fails to 
really shed new light on the presence of elements with a national origin in the 
international case-law produced by the ECtHR. Indeed, the second step in the 
analysis has taken into consideration the well-defined structure of ECtHR judg-
ments in order to investigate the frequency of SBEs in each individual section of 
the judgment, as shown in Table 12.
Category Procedure Facts Law
Operative 
part
Total no. 
of hits per 
category
Criminal offences and 
civil wrongs 
under Italian law
1 90 59 1 151
Italian legislation 0 368 312 2 682
Italian judicial 
authorities
5 459 339 4 807
Italian judicial 
procedure
10 433 595 10 1,048
Total no. of hits 
per section
16 1,350 1,308 17 2,688
0.60% 50.22% 48.55% 0.63%
Table 12. Distribution of hits of Italian SBEs extracted from the corpus in individual sec-
tions, ordered by total number of hits per category.
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What emerges from Table 12 is that the number of hits in the Procedure and 
in the Operative part sections is almost irrelevant compared to the number of 
hits in the other two sections. Indeed, these two sections account for 0.60% and 
0.63% of the total number of hits respectively. On the other hand, the Facts sec-
tion slightly outnumbers the Law section with 50.22% compared to 48.55%. 
These differences may be explained by considering two facts. The first is that 
the Facts and the Law sections are much longer and richer in terms of types and 
tokens and therefore more lexically diverse compared to the Procedure and the 
Operative part sections (see Table 6 in Section 5.1.5). The second is that not only 
are the latter sections much shorter, but they are also remarkably more formulaic 
and standardised than the other two sections. This explains why the likelihood of 
encountering SBEs in the Procedure and Operative part sections is almost non-
existent.
6.1.1 Hapaxes and univocal instances
The observation of the number of hits per each instance provides evidence to the 
fact that many of the instances identified in the corpus are hapaxes, i.e. instances 
that occur only once in the corpus or, in other words, instances for which the 
number of hits equals 1. As can be seen in Table 13, the total number of hapaxes in 
the corpus amounts to 216, which corresponds to 53.87% of the total number of 
instances retrieved from the corpus.
Category
No. of instances 
that are hapaxes 
per category
% compared to 
the no. of instances
Criminal offences and civil wrongs under 
Italian law
43 62.32%
Italian legislation 16 38.10%
Italian judicial authorities 26 41.27%
Italian judicial procedure 131 57.71%
Total no. of instances that are hapaxes 216 53.87%
Table 13. Number of instances of Italian SBEs that are hapaxes in the ECtHR corpus.
Another interesting aspect is that for more than 80% of the instances retrieved 
from the corpus (see Table 14) at least one alternative linguistic form (e.g. syno-
nym or acronym) was identified. For example, the Italian SBE legittimo impedimen-
to is referred to as either “legitimate impediment” or “legitimate reason for not 
attending”. The remaining 19.20% of instances fall within what is here termed 
“univocal instances”, i.e. the instances for which no synonyms were found. Two 
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examples in the “Criminal offences and civil wrongs under Italian law” category 
are “attempted murder” (for the Italian SBE tentato omicidio) and “concealing a 
body” (occultamento di cadavere), while in the category “Italian judicial procedure” 
we find “precautionary measure” (misura cautelare) and “carabinieri”. 
Category
No. of univocal instances 
per category
% compared to 
the no. of instances
Criminal offences and civil wrongs 
under Italian law
29 42.03%
Italian legislation 2 4.76%
Italian judicial authorities 15 23.81%
Italian judicial procedure 31 13.66%
Total no. of instances that are 
univocal terms
77 19.20%
Table 14. Number of instances of Italian SBEs that are univocal hapaxes in the ECtHR corpus.
Considering the frequency of univocal instances in the corpus and focusing on 
the number of hapaxes, what emerges is that, of the 77 univocal instances re-
trieved, 43 actually have a frequency of 1 (see Table 15). Examples of univocal in-
stances that occur only once are “judge supervising enforcement” (for the Italian 
giudice dell’esecuzione) and “false imprisonment with a view to extortion” (seques-
tro di person a scopo di estorsione). The figures recorded in Table 15 thus mean that 
more than 55% of the univocal instances are also hapaxes and that these instances 
amount to slightly more than 10% of all the instances retrieved from the corpus.
Category
No. of instances 
that are hapaxes 
and univocal 
instances
per category
% compared to 
the total no. of 
instances that 
are hapaxes per 
category
% compared to 
the no. of 
instances
per category
Criminal offences and civil wrongs 
under Italian law
19 44.19% 27.54%
Italian legislation 1 6.25% 2.38%
Italian judicial authorities 4 15.38% 6.35%
Italian judicial procedure 19 14.50% 8.37%
Total no. of instances that are 
hapaxes and univocal instances
43 19.91% 10.72%
Table 15. Number of instances of Italian SBEs that are hapaxes and univocal instances in 
the ECtHR corpus.
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The most interesting element of the data presented in Table 15 is the figure relat-
ed to the category of criminal offences and civil wrongs under Italian law, which 
corresponds to slightly more than a quarter of the total number of instances fall-
ing within this category. This figure may be explained with reference to the aim 
pursued by the ECtHR, which not only decides whether there has been a violation 
of the European Convention on Human Rights in a single case, but also ensures 
that its principles are disseminated throughout its Contracting Parties. There-
fore, while the ECtHR needs to recall the circumstances of the case, the facts and 
the legal characterisation of the events and acts occurred at the domestic level, 
it then reflects on these elements from a more general perspective. This may be 
one of the reasons for specific expressions referring to crimes or civil wrongs un-
der Italian law being used only once in the corpus. Nevertheless, there may also 
be other reasons, and two examples are provided here to illustrate them.
13. In the article the applicant, after referring to the proceedings brought by Mr Caselli 
against Mr G. Andreotti, a very well-known Italian statesman accused of aiding and 
abetting the Mafia (appoggio esterno alla mafia) who has in the meantime been acquit-
ted at first instance, expressed himself as follows: […] (Case of Perna v. Italy)
30. On 9 September 1997 the Florence Youth Court ordered the two children’s place-
ment at “Il Forteto”, pursuant to Article 333 of the Civil Code (Condotta del genitore 
pregiudizievole ai figli – “parental behaviour harmful to the children”), suspended the 
father’s and the mother’s parental rights pursuant to Article 330 of the Civil Code 
(Decadenza dalla potestà sui figli – “lapse of parental rights”), ordered that if the parents 
refused to comply, the decision was to be enforced with police assistance, and granted 
the parents the right to visit the younger son only, such visits to take place on the co-
operative’s premises and in the presence of members of its staff. […] (Case of Scozzari 
and Giunta v. Italy)
In the first example, the SBE “aiding and abetting the Mafia (appoggio esterno alla 
mafia)” is not directly related to the case to be decided upon by the ECtHR, but 
rather contributes to the building of a clearer picture by providing additional 
information to the description of the facts. On the other hand, in the second ex-
ample the SBE “Condotta del genitore pregiudizievole ai figli – ‘parental behaviour 
harmful to the children’” appears in brackets after the reference to a piece of do-
mestic legislation. Therefore, once the content of the article referred to is briefly 
mentioned using the Italian heading and its English translation in brackets, in 
the remaining parts of the text there is no need to repeat the SBE, since recalling 
the reference number of the article is sufficient.
Going back to the discussion of hapaxes and unique instances, the other side 
of the coin is that not all univocal instances are also hapaxes, as shown in Table 16.
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No. of univocal instances 
that are not hapaxes per 
category
% compared to 
the no. of instances
Criminal offences and civil wrongs 
under Italian law
10 14.49%
Italian legislation 1 2.38%
Italian judicial authorities 11 17.46%
Italian judicial procedure 12 5.29%
Total no. of univocal instances that are 
not hapaxes
34 8.48%
Table 16. Number of univocal instances of Italian SBEs that are not hapaxes in the ECtHR 
corpus.
What Table 16 tells us is that less than a tenth of all the instances extracted from 
the ECtHR corpus are univocal instances with a frequency higher than 1. In other 
words, this means that there are certain SBEs that occur several times in the cor-
pus but for which always the same expression is used and which are therefore 
not characterised by synonymy. However, a great variety in terms of frequency 
can be noticed, since twenty-five unique instances that are not hapaxes have a 
frequency between 2 and 10, six between 11 and 20, two between 21 and 30 and 
41 and 50, and one (i.e. “preventive measures”) occurs 109 times in the corpus. 
Although, as already noted, the “instances” as observed in this study go beyond 
what are traditionally considered terminological units, the figures in Table 16 
seem to provide further corroboration to the research findings that have chal-
lenged the univocity principle in terminology, i.e the principle according to 
which each designation should ideally refer to only one concept, while for each 
concept only one designation should be used. In the following section, more in-
formation is provided in this regard.
6.1.2 Clusters
In the previous section, it has been shown that, in most cases, there is no univoc-
ity between an instance and an SBE. In other words, synonymy is a feature of 
ECtHR judgments and more than one instance may be used to refer to the same 
SBE. For this reason, the extracted instances have been grouped into what are 
here called “clusters”. The actual number of clusters created with the extracted 
instances is summarized in Table 17.
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Category No. of instances No. of clusters No. of hits
Italian legislation 42 13 682
Italian judicial authorities 63 24 807
Criminal offences and civil wrongs 
under Italian law
69 43 151
Italian judicial procedure 227 90 1,048
Total 401 170 2,688
Table 17. Number of instances referring to Italian SBEs, clusters and hits extracted from 
the ECtHR corpus.
To understand the figures in Table 17, two remarks should be made. The first is 
that in this study a cluster is conceived as a broad container for instances that 
point to a legal concept, notion or institution belonging to the Italian legal sys-
tem extracted from a corpus. Therefore, a cluster is created only when at least one 
SBE is identified in the corpus. As a consequence, a cluster necessarily contains 
at least one instance, but the actual number of instances grouped under a cluster 
may be variable. For example, only one instance was found to refer to permesso 
di uscire dal carcere (i.e. “prison leave”), which means that the cluster contains a 
univocal instance, while two instances were included in the cluster referring to 
concorso di reati (i.e. “cumulative offences” and “‘cumulative offences’ (concorso di 
reati)”) and five in the cluster for giudice per le indagini preliminary (i.e. “investigat-
ing judge”, “preliminary investigations judge”, “investigating judge (giudice per 
le indagini preliminari)”, “judge responsible for preliminary investigations”, and 
“preliminary investigations judge (giudice per le indagini preliminari)”.
The second remark concerns the conceptual boundaries of these clusters. A 
cluster ideally contains linguistic expressions designating an Italian SBE. Howev-
er, delimiting an SBE from another is far from straightforward and, at any rate, an 
excessively fine-grained grouping through clusters does not appear to add much of 
significance to the analysis. A couple of examples are provided to clarify this point.
The first example refers to a cluster included in the category “Italian judicial 
authorities” which contains the three instances retrieved in the corpus to refer 
to the Procuratore Generale presso la Corte di Cassazione, namely “Advocate-General 
[Procuratore Generale]”, “Chief Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation”, and “Prosecu-
tor General at the Court of Cassation”. The cluster can be considered to have clear-
cut boundaries, since the instances refer to a specific type of Public Prosecutor 
under Italian law. On the other hand, in the category “Italian judicial procedure” 
we find another cluster whose instances do not point to exactly the same legal 
notion, but rather to a series of circumstances leading to the dismissal of the ac-
cused person. These circumstances are expressed in Italian through different 
prefabricated formulae, which in certain cases also occur in the corpus, as can be 
seen in Table 18.
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Italian formula Instance No. of hits
perché ignoti gli autori del reato on the ground that the offenders could not be 
identified 
1
perché ignoti gli autori del reato on the ground that the offenders could not be 
identified (perché ignoti gli autori del reato)
1
perché il fatto non sussiste because the alleged facts had never occurred 1
perché il fatto non sussiste on the ground that the alleged facts had never 
occurred
1
perché il fatto non sussiste on the ground that the alleged facts had never 
occurred (perché il fatto non sussiste)
1
perché il fatto non sussiste, per non 
aver commesso il fatto, perché il fatto 
non costituisce reato o non è previsto 
dalla legge come reato
on the grounds that the alleged facts never 
occurred, he did not commit the offence, no 
criminal offence has been committed or the 
facts alleged do not amount to an offence in law
2
perché il fatto non sussiste, per non 
aver commesso il fatto, perché il fatto 
non costituisce reato o non è previsto 
dalla legge come reato
on the grounds that the case against him 
has not been proved, he has not committed 
the offence, no criminal offence has been 
committed or the facts alleged do not amount 
to an offence at law
1
perché è insufficiente o è 
contraddittoria la prova che il fatto 
sussiste
on the ground that no concrete evidence in 
support of that allegation could be found 
during the preliminary investigation and trial
1
Table 18. Instances included in the cluster “dismissal formulae”.
A similar approach has been adopted for the cluster in the category “Italian legis-
lation”, which includes all the instances used to designate the Italian statute law 
in the form of a Legge, which are illustrated in Table 19.
Instance No. of hits
Law 10
Law no. + Reference 183
Law no. + Reference + Title 4
Surname + Act 28
Title (Act) + Reference 5
Title (Act) 23
Act no. 38
Act 39
Law no. + Reference + Content 1
Table 19. Instances included in the cluster “Law”.
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The focus in this study was on the English expressions used to refer to the Italian 
term Legge and not on the single laws mentioned in the corpus. Rather than con-
sidering all the instances separately, they have been grouped in the cluster taking 
into account their linguistic form, which will be analysed later in this chapter. 
Therefore, the instances included in this cluster point to different Italian statuto-
ry instruments but have been grouped on the basis of the fact that they all belong 
to the same type of legislative act, which in Italian is designated by a single term.
The examples provided in Tables 18 and 19 also help understand that the data 
presented in Section 6.1.1 on the presence of hapaxes and univocal instances in 
the ECtHR corpus must be interpreted in the light of this loose method used to 
assemble the instances into clusters. In fact, what is considered a univocal in-
stance in this study may well be part of a larger cluster if other judgments are 
added to the corpus, while the number of clusters may substantially change if 
stricter grouping criteria are introduced.
6.1.3 Frequency, distribution, and co-text
Another interesting aspect that emerged during the extraction of instances is the 
co-text in which the expressions occur. As seen in Chapter 1, the ECtHR’s main 
role is to establish whether there has been a violation of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights. To do so, it takes into account different sources of law, 
e.g. the national statute law and case-law of the respondent State, and a specific 
section in the structure of ECtHR judgments is devoted to the “relevant domestic 
law and practice”. Furthermore, the ECtHR reviews the whole case up to that mo-
ment, which means that it refers back to national case-law and, when the case is 
brought before the Grand Chamber, also to prior Chamber case-law. To do so, the 
Court usually resorts to two different methods. The first consists in simply refer-
ring to, for example, the reference number of a statute law or case and, if need be, 
recall the main points relevant to the case. The second method is to give a quota-
tion of the relevant law or judgment, which is not a rare practice.
At close scrutiny, the co-text in which Italian SBEs occur in the corpus can be 
said to fall within four main types: 
(i)   text produced directly by the Grand Chamber, 
(ii)  text quoted from previous ECtHR judgments, 
(iii)  text quoted from Italian sources (mainly statute law and case-law), and 
(iv)  text quoted from other sources (e.g. reports from NGOs, e.g. Amnesty
   International). 
The final texts of the Grand Chamber judgments included in the corpus are 
the result of a drafting process that is far from straightforward. This is so both 
because of the high number of judges composing the judicial formation and of 
other staff of the Court and because of the peculiar linguistic regime adopted by 
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the ECtHR, based on two official languages only. As noted at the beginning of 
Chapter 5, while the English and the French versions of Grand Chamber judg-
ments are equally authentic and valid, the English texts analysed here are trans-
lated from French. This must be borne in mind especially when the more lin-
guistically relevant aspects are investigated, because it means that the solutions 
adopted by the Grand Chamber to refer to Italian SBEs derive from the choices 
made in the drafting process of the first “original” language of the judgment (i.e. 
French) rather than in English.
The only thing that is considered worth noting about the first type of co-text 
mentioned above is that it consists in all the portions of text that did not exist 
before the actual drafting of the judgment. In a similar vein, the fourth type is 
believed not to deserve particular attention and was actually discarded from the 
study, given that the number of hits referring to Italian SBEs in it was overall 
irrelevant and concerned a very limited number of texts included in the corpus.
On the contrary, the second type of co-text could be associated with what is 
generally referred to as “linguistic precedent” (Weston 1988: 687; Brannan 2018: 
178ff.; 2013: 917ff.). The ECtHR needs its decisions to be consistent, and the lan-
guage it uses should also be such that interpretation of the judgments is consist-
ent. A linguistic precedent is a portion of text from previous judgments used in 
later judgments. What emerges from the examples provided in the literature, 
however, is that these portions of text are not always easily recognisable, since 
some expressions simply become stock phrases used by the ECtHR and their 
presence in later judgments does not need to be signalled in any way. Given the 
difficulty of identifying “unsignalled” linguistic precedents in ECtHR case-law, 
in the present study only those precedents that were explicitly marked in the 
corpus through the use of quotation marks were considered.
The quotations from national statute law and case-law are generally provided 
in quotation marks and, when the portion of text is particularly long or when 
it appears in the Relevant domestic law subsection, it is in quotation marks, in-
dented, and in a smaller font, as in the following example:
32. Article 112 of the Italian Constitution provides:
“The public prosecutor’s office has a duty to prosecute.” (Case of Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy)
Reading a Grand Chamber judgment without taking into consideration the 
source of the cited portions of text is thus like watching a perfectly lip-synched 
film: the original language version disappears and the impression we have is 
that those portions of text are perfectly integrated with the other parts of the 
judgment. However, there are also cases where the viewer is reminded that some 
parts of the film have been dubbed. In the first example provided here, an Italian 
term is used to refer to a judicial body.
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21. Article 31 of Royal Decree no. 1024 of 26 June 1924 provides:
“No appeal to the Consiglio di Stato, sitting in its judicial capacity, shall lie against acts or deci-
sions of the government which involve the exercise of political power.” (Case of Markovic and 
Others v. Italy)
In the second example, an Italian term is provided in square brackets after the 
English expression:
17. In written submissions dated 16 November 2001, Assistant Principal State Counsel 
at the Court of Cassation argued that the application for a preliminary ruling should 
be declared inadmissible as it concerned the merits of the claim, not the issue of juris-
diction. He stated as follows:
“The governmental bodies defending this claim have requested a preliminary ruling on the 
issue of jurisdiction, arguing that:
[…]
(b) paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the London Convention of 19 June 1951, which Italy ratified 
by Law no. 1335 of 1955, does not provide any basis for the action either, as it applies to dam-
age caused in the receiving State.
The government seek to show through this jurisdictional issue that the Italian legal system 
does not contain any provision or principle capable of providing a basis for the alleged per-
sonal right [diritto soggettivo perfetto] or of guaranteeing it in the abstract.
[…]” (Case of Markovic and Others v. Italy)
Although the problem of the original language may go unnoticed, the fact that 
the quotations from national statute law and case-law are the result of transla-
tion first from Italian into French and then into English should not be underes-
timated, because these steps may lead to final texts that are different from the 
possible texts obtained through direct translation. Yet, it should also be remem-
bered that translators at the ECtHR are not prevented from consulting the Ital-
ian source text when necessary. However, this is an aspect that goes beyond the 
scope of the present study, which is product-oriented.
After having established that Italian SBEs in Grand Chamber judgments may 
occur in different types of co-text, the question to be addressed is how these SBEs 
are distributed among types of co-text. The answer to the question can be in-
ferred from Table 20. 
Type of co-text No. of hits
(i) text produced directly by the Grand Chamber 2,414 89.71%
(ii) text quoted from previous ECtHR judgments 37 1.37%
(iii) text quoted from Italian sources 240 8.92%
Table 20. Distribution of hits of Italian SBEs by type of co-text.
The distribution of Italian SBEs among different types of co-text is far from even, 
with a clear predominance in the portions of text produced directly by the Grand 
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Chamber, which is ten times higher than in the texts quoted from Italian sourc-
es, and figures that are barely above 1% in the texts quoted from previous ECtHR 
judgments. However, these figures become more meaningful when combined 
with the subdivision into sections of ECtHR judgments, as done in Table 21.
Category Procedure Facts Law Operative part
GC ECtHR ITA GC ECtHR ITA GC ECtHR ITA GC ECtHR ITA
Italian judicial 
authorities
5 0 0 413 8 38 330 8 1 4 0 0
Italian judicial 
procedure
10 0 0 332 2 99 582 8 5 10 0 0
Criminal offences 
and civil wrongs 
under Italian law
1 0 0 75 2 13 58 1 0 1 0 0
Italian legislation 0 0 0 282 2 84 306 6 0 2 0 0
Total 16 0 0 1,102 14 234 1,276 23 6 17 0 0
Table 21. Distribution of hits of Italian SBEs by section and type of co-text (“GC”: text pro-
duced directly by the Grand Chamber; “ECtHR”: text quoted from previous ECtHR judg-
ments; “ITA” text quoted from Italian sources).
The picture that emerges from Table 21 is that, in both the Procedure section and 
the Operative part section, SBEs occur only in the text produced directly by the 
Grand Chamber. As regards the Facts section, 1,102 hits are concentrated in the 
text produced directly by the Grand Chamber, which corresponds to almost four 
times the number of hits in the text quoted from Italian sources, while the num-
ber of hits in the text quoted from previous ECtHR judgments is extremely low 
(14 hits only). In the Law section the highest number of hits is also in the text 
produced directly by the Grand Chamber (1,276). However, in this same section 
an inverse trend can be noticed with respect to the Facts section, since the num-
ber of hits in the text quoted from Italian sources (6) is lower than that of hits 
in the text quoted from previous ECtHR judgments (23). At any rate, the sum of 
these two figures (29) corresponds to slightly more than 2% of total hits in the 
Law section (1,305).
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6.2 Italian SBEs in Grand Chamber judgments: Linguistic analysis
In the previous section, the frequency and distribution of Italian SBEs in the 
ECtHR corpus were discussed. In this section, a more qualitative approach is 
adopted to investigate this aspect, with a focus on the linguistic form of SBEs.
6.2.1 Single-word instances and acronyms
The first feature to stand out when considering the SBEs from a linguistic per-
spective is the high predominance of multi-word instances compared to single-
word instances. In Table 22, the number of single word instances divided per 
category is shown.
Category No. of single-word instances per category
Italian legislation 6
Italian judicial authorities 2
Criminal offences and civil wrongs under Italian law 5
Italian judicial procedure 12
Total no. of single-word instances 25
Table 22. Number of single-word instances referring to Italian SBEs in the ECtHR corpus.
Table 22 shows that, in the analysed corpus, only twenty-five single-word in-
stances referring to Italian SBEs were found, corresponding to 6.23% of the to-
tal number of SBEs identified in the corpus. Of these, it is noteworthy to notice 
that five are Italian words (e.g. “magistrato”, “carabinieri”, “pentito”), while six are 
acronyms. Among the latter, it should be noticed that four actually correspond 
to the Italian acronyms (“CIE”, “CPP”, “CSPA”, and “GUP”), while the other two 
correspond to the acronym derived from the English translation of the Italian 
designation (i.e. “CCP”, standing for “Code of Criminal Procedure” or “Codice di 
procedura penale” in Italian, and “RAC”, standing for “Regional Administrative 
Court” or “Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale” in Italian). It should be borne in 
mind, however, that these are also univocal instances in only four cases, while in 
all the other cases these single-word instances are included in a cluster. In other 
words, the complete designations of these SBEs are not single-word instances, 
but rather longer lexical bundles that, for different reasons (mainly linguistic 
economy), are not used in their full form throughout the text. Two paragraphs 
from Mennito v. Italy are provided here to illustrate this:
10. As the USL did not reply, the applicant brought proceedings against it in the Cam-
pania Regional Administrative Court (“the RAC”) on 2 August 1993. […]
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12. The case was heard on 14 January 1997. In a judgment of 14 January and 4 February 
1997, the text of which was deposited with the registry on 3 March 1997, the RAC ob-
served in the first place that the applicant was not required to challenge the decision in 
issue as it did not contain a refusal to pay the full amount of the allowance. […] 
The single-word instances mentioned above, however, raise a very interesting 
issue regarding the SBEs that were extracted from the corpus, i.e. the presence of 
Italian acronyms and words in texts that are predominantly written in English. 
This aspect is further discussed below.
 
6.2.2 Instances containing Italian words or acronyms
As already mentioned in Chapter 5, in the ECtHR corpus it is not impossible to 
find instances referring to Italian SBEs which are, in whole or in part, Italian 
expressions. In fact, in the empirical study presented here almost one in four 
instances extracted from the corpus (22.69%) is a linguistic form which either 
contains one or more Italian words or consists of an Italian word tout court. How-
ever, in contrast with what has already been acknowledged in the literature by 
Brannan (2013) and Weston (2005) (see Section 5.2.3), these Italian words do not 
appear only in brackets after a translation into the official language of the ECtHR, 
but are also used in other ways, as summarised in Table 23 and discussed below.
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Italian legislation 3 0 0 0 1 0 4
Italian judicial 
authorities
5 1 0 0 1 1 8
Criminal offences 
and civil wrongs 
under Italian law
7 0 0 1 0 0 8
Italian judicial 
procedure
54 4 5 3 2 3 71
Total no. of 
instances containing 
an Italian expression
69 5 5 4 4 4 91
Table 23. Patterns in which Italian expressions are used in the ECtHR corpus and numbers 
of instances per category.
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The figures in Table 23 show that the most frequent case in which Italian expres-
sions are used in the ECtHR corpus (69 instances, i.e. 75.82% of instances con-
taining or consisting of an Italian expression) is, indeed, the one already men-
tioned in the literature. What precedes the brackets is generally considered to be 
a “translation” in the language of the judgment, but a closer look at the instances 
extracted from the corpus is here in order so as to determine what these transla-
tions actually look like.
By way of example, the English expression preceding the Italian one may be 
a word-for-word translation, such as in “‘a manifest error of law’ (evidente errore 
di diritto)” and “‘legitimate interest’ (interesse legittimo)”. In other cases, formu-
lations in line with the observation made by Brannan (2013: 920) on the use of 
“generic terms” can be observed, although in these cases the generic terms are 
followed by Italian specialised terms in brackets, such as in “summary procedure 
(giudizio abbreviato)”, “transfer (cessione volontaria)”, and “alternative measure to 
detention (semilibertà)”. In some other cases, the expressions used in English do 
not correspond, in terms of part of speech, to the Italian expressions in brackets. 
Examples of this are “statute-law is time barred [decadenza]” and “the provisions 
that had previously been applicable come back into force (reviviscenza)”, where 
the paraphrase consists in a verbal construction rather than an abstract noun like 
the Italian term that follows in brackets.
In other cases still, what precedes the Italian expression is more similar to a par-
aphrase or an explanation than a literal (or loan) translation1 or a generic term, such 
as in “persons against whom there is evidence (indiziati)”. As concerns this solution, 
it can also be said that sometimes the paraphrase contains more detailed informa-
tion on the Italian SBE compared to the information provided by the designation 
in brackets, such as in “preliminary ruling from the Court of Cassation on the ques-
tion of jurisdiction (regolamento preventivo di giurisdizione)” and “substantial awards 
of compensation for expropriation (serio ristoro)”, which may be explained in terms 
of background knowledge: while the Italian reader is expected to know what the 
term in brackets refers to, the reader of the English text may need additional infor-
mation to get a clearer picture of the Italian legal and judicial reality.
A preference for paraphrases has been observed especially in relation to full 
phrases (which are here considered non-terminological SBEs) rather than spe-
cialised terms. Examples are “through the intermediary of a specially instructed 
representative [per mezzo di procuratore speciale]”, “on the ground that the offend-
ers could not be identified (perché ignoti gli autori del reato)” and “on the ground 
that the alleged facts had never occurred (perché il fatto non sussiste)”2. 
1 A loan translation, or calque, is “a translation technique applied to an SL [source language] ex-
pression and involving the literal translation of its component elements” (Palumbo 2009: 15).
2 Please note that two types of brackets are used based on the type of co-text in which the SBE oc-
curs (see Section 6.1.3): when the SBE appears in portions of text produced directly by the Grand 
Chamber, the brackets are round, while when the SBE occurs in portions of text quoted from 
previous ECtHR judgments or from Italian sources, the brackets are square.
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The last example, however, could also be used to point out another fact. The 
full form “on the ground that the alleged facts had never occurred (perché il fatto 
non sussiste)” is a hapax and is never repeated in this full form in the rest of the 
corpus, where three shorter variants occur, i.e. “because the alleged facts had 
never occurred” (1 hit), “on the ground that the alleged facts had never occurred” 
(1 hit), and “on the grounds that the alleged facts never occurred” (2 hits). This 
means that the linguistic form following the pattern “English expression + Ital-
ian expression” is not a univocal term but is rather part of a cluster comprising 
more than one instance. Of the 69 instances following this pattern, 54 belong 
to a cluster, while the remaining 15 are univocal terms and hapaxes at the same 
time. This means that they occur only once, and no other linguistic form is used 
to refer to the underlying SBE elsewhere in the corpus. Examples of these hapaxes 
are “offices of State Counsel [Avvocatura dello Stato]” and “‘Notice to appear in ap-
peal proceedings before the court sitting in private’ (decreto di citazione per il gi-
udizio di appello davanti la Corte in camera di consiglio)”.
However, within the same pattern instances were also detected where a va-
riety of English expressions are followed by the same Italian transcription in 
brackets. This is the case, for example, of “on the basis of the case file as it stands 
(allo stato degli atti)” and “on the basis of the steps in the proceedings taken at the 
preliminary investigation stage (allo stato degli atti)” and “refusal of entry (resp-
ingimento)” and “refusal-of-entry measure (respingimento)”.
In the remaining 22 instances (24.18%) in which an Italian expression occurs, 
one pattern consists in the use of the Italian expression only. However, in this 
regard it should be noticed that three of the instances are univocal expressions, 
i.e. “Consiglio di Stato”, “carabinieri”, and “magistrato”. Their use as univocal terms 
allows us to infer either that the Italian designations are considered to be already 
known to or sufficiently transparent for the potential readers of the ECtHR judg-
ments, or that the context in which they are used compensates the possible lack 
of understanding of an Italian SBE. On the other hand, “mafioso”/“mafiosi” and 
“pentito”/“pentiti” are part of a cluster, but a difference can be seen right from the 
outset. The former are used in roman characters and without further explanation 
(the alternative expression identified in the corpus is “member(s) of the Mafia”), 
which may indicate that the expression has already been naturalised in English. 
On the other hand, “pentito”/“pentiti” has not entered the English vocabulary in 
the same way and, in order for it to be understandable, it needs an explanation 
in brackets which, curiously enough, contains the word “mafioso”, i.e. “pentito (a 
former mafioso who has decided to cooperate with the authorities)”. 
The latter example is, in turn, one of the four instances that follow the pattern 
“Italian expression + English expression”, all of which are hapaxes. A very similar 
instance is “latitante (that is to say, wilfully evading the execution of a warrant 
issued by a court)”, where the brackets contain an explanation of the Italian term.
The same small number of instances is shared by two other patterns, i.e. an 
Italian acronym used on its own or an English expression followed by an Italian 
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expression and the corresponding acronym. It must be said, however, that, save 
for the case of “CPP”, which refers to the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure and 
for which the full Italian expression is not given, in all the other cases where Ital-
ian acronyms are used on their own the full expression is given in the form of 
the second pattern mentioned here. In other words, an acronym such as “GUP” 
would not be particularly meaningful to a reader who has no knowledge of the 
Italian judicial system. For this reason, the first time the acronym appears in the 
corpus it is part of a longer string of words, i.e. “preliminary hearings judge (giu-
dice dell’udienza preliminare – ‘the GUP’)”, which explains the meaning of the SBE 
and makes it possible to use a shorter form in the rest of the text.
The last pattern involving Italian expressions detected in the corpus consists 
in hybrid forms obtained through the combination of an Italian acronym with 
English lexical elements. Table 23 shows that this pattern concerns five instances, 
but this figure needs to be interpreted cautiously, since all the instances identi-
fied refer to the same Italian SBE. One of these instances can be considered the 
full form, since it contains both the Italian expression and the relevant acronym 
(“high-supervision (Elevato Indice di Vigilanza – E.I.V.) prison unit”), while the 
other instances are derived forms (“E.I.V. prison unit”, “E.I.V. regime”, “high-su-
pervision (“E.I.V.”) unit”, and “E.I.V. unit”). 
6.2.3 Instances not containing Italian words or acronyms
The most obvious way of making the link between an expression and the national 
system it belongs to clear is to introduce the SBE by using an instance containing 
an Italian expression and then refer to it by using the English expression only. An 
example is the cluster referring to the Italian concept of respingimento, where the 
three linguistic forms containing an Italian element are hapaxes (“refusal of en-
try (respingimento)”, “refusal-of-entry measure (respingimento)”, “shall refuse entry 
(respinge)”), while the other forms without the Italian elements are not (“refusal 
of entry”, “refusal-of-entry measure”, “refusal-of-entry order”). However, using a 
combination of English and Italian elements for a problematic SBE the first time 
it is mentioned and repeating the English element only later in the text is not the 
only solution adopted in the corpus. Indeed, in 310 instances retrieved from the 
corpus (77.31%), a direct connection to the Italian legal and judicial system is not 
made through the combination of English and Italian elements. Yet, this does not 
mean that the readers are left without clues enabling them to match what they 
read with the relevant national legal and judicial system.
A very important role in this regard is played by the section of the judgment 
and the co-text in which a given SBE appears, since they may very well contain 
the necessary information to match the linguistic elements with the correct legal 
or judicial system. The following two passages, which are extracts from Khlaifia 
and Others v. Italy (emphasis added), can clarify this point.
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30. Two other migrants in respect of whom a refusal-of-entry order had been issued 
challenged those orders before the Agrigento Justice of the Peace.
[…]
33. Legislative Decree (decreto legislativo) no. 286 of 1998 (“Consolidated text of pro-
visions concerning immigration regulations and rules on the status of aliens”), as 
amended by Laws no. 271 of 2004 and no. 155 of 2005, and by Legislative Decree no. 
150 of 2011, provides inter alia as follows:
[…]
Article 14 (execution of removal measures)
“1. Where, in view of the need to provide assistance to an alien, to conduct additional checks 
of his or her identity or nationality, or to obtain travel documents, or on account of the lack 
of availability of a carrier, it is not possible to ensure the prompt execution of the deporta-
tion measure by escorting the person to the border or of the refusal-of-entry measure, the 
Chief of Police (questore) shall order that the alien be held for as long as is strictly necessary 
at the nearest Identification and Removal Centre, among those designated or created by or-
der of the Minister of the Interior in collaboration (di concerto) with the Minister for So-
cial Solidarity and the Treasury, the Minister for the Budget, and the Minister for Economic 
Planning. [...]”
Since both paragraphs occur in the Facts section, the reader may expect the con-
tent to refer to the national legal system, and the co-text provides further details 
to confirm this hypothesis. In paragraph 30 in the example, a national type of 
judicial body is mentioned (“Justice of the Peace”) preceded by an Italian place 
name, while paragraph 33 provides even more coordinates meant to guide the 
reader. Indeed, the paragraph starts with an introductory sentence containing 
references to Italian legal provisions, which is followed by their actual wording 
in the form of direct quotations translated into English. From the observations 
made so far, it can be concluded that, while instances containing Italian words 
or acronyms could be easily recognized as pointing to SBEs, the same cannot be 
said for instances not containing Italian elements, which need to be considered 
in their co-text if they are to be interpreted correctly.
By shifting the focus on the linguistic form of the instances not containing 
Italian words or acronyms, the same trend as for the previous type of SBEs can 
be noticed: most of them correspond to a literal translation. However, two as-
pects must be emphasised here. The first is that the English version of the judg-
ments under analysis is a translation from French, which means that the Eng-
lish expressions used to refer to the Italian SBE may have been obtained not by 
translating directly from Italian but rather from French. The second is that, of 
the 91 instances containing Italian words or acronyms analysed in Section 6.2.2, 
only twenty-five are univocal. The reason this is relevant to the discussion has 
to do with what was just mentioned above: in many cases, the Italian expres-
sion is first transcribed and accompanied by its translation in English, while in 
the rest of the text the English “translation” is only used, such as in the already 
mentioned examples “on the ground that the offenders could not be identified 
(perché ignoti gli autori del reato)” and “objective situation effectively permitting 
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every individual to be aware of the acts in question (situazione oggettiva di effettiva 
conoscibilità, da parte di tutti, degli atti medesimi)”. 
However, in the instances where the Italian expression is not transcribed, an 
attentive reader versed in the Italian legal and judicial system would recognise a 
loan translation of Italian terms, such as in the following examples: “lawyer hold-
ing a special authority” indicating the Italian legale munito di procura speciale and 
“District Tax Commission” and “Regional Tax Commission” standing for Com-
missione Tributaria Provinciale and Commissione Tributaria Regionale respectively. A 
less attentive reader, on the other hand, will have to rely on the co-text in order to 
identify such expressions as SBEs.
Another interesting aspect related to the loan translation of Italian expres-
sions concerns the use of acronyms. Indeed, two instances were detected in the 
corpus which are the result of a loan translation process, but they are first accom-
panied by the acronym derived from them, i.e. “Code of Criminal Procedure (‘the 
CCP’)” (standing for Codice di procedura penale or cpp) and “Regional Administra-
tive Court (the ‘RAC’)” (standing for Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale or TAR). 
This solution seems particularly convenient in terms of linguistic economy, 
since the full forms have a very low frequency (1 and 2 hits respectively), while 
the acronyms used on their own occur with a (much) higher frequency (104 and 
14 hits respectively). The number of acronyms derived from a loan-translation 
process is lower compared to the number of Italian acronyms in the corpus. This 
is so because the use of loan-translation acronyms in ECtHR judgments is dis-
couraged by the English Style Manual3, which encourages the use of “the foreign-
language abbreviation rather than an abbreviation based on the translated word-
ing […], provided the foreign-language term (and translation) is given in full on 
the first occurrence (unless the abbreviation is well known, e.g. the PKK, or it 
would be too complicated to indicate the full term, in which case only a transla-
tion/explanation should be necessary)”.
Just like for the instances analysed in Section 6.2.2, it is also worth noting 
that not all of the instances that do not contain Italian words or acronyms are ob-
tained through loan translation: some of them are created through what is more 
similar to a paraphrase or an explanation. This is the case, for instance, of the 
Italian legittimo impedimento, for which in the corpus both the loan translation 
“legitimate impediment” and the more explicit form “legitimate reason for not 
attending” are used. Other instances still, such as “detention pending trial” and 
“pre-trial detention”, could be considered as generic terms, since they convey the 
general meaning of the legal institution but may be applied to any national sys-
tem in which a similar institution exists. Interestingly enough, as an exception 
to what has been described so far, in two instances terms that are generally asso-
ciated with the common law tradition were identified to designate Italian SBEs, 
3 I am indebted to James Brannan for pointing this out and providing me with a copy of the 
English Style Manual (Registry of the European Court of Human Rights, English Language Divi-
sion and Publications Unit (2019), internal document).
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i.e. “aiding and abetting the Mafia (appoggio esterno alla mafia)” and “application 
for bail”. However, given that these two instances have a very low frequency (1 
and 2 hits respectively) and that they are univocal terms, the presence of com-
mon law terms is not considered relevant for drawing conclusions about Italian 
SBEs in the ECtHR corpus.
In Section 6.2.2, quantitative figures have been provided concerning the pref-
erence for one pattern over other possible patterns identified when Italian words 
or acronyms are used in the corpus. In this section, a different approach has been 
adopted to describe the instances not containing Italian words or acronyms. The 
observation of these instances revealed a prevalence of what could be described 
as loan translations over other forms of designations. However, giving precise 
quantitative data in this regard would have meant tracing a clear-cut distinction 
between loan translations and other solutions, such as paraphrases or explana-
tions. This task is far from straightforward and, in many cases, it would rely too 
much on subjectivity. For example, there seems to be little doubt that “prelimi-
nary investigations judge” can be considered as a loan translation of the Italian 
giudice per le indagini preliminari, but does the same apply when trying to describe 
solutions such as “investigating judge” or “judge responsible for preliminary in-
vestigations”? And even more complex cases may occur, such as the Italian SBE 
esigenze cautelari, whose cluster contains eight instances (Table 24).
circumstances warranting the adoption of a precautionary measure
conditions for a precautionary measure
conditions for the application of a precautionary measure (misura cautelare)
conditions for the application of a precautionary measure depriving a person of his liberty
grounds for decisions ordering precautionary measures
grounds for imposing precautionary measures
grounds for precautionary measures
serious need for precautionary measures
Table 24. Instances in the cluster referring to esigenze cautelari.
Without going into too much detail, suffice to say that in Italian the terminologi-
cal unit consists of two words, while in the ECtHR corpus English solutions that 
are much longer were discovered. Of these, only one instance contains an Ital-
ian expression, which, however, refers to only one of the conceptual elements 
included in the SBE. Therefore, here and in the other instances included in the 
cluster, a loan translation (i.e. “precautionary measure”) is used for one element 
only, while the remaining parts of the English expressions contain in most cases 
explanatory language.
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6.3 Secondary term formation and stipulative correspondence 
Regardless of the different labels that can be given to Italian SBEs in the Eng-
lish version of the ECtHR judgments in the corpus, all the formulation patterns 
that have been described in Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 can perhaps be related to the 
more general notion of “secondary term formation” (Sager 1990: 80). According 
to the generally accepted definition, this phenomenon “occurs as a result of (a) 
the monolingual revision of a given terminology […], or (b) a transfer of knowl-
edge to another linguistic community, a process which requires the creation of 
new terms in the target language” (Sager 2001: 251). Furthermore, secondary 
term formation is obtained through several methods, such as borrowing, loan 
translation, paraphrase, parallel translation, adaptation and creation ex nihilo, 
which “can be used simultaneously or sequentially and often give rise to several 
alternative or competing new terms. It can therefore take time before a terminol-
ogy stabilizes in this field” (Sager 2001: 253). Although secondary term forma-
tion is a long-known phenomenon, in legal linguistics it seems to have received 
(limited) attention in recent years only and mainly with regard to the creation 
of a multilingual terminology capable of designating concepts belonging to the 
legal system of the European Union (see, for example, Fischer 2010: 28ff.; Peruzzo 
2012, 2018: 128ff.; Šarčević 2015: 189ff.; Temmerman 2018).Little is known about 
its use within other supranational institutions.
On the basis of the definition provided above, the phenomenon of secondary 
term formation seems to share much with what has been observed here in rela-
tion to SBEs in the ECtHR corpus, especially as far as the “transfer of knowledge 
to another linguistic community” is concerned. Indeed, the need to refer to a le-
gal concept or institution originally embedded in a national context expressed in 
one language in a supranational context expressed in another language makes 
the transfer of knowledge through “translation” inevitable. However, caution is 
needed here before concluding that all the phenomena observed in the corpus 
fall within secondary term formation.
The first reason for being cautious relates to the designation itself. As has 
been pointed out in Section 6.1 and illustrated by means of several examples, 
not all the SBEs extracted from the corpus would be unanimously recognised as 
terminological units, and a good example of this is provided by the circumstanc-
es leading to the dismissal of the accused person mentioned in Table 18 above. 
Therefore, while in most cases we could say that a term is created, in other cases 
what we see may be a phraseological unit (e.g. “by means of a reasoned decision 
[con decreto motivato]”) or a stock phrase (e.g. “on the ground that the alleged facts 
had never occurred”) rather than a term. Moreover, the drafting process involv-
ing translation may also require a term in the original language to assume a dif-
ferent linguistic form when moved to the supranational context so as to make 
the content more intelligible to the broad readership of the ECtHR case-law, as is 
the case for “the provisions that had previously been applicable come back into 
force (reviviscenza)” mentioned above.
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Another reason for not jumping to the conclusion that all the instances re-
trieved from the corpus can be described as cases of secondary term formation 
is that the transfer of knowledge from one linguistic community to another may 
not lead to the stabilisation of the relevant term – or other linguistic expression 
– in the receiving language. It has been suggested that “[s]ometimes secondary 
term formation constitutes an isolated process when used to fill in specific ter-
minology gaps in the target language” (Sanz Vicente 2012: 106, see also Peruzzo 
2013: 153), and this can also apply to the other linguistic expressions just men-
tioned. However, it is the author’s opinion that for a terminological unit to be 
properly considered as such it must have undergone a terminologisation pro-
cess, i.e. not only must it have acquired or been attributed a specialised meaning 
in a specialised context, but it must also be recognised or used by the linguistic 
community in that context. Therefore, a term resulting from an isolated process 
should be seen as a neologism – a term in its embryonic phase whose future is 
impossible to predict. This is actually the case for the hapaxes that are also uni-
vocal instances that were identified in the corpus: they occur only once, and no 
further observations or predictions can be made on their degree of terminologi-
sation based on the results obtained. 
Another similarity can however be seen between secondary term formation 
and the phenomena observed in the corpus, i.e. the presence of linguistic vari-
ants for the same SBE, which can be perceived as a temporary lack of stability. 
Indeed, secondary term formation can be described as a process in which alterna-
tive designations exist and sometimes compete before one or more prevail over 
the others. The cluster shown in Table 24 above is a clear example of alternative 
designations used for the same SBE. Still, it is hard to draw conclusions as to the 
degree of terminologisation of these variants, since it is impossible to foresee 
whether in the future there will be the need to refer to the same SBE and, if so, 
whether the drafters and translators will prefer one alternative to the others or 
will decide to depart from the linguistic precedent and use yet another designa-
tion. Once again, it is fundamental not to overlook the types of co-text in ECtHR 
judgments, which may constitute a possible factor influencing this choice. Let’s 
imagine, for example, an existing ECtHR judgment containing the quotation, 
and thus the translation, of the wording of an Article from a national legal provi-
sion. A good reason would certainly be needed to the drafter and the translator 
to decide not to re-use the same translation in a later judgment, thus departing 
from the linguistic precedent. The discussion of the life cycle of terms and other 
expressions referring to SBEs is, however, beyond the scope of this book. A dia-
chronic approach would be required for this type of analysis.
Based on what has been said so far, the phenomena related to Italian SBEs 
observed in the ECtHR corpus can be associated with secondary term formation. 
Nevertheless, due to the broad definition of SBEs adopted in this study and to the 
other reasons just mentioned, secondary term formation seems too narrow a no-
tion to describe what happens to a national SBE when it enters a supranational 
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text. In fact, when this occurs, translation and transfer of knowledge are involved, 
but they entail no legal transplant. In other words, the supranational legal sys-
tem does not acquire a new legal concept, institution or rule for the simple fact 
of discussing them in a judicial decision. In line with Magris (2018: 17), the SBEs 
analysed here would perhaps be better characterised as examples of “stipulative 
correspondence”. Stipulative correspondence consists in the relationship that is 
established between a term designating an SBE in the source language and the 
term used in the target language. It is thus a relationship at the lexical level only, 
since the SBE remains part of the original legal system and is not introduced in 
the legal system of the target language. With respect to Magris’s own characteri-
sation (2018), in the present study the concept of stipulative correspondence has 
been extended so as to include expressions that are not prototypically termino-
logical units. As a result, building on Magris’s notion, the phenomena observed 
and described in the present study could generally be considered as the result 
of a process of “creation of stipulative corresponding expressions” in the official 
language(s) of a supranational institution. These expressions could, in some cas-
es, represent the first step in a terminologisation process.
To illustrate what is meant here, an example already given by Brannan (2013: 
922) can be described in terms of the creation of a stipulative corresponding 
expression. The example concerns the concept referred to as parte civile in Ital-
ian and partie civile in French, which belongs to the civil law tradition and is un-
known in the common law. According to Brannan (2013: 922), “[i]n an attempt 
to find a non-national term to reflect a domestic reality, the translator may opt 
for strict linguistic equivalence, unless the result is clearly meaningless”. There-
fore, the term “was initially translated as ‘party claiming damages in criminal 
proceedings’”, which can be considered as an example of a stipulative corre-
sponding expression. However, the “explanatory rendering was abandoned as it 
became obvious that damages were not necessarily at stake” and was replaced by 
the stand-alone term “civil party”. In the corpus under examination, “civil party” 
occurs along with “civil party in (the) criminal proceedings”. Both “civil party” 
and “civil party in (the) criminal proceedings” are thus stipulative corresponding 
expressions, because they are labels identifying a national SBE in supranational 
case-law. By Brannan’s own admission, “civil party” is now the most frequent 
term used to refer to this SBE in ECtHR case-law, which confirms that the term 
has undergone a terminologisation process. Designations for SBEs that occur 
with very low frequency may not be undergoing a similar terminologisation pro-
cess; still, they can best be described as cases of stipulative correspondence given 
the kind of relationship that they establish with the corresponding notion in the 
“source” language.
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By way of conclusion
When I first began working on this project, my intention was to write a book fo-
cussing on the techniques used to translate the terminology referring to national 
legal systems in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. However, 
when I started digging into the functioning of the ECtHR and its language re-
gime, my attention was soon captured by the lack of descriptions and analyses 
specifically intended for linguists and translators. This made me deviate from my 
original plan: rather than presenting a linguistic study in medias res, I thought it 
would be more useful first to provide the readers with the background informa-
tion necessary to understand why and how the ECtHR produces its case-law and 
to concentrate on the linguistic aspects involved in its drafting.
My goal in the first part of the book was therefore to write something inform-
ative as well as legally accurate for an audience interested in legal language and 
legal translation who cannot be assumed to be knowledgeable about the ECtHR. 
The contribution of this part of the book thus lies in its focus on the peculiari-
ties of the language regime of the ECtHR (which has only two official languages, 
i.e. English and French) and on the consequences of this regime on the drafting 
process. Indeed, the final versions of the judgments published on the HUDOC 
portal (sixteen of which were used for the study presented in this book) are the 
result of multiple drafting and editing steps carried out by different professional 
profiles. Based on this assumption, a main thrust of the first part of the book is 
that it sheds light on the fundamental role played by translation in the drafting 
process, be it from and into the two official languages of the ECtHR or from the 
so-called “third” or “hidden” languages, i.e. the official languages of the member 
States of the Council of Europe.
I then dedicated the second part of the book to a product-oriented study on a 
corpus of ECtHR judgments. This study represents a major step forward in the 
research on the linguistic features of the supranational case-law produced by the 
ECtHR for two reasons. The first is that, to my knowledge, no corpus-driven or 
corpus-based study on these judgments has ever been conducted so far1, a gap 
that this study has tried to narrow. The second is that the study required the revi-
sion, from a theoretical standpoint, of what I had initially considered as “terms 
referring to a national legal and judicial system”. A preliminary observation of 
my corpus revealed that the “things I wanted to extract from the corpus” went be-
yond what is generally considered a “term” or “terminological unit” and included 
also expressions more similar to phraseological units and stock phrases typical 
of legal discourse. For this reason, I adopted a broader perspective and tried to 
characterise the linguistic expressions having a national dimension as types of 
“culture-bound elements”. Drawing on this notion and considering the embed-
1 The only existing linguistic case-study on ECtHR judgments is reported in Caliendo (2004), 
but the corpus used in that case was made of only one judgment.
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dedness of the underlying concepts and institutions in a national legal and judi-
cial system, I decided to refer to them as “system-bound elements” (SBEs). This 
allowed me to take into account linguistic elements that would not be generally 
considered as terminological units and whose use is well established in Italian 
texts but almost unknown in supranational texts.
Apart from theoretical issues, the search for Italian system-bound elements 
in a corpus of ECtHR judgments also posed several methodological challenges. 
Extracting Italian SBEs from a corpus of slightly more than 246,500 tokens and 
distinguishing them from supranational elements or SBEs embedded in nation-
al legal and judicial systems other than the Italian one is not an easy task, and no 
specific tool exists which is able to do so automatically. For this reason, a method-
ology was first devised by combining event templates as applied in frame-based 
terminology and keywords. Since the corpus contained also Italian words and 
expressions, the methodology was then supplemented with an ad hoc method 
for their extraction. This methodology allowed for the retrieval of 401 instances 
of SBEs referring to 170 Italian legal and judicial concepts, notions and institu-
tions, which were then analysed in terms of distribution, frequency, and linguis-
tic form. For the purposes of the study presented in this book, the methodology 
adopted was considered successful, but further studies are desirable, possibly 
concerning SBEs from other national environments, in order to prove its validity.
The analysis of the SBEs retrieved from the corpus brought to the fore two 
salient aspects. The first is that it is impossible to describe the language of ECtHR 
judgments without sufficient knowledge of how they are drafted and what the 
role of translation is in the drafting process. In this regard, a major finding of 
this study is that SBEs may occur in four different types of co-text, namely (i) text 
produced directly by the Grand Chamber, (ii) text quoted from previous ECtHR 
judgments, (iii) text quoted from Italian sources, and (iv) text quoted from other 
sources. The observation of these types of co-text confirmed that translation is a 
crucial component in the drafting of ECtHR case-law. As regards co-text type (iii), 
there is little doubt that translation from a “third” language is needed to publish 
a judgment in the official languages of the ECtHR. Yet, translation is also needed 
in cases before the Grand Chamber, because drafts are first handed down in one 
official language and then translated into the other official language. In cases 
where Italy is the respondent State, judgments are usually first drafted in French 
and then translated into English; therefore, translation is involved in both co-
text types (i) and (ii).
The second essential aspect that emerged from the study is that not only SBEs 
exist solely when a form of comparison and migration from one context to an-
other is involved, but also that the knowledge transfer implied in this migration 
does not result in a legal transplant. When this migration also implies a transfer 
from one language to another, a form of translation is necessarily involved. The 
linguistic methods used to make this knowledge transfer possible have tradition-
ally been studied within the framework of “secondary term formation” (Sager 
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1990: 80). However, this notion was not considered entirely suitable to describe 
the phenomena observed in the present study. On the one hand, if the focus is on 
term formation, then it is hard to incorporate in the framework elements whose 
linguistic expression fails to qualify as a terminological unit, as was the case 
for several of the SBEs identified in the analysis. On the other, term formation 
generally implies a certain degree of terminologisation, while the expressions 
observed in the analysed corpus are frequently the result of ad hoc translation 
choices. For these reasons, a different notion was taken into consideration, i.e. 
“stipulative correspondence” (Magris 2018: 17), which is the lexical relationship 
established between an SBE in its original linguistic context and the designation 
used to refer to the same SBE in a different linguistic context. It is a relationship 
at the lexical level only, since the expression used in the target language does not 
imply a legal transplant. All the linguistic methods used to refer to Italian SBEs 
in the English-language corpus were thus subsumed under the umbrella term 
“creation of stipulative corresponding expressions”.
 The findings presented in this work are clearly limited due to the meth-
odology applied and the size of the corpus used for the analysis. As stated earlier, 
further research would be necessary to assess the validity of the methodology, 
and studies involving languages other than Italian and supranational bodies 
other than the ECtHR would be needed to further elucidate and possibly extend 
the concept of “system-bound element”. Moreover, the idea of “stipulative cor-
respondence” is still in its infancy and should be further explored, both from a 
synchronic and a diachronic perspective. 
Despite these limitations, the study presented in this book is believed to be of 
relevance because it sheds light on a frequently overlooked phenomenon, name-
ly that the texts of ECtHR judgments are more like a collage than a picture entire-
ly drawn by the ECtHR itself. To use another metaphor, ECtHR judgments may be 
compared to a film. The Court is the director, who takes the main decisions, and 
is supported by the screenwriter, who drafts the actual texts of the judgments, 
and the director of photography, who makes sure that the judgments follow the 
prescribed standardised structure. The quotations from national statute law and 
case-law and from previous ECtHR judgments are part of the soundtrack. Given 
their origin, these quotations are not film scores, i.e. music written specifically 
to accompany the film, but rather already existing songs used instrumentally to 
give further meaning to the film scenes. However, for some of the songs to be 
used in the film, they first need to be translated. And, to finish in the same vein, 
given the importance and the effects of the decisions taken by the Grand Cham-
ber, it comes as no surprise that the producer opts for audiovisual translation to 
enhance the distribution of the film.
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Appendix 1
List of judgments included in the ECtHR corpus
 • Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy (Application no. 32967/96)
 • De Tommaso v. Italy (Application no. 43395/09)
 • Enea v. Italy (Application no. 74912/01)
 • Ferrazzini v. Italy (Application no. 44759/98)
 • Hermi v. Italy (Application no. 18114/02)
 • Khlaifia and Others v. Italy (Application no. 16483/12)
 • Labita v. Italy (Application no. 26772/95)
 • Markovic and Others v. Italy (Application no. 1398/03)
 • Mennitto v. Italy (Application no. 33804/96)
 • N.C. v. Italy (Application no. 24952/94)
 • Perna v. Italy (Application no. 48898/99)
 • Pisano v. Italy ((Application no. 36732/97)
 • Scoppola v Italy (No. 2) (Application no. 10249/03)
 • Scordino v. Italy (No. 1) (Application no. 36813/97)
 • Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy (Applications nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98)
 • Sejdovic v. Italy (Application no. 56581/00)
All the judgments were retrieved from the HUDOC portal (https://www.echr.
coe.int/).
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Appendix 2
Preliminary list of keywords used to extract Italian SBEs from the ECtHR corpus
Category: Italian judicial authorities
court
corte
judge
tribunal
tribunale
Category: Criminal offences and civil wrongs under Italian law
alleged
crime
offence
to be accused of
to commit
to be suspected of
Category: Italian legislation
article
code
in accordance with 
in compliance with
law
to provide
under
Category: Italian judicial procedure
hearing
phase
proceedings
procedure
stage
to order
to sentence
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Appendix 3
List of instances referring to Italian SBEs extracted from the ECtHR corpus
The four tables below contain the instances of Italian SBEs extracted from the 
ECtHR corpus and are subdivided in accordance with the categories they belong 
to. The instances in the tables are grouped into clusters and ordered on the basis 
of the total number of hits per instance. In the tables, “ITA” stands for text quoted 
from Italian sources, “GC” for text produced directly by the Grand Chamber, and 
“ECtHR” for text quoted from previous ECtHR judgments.
Category: Italian judicial authorities
Instances grouped into clusters
Total no. 
of hits
ITA GC ECtHR
Court of Cassation 165 1 155 9
Court of Cassation, sitting as a full court 9 3 6 0
plenary Court of Cassation 6 0 6 0
full court 5 2 3 0
Court of Cassation, sitting as a full court 
(Sezioni Unite)
2 0 2 0
full Court of Cassation 2 0 2 0
Court of Cassation (First Section) 1 0 1 0
Court of Cassation, combined divisions 1 0 1 0
Court of Cassation, First Division 1 0 1 0
Court of Cassation, in plenary session 1 0 1 0
Court of Cassation, Section I 1 0 1 0
Court of Cassation, Section II 1 0 1 0
Court of Cassation, Third Criminal Division 1 0 1 0
First Division of the Court of Cassation 1 0 1 0
First Section of the Court of Cassation 1 0 1 0
full court of the Court of Cassation 1 0 1 0
Court of Appeal 128 9 119 0
court of appeal 18 7 9 2
appellate court 3 0 3 0
Youth Court 90 1 89 0
judge of the Youth Court 1 0 1 0
youth court 1 0 1 0
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District Court 81 2 79 0
Criminal Court 7 0 7 0
district court 7 0 7 0
civil court 5 0 5 0
Court of First Instance 3 0 3 0
court of first instance 2 0 2 0
Civil Court 1 0 1 0
criminal court 1 0 1 0
court responsible for the execution of 
sentences
43 0 43 0
public prosecutor’s office 34 3 31 0
Public Prosecutor’s Office 5 2 3 0
prosecution service 2 1 1 0
Justice of the Peace 19 1 18 0
investigating judge 18 0 18 0
preliminary investigations judge 13 0 13 0
investigating judge (giudice per le indagini 
preliminari)
2 0 2 0
judge responsible for preliminary 
investigations
1 0 1 0
preliminary investigations judge (giudice per 
le indagini preliminari)
1 0 1 0
judge responsible for the execution of 
sentences
18 1 17 0
preliminary hearings judge 15 1 14 0
GUP 7 0 7 0
preliminary hearings judge (giudice 
dell’udienza preliminare – “the GUP”)
1 0 1 0
preliminary hearings judge (giudice 
dell’udienza preliminare)
1 0 1 0
RAC 14 0 14 0
Regional Administrative Court 2 0 2 0
Regional Administrative Court (“the RAC”) 2 0 2 0
Assize Court 13 0 9 4
guardianship judge 10 0 10 0
Assize Court of Appeal 9 0 9 0
Consiglio di Stato 9 1 8 0
District Tax Commission 7 0 7 0
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President of the court responsible for the 
execution of sentences
3 0 3 0
appeal judge 2 1 1 0
magistrate’s court, sitting as an employment 
tribunal
2 0 2 0
Advocate-General [Procuratore Generale] 1 1 0 0
Chief Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation 1 0 1 0
Prosecutor General at the Court of Cassation 1 0 0 1
judge supervising enforcement 1 1 0 0
Regional Tax Commission 1 0 1 0
special court 1 1 0 0
trial judge 1 0 1 0
Category: Italian legislation
Instances grouped into clusters
Total no. 
of hits
ITA GC ECtHR
Law no. + Reference 183 33 149 1
Act 39 6 32 1
Act no. 38 3 35
Surname + Act 28 4 23 1
Title (Act) 23 0 23 0
Law 10 0 10 0
Title (Act) + Reference 5 0 5 0
Law no. + Reference + Title 4 1 3 0
Enabling Act 1 0 1
Law no. + Reference + Content 1 0 1 0
CCP 104 1 102 1
Code of Criminal Procedure 25 2 22 1
Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) 10 5 5 0
Code of Criminal Procedure (‘the CCP’) 1 0 0 1
Code of Criminal Procedure [‘the CCP’] 1 0 1 0
CPP 1 0 1 0
Italian Code of Criminal Procedure 1 0 1
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Legislative Decree no. + Reference 72 3 68 1
legislative decree 7 5 1 1
Legislative Decree 2 1 1 0
Legislative Decree (decreto legislativo) no + 
Reference + (Title)
1 0 1 0
Criminal Code 38 2 36 0
Civil Code 17 5 12 0
Italian Civil Code 2 1 1 0
Regional Law 13 2 11 0
Regional Law no. + Reference 3 0 3 0
Law 1 1 0 0
Official Gazette 10 3 7 0
Official Gazette (Gazzetta ufficiale) 1 0 1 0
Official Gazette (Gazzetta ufficiale) no. + 
Reference
1 0 1 0
Official Gazette no. 1 0 1 0
Code of Civil Procedure 7 3 4 0
Italian Code of Civil Procedure 1 0 1 0
Italian Constitution 7 0 7 0
Constitution 1 0 1 0
Wartime Military Criminal Code 7 0 7 0
Presidential Decree no. + Reference 5 0 5 0
Title (Presidential Decree no. + Reference) 1 0 1 0
Title (Act) 4 3 1 0
Title (Code) 3 0 3 0
Title (Act) + (Title in Italian) 1 0 1
Constitutional Act no. 1 0 1 0
Category: Criminal offences and civil wrongs under Italian law
Instances grouped into clusters
Total no. 
of hits
ITA GC ECtHR
ill-treatment 21 0 21 0
murder 11 4 7 0
homicide 1 0 1 0
offence of homicide 1 0 1 0
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defamation 10 0 10 0
offence of defamation 1 0 1 0
drug trafficking 10 0 10 0
offence of drug trafficking 1 0 1 0
[to be] a member of a mafia-type organisation 5 0 5 0
[to belong] to the Mafia 5 0 3 2
[to be] a member of the Mafia 3 0 3 0
[to belong] to a mafia-type organisation 2 0 2 0
membership of a mafia-type criminal 
organisation
2 0 2 0
[to be] members of the Mafia 1 0 1 0
[to belong] to a Mafia-type organisation 1 0 0 1
Mafia membership 1 0 1 0
membership of a mafia-type organisation 1 0 1 0
involuntary manslaughter 4 0 4 0
absconding 3 0 3 0
offence of absconding 1 0 1 0
allegedly illegal act of war 3 0 3 0
ill-treatment and sexual abuse 3 0 3 0
paedophile assault 3 0 3 0
paedophile abuse 2 0 2 0
abusing the children 1 0 1 0
paedophile violence 1 0 1 0
to indecently assault children 1 0 1 0
serious offence 3 0 3 0
attempted murder 2 0 2 0
cumulative offences 2 1 1 0
“cumulative offences” (concorso di reati) 1 0 1 0
offence against the constitutional order 2 2 0 0
offence of causing bodily harm 2 0 2 0
personal injury 2 0 2 0
offence relating to organised crime 2 2 0 0
serious offence involving the use of weapons 
or other violent means against the person
2 2 0 0
tobacco smuggling 2 0 2 0
“continuous offence” (reato continuato) 1 0 1 0
continuous offence 1 1 0 0
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abuse of authority 1 0 1 0
abuse of authority for political ends 1 0 1 0
aiding and abetting the Mafia (appoggio 
esterno alla mafia)
1 0 1 0
Condotta del genitore pregiudizievole ai figli – 
“parental behaviour harmful to the children”
1 0 1 0
belonging to a criminal organisation that 
engaged in serious crime
1 0 1 0
concealing a body 1 0 1 0
defamation through the medium of the press 
(diffamazione a mezzo stampa)
1 0 1 0
false imprisonment with a view to extortion 1 0 1 0
handling illegal weapons 1 0 1 0
illegally carrying a weapon 1 0 1 0
illegal activities relating to drugs 1 0 1 0
illegal possession of firearms 1 0 1 0
unlawful possession of weapons 1 0 1 0
unauthorised possession of a firearm 1 0 1 0
launder money coming from illegal Mafia 
activities
1 0 1 0
Mafia offences 1 0 1 0
Mafia-related offences 1 0 1 0
offences relating to Mafia activities 1 0 1 0
offence of abuse of authority over persons 
who had been arrested or detained (Article 
608 of the Criminal Code)
1 0 1 0
offence of breaching the terms of special 
supervision
1 0 1 0
offence of fraudulently holding themselves 
out as XXX
1 0 1 0
offence of wrongfully holding themselves out 
(usurpazione di titolo) as XXX
1 0 1 0
offences committed with a view to facilitating 
the activities of mafia-type criminal 
organisations
1 0 1 0
physical and mental ill-treatment 1 0 1 0
serious offences against children in their care 1 0 1 0
subversive activities (Act no. 152/1975, 
introduced …)
1 0 1 0
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terrorist crime 1 0 1 0
the legal characterisation of the offence [il 
titolo del reato]
1 1 0 0
to sexually abuse (atti di libidine violenti) 1 0 1 0
voluntary manslaughter 1 0 1 0
Category: Italian judicial procedure
Instances grouped into clusters
Total no. 
of hits
ITA GC ECtHR
preventive measures 109 13 96 0
CSPA 92 0 92 0
reception centre 10 0 10 0
Early Reception and Aid Centre (Centro di 
Soccorso e Prima Accoglienza – “CSPA”)
1 0 1 0
Early Reception and Aid Centre (CSPA) 1 0 1 0
reception centre for irregular migrants 1 0 1 0
summary procedure 74 4 63 7
trial under the summary procedure 12 0 12 0
summary proceedings 2 2 0 0
summary procedure (giudizio abbreviato) 1 0 1 0
refusal-of-entry order 39 0 39 0
refusal-of-entry measure 5 1 4 0
refusal of entry 2 1 1 0
refusal of entry (respingimento) 1 0 1 0
refusal-of-entry measure (respingimento) 1 0 1 0
shall refuse entry (respinge) 1 1 0 0
detention pending trial 32 3 29 0
pre-trial detention 10 0 10 0
E.I.V. unit 27 1 26 0
E.I.V. regime 2 0 2 0
high-supervision (“E.I.V.”) unit 2 0 2 0
high-supervision unit 2 0 2 0
E.I.V. prison unit 1 0 1 0
high-supervision (Elevato Indice di Vigilanza – 
E.I.V.) prison unit
1 0 1 0
in absentia 26 3 23 0
trial in absentia 5 0 5 0
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special supervision 25 2 23 0
special police supervision 7 0 7 0
measure of special supervision 2 0 2 0
special supervision measure 2 0 2 0
order for special supervision, compulsory 
residence or exclusion
1 0 1 0
special police supervision (sorveglianza 
speciale di pubblica sicurezza)
1 0 1 0
special police supervision measure 1 0 1 0
special supervision order 1 0 1 0
appeal hearing 24 0 24 0
appeal stage 4 0 4 0
special regime 23 0 23 0
special prison regime 20 0 20 0
special prison regime provided for by section 
41 bis of the Prison Administration Act
2 0 2 0
prison regime provided for in section 41 bis of 
the Prison Administration Act
1 0 1 0
prison regime provided for in the second 
paragraph of section 41 bis of the Prison 
Administration Act (“Law no. 354 of 1975”)
1 0 1 0
special prison regime provided for by section 41 bis 1 0 1 0
special prison regime under section 41 bis 1 0 1 0
special prison regime under section 41 bis of 
the Prison Administration Act
1 0 1 0
removal 22 3 19 0
“deportation” (espulsione) 1 0 1 0
administrative deportation 1 1 0 0
deportation (espulsione) 1 0 1 0
deportation measure 1 1 0 0
deportation of an alien 1 1 0 0
deportation order 1 1 0 0
detention pending removal 1 0 1 0
removal by escorting the person to the border 1 0 1 0
removal measures 1 0 1 0
removal of asylum-seekers 1 0 1 0
removal of irregular migrants 1 0 1 0
removal of migrants 1 0 1 0
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monitoring of someone’s correspondence 21 0 21 0
monitoring of correspondence 5 0 5
monitoring of correspondence and telephone calls 3 0 3 0
house arrest 16 2 14
house arrest (arresti domiciliari) 1 0 1 0
pentito / pentiti 15 1 14 0
pentito (a former mafioso who has decided to 
cooperate with the authorities)
1 0 1 0
grounds of appeal 14 4 8 2
precautionary measure 14 2 12 0
carabinieri 12 3 9 0
CIE 11 0 11 0
Identification and Removal Centre 1 1 0 0
Identification and Removal Centre (Centro di 
Identificazione ed Espulsione – “CIE”)
1 0 1 0
leave to appeal out of time 11 0 11 0
application for leave to appeal out of time 9 0 9 0
preliminary hearing 9 2 7 0
preliminary hearing stage 2 0 2 0
effective knowledge 8 5 3 0
effective knowledge [effettiva conoscenza] 2 2 0 0
preliminary investigation 8 2 6 0
preliminary investigation stage 1 0 1 0
preliminary investigations stage 1 0 1 0
appeal to the Justice of the Peace 7 0 7 0
appeal with the Justice of the Peace 4 0 4 0
compulsory residence order 7 0 7 0
compulsory residence order requiring him to live 
in a named municipality (obbligo di soggiorno)
1 0 1 0
order for compulsory residence in a specified 
district
1 0 1 0
order for compulsory residence in a 
specified district (obbligo del soggiorno in un 
determinato comune)
1 0 1 0
prison leave 7 0 7 0
stay of execution of someone’s sentence 7 0 7 0
stay of execution 2 0 2 0
stay of execution of someone’s judgment 1 0 1 0
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member of the Mafia 6 0 6 0
mafioso/mafiosi 4 0 4 0
objection to execution 6 0 6 0
objection to execution (incidente 
d’esecuzione)
1 0 1 0
Chief of Police (questore) 5 3 2 0
Prefect 4 1 3 0
Chief of Police 3 1 2 0
prefect 2 1 1 0
prefect (questore) 1 0 1 0
civil party 5 1 4 0
civil party in (the) criminal proceedings 2 0 2 0
suspension of someone’s parental rights 5 0 5 0
[to suspend] someone’s parental rights 4 0 4 0
[to declare] parental rights forfeit 2 2 0 0
[to deprive] someone of parental rights 2 0 2 0
Decadenza dalla potestà sui figli – “lapse of 
parental rights”
1 0 1 0
order suspending parental rights 1 0 1 0
“fugitive” (latitante) 4 0 4 0
latitante (that is to say, wilfully evading the 
execution of a warrant issued by a court)
1 0 1 0
admission of new evidence 4 0 4 0
production of fresh evidence 2 0 2 0
admission of evidence not contained in the 
file held by the Public Prosecutor’s Office
1 0 1 0
admission of fresh evidence 1 0 1 0
admission of fresh evidence (integrazione 
probatoria)
1 0 1 0
production of new evidence 1 0 1 0
danger of reoffending 4 0 4 0
danger of his reoffending 2 0 2 0
danger that he might commit other similar 
offences
1 0 1 0
need to prevent the commisison of a criminal offence 1 0 1 0
extraordinary appeal on the ground of a factual 
error
4 0 4 0
extraordinary appeal 2 0 2 0
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first-instance hearing 4 0 4 0
law XXX come back into force 4 0 4 0
the provisions that had previously been 
applicable come back into force (reviviscenza)
1 0 1 0
legitimate interest 4 0 4 0
“legitimate interest” (interesse legittimo) 2 0 2 0
“substantial evidence of guilt” 3 3 0 0
substantial evidence of his guilt 2 0 2 0
“substantial evidence” of the applicant’s guilt 1 1 0 0
“substantial evidence of [his] guilt” 1 1 0 0
strong indication of guilt (consistente fumus 
di colpevolezza)
1 1 0 0
substantial evidence of his guilt (gravi indizi di 
colpevolezza)
1 0 1 0
substantial evidence of his guilt [gravi indizi di 
colpevolezza]”
1 1 0 0
Assistant Principal State Counsel at the Court 
of Cassation
3 0 3 0
Assistant Principal State Counsel 1 0 1 0
deputy chief of police 3 0 3 0
deputy chief of police (vice questore) 1 0 1 0
exclusion order 3 0 3 0
prohibitionon residence in a named district or 
province
1 0 1 0
first-instance proceedings 3 0 3 0
habitual offender 3 0 3 0
legitimate reason for not attending 3 2 1 0
legitimate impediment 1 0 1 0
magistrato 3 0 3 0
risk of evidence being tampered with 3 0 3 0
[need] to prevent interference with the course 
of justice
2 0 2 0
“personal right” (diritto soggettivo perfetto) 2 0 2 0
personal right [diritto soggettivo perfetto] 1 1 0 0
“deferred refusal of entry” 2 0 2 0
“deferred refusal-of-entry” 1 0 1 0
“deferred refusal-of-entry” orders 1 0 1 0
“deferred refusal-of-entry” procedure 1 0 1 0
“deferred” refusal of entry 1 0 1 0
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application for bail 2 0 2 0
danger of his absconding 2 1 1 0
danger of absconding (Article 274 (b)) 1 0 1 0
risk of the applicant’s absconding, reoffending 
or tampering with evidence
1 0 1 0
risk that he might abscond 1 0 1 0
grounds for imposing precautionary measures 2 0 2 0
circumstances warranting the adoption of a 
precautionary measure
1 0 1 0
Conditions for a precautionary measure 1 0 1 0
conditions for the application of a 
precautionary measure (misura cautelare)
1 0 1 0
Conditions for the application of a 
precautionary measure depriving a person of 
his liberty
1 0 1 0
Grounds for decisions ordering precautionary 
measures
1 0 1 0
grounds for precautionary measures 1 0 1 0
serious need for precautionary measures 1 1 0 0
incapable of understanding the wrongful 
nature of his acts and of forming the intent to 
commit them
2 0 2 0
laissez-passer 2 0 2 0
on the basis of the documents contained in 
the file held by the Public Prosecutor’s Office
2 0 2 0
unable to determine the case as it stands [se 
ritiene di non essere in grado di decidere allo 
stato degli atti], shall order the investigation 
to be reopened.
1 1 0 0
on the basis of the case file as it stands 1 1 0 0
on the basis of the case file as it stands (allo 
stato degli atti)
1 0 1 0
on the basis of the file held by the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office
1 0 1 0
on the basis of the steps in the proceedings 
taken at the preliminary investigation stage (allo 
stato degli atti)
1 0 1 0
the case cannot be determined as it stands 1 1 0 0
on the grounds that the alleged facts never 
occurred, he did not commit the offence, no 
criminal offence has been committed or the 
facts alleged do not amount to an offence in law
2 1 1 0
153appendix
because the alleged facts had never occurred 1 0 1 0
on the ground that no concrete evidence in 
support of that allegation could be found 
during the preliminary investigation and trial
1 0 1 0
on the ground that the alleged facts had never 
occurred
1 0 1 0
on the ground that the alleged facts had never 
occurred (perché il fatto non sussiste)
1 0 1 0
on the ground that the offenders could not be 
identified 
1 0 1 0
on the ground that the offenders could not be 
identified (perché ignoti gli autori del reato)
1 0 1 0
on the grounds that the case against him 
has not been proved, he has not committed 
the offence, no criminal offence has been 
committed or the facts alleged do not amount 
to an offence at law 
1 0 1 0
prefecture 2 1 1 0
Prefecture 1 1 0 0
refusal-of-entry and removal order 2 0 2 0
refusal of entry combined with removal 1 1 0 0
to arrest in flagrante delicto 2 0 2 0
“global credibility” criterion – attendibilità 
complessiva
1 0 1 0
exclusion of evidence which is prohibited by 
law, manifestly superfluous or of no relevance 
to the proceedings
1 1 0 0
“a manifest error of law” (evidente errore di 
diritto)
1 0 1 0
“Notice to appear in appeal proceedings 
before the court sitting in private” (decreto di 
citazione per il giudizio di appello davanti la 
Corte in camera di consiglio)
1 0 1 0
“refusal of entry at the border” 1 0 1 0
“unjust” (ingiusta) 1 0 1 0
“voluntary agreement” for the transfer of the land 1 0 1 0
transfer (cessione volontaria) 1 0 1 0
by means of a reasoned decision [con decreto 
motivato].
1 1 0 0
acquittal on grounds of insufficient evidence 1 0 1 0
as there was insufficient evidence 1 0 1 0
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alternative measure to detention (semilibertà) 1 0 1 0
appeal (reclamo) 1 0 1 0
co-defendant, Ms XXX (chiamata di correo) 1 0 0 1
execution of removal measures 1 1 0 0
execution of the removal 1 0 1 0
he shall acquire (assume) 1 1 0 0
judgment [provvedimento] 1 1 0 0
lawyer holding a special authority 1 1 0 0
notice to appear at the appeal hearing 1 0 1 0
notification of the appeal hearing 1 0 1 0
objective situation effectively permitting every 
individual to be aware of the acts in question 
(situazione oggettiva di effettiva conoscibilità, 
da parte di tutti, degli atti medesimi).”
1 1 0 0
offices of State Counsel [Avvocatura dello Stato] 1 1 0 0
on the merits [nel merito] 1 1 0 0
order banning someone from holding public office 1 0 1 0
perpetrator of a serious offence 1 0 1 0
persons against whom there is evidence 
(indiziati)
1 0 1 0
police authorities (Questura) 1 0 1 0
police authorities (questura) 1 0 1 0
preliminary ruling 1 0 1 0
preliminary ruling from the Court of Cassation 
on the question of jurisdiction (regolamento 
preventivo di giurisdizione)
1 0 1 0
preliminary ruling on the issue of jurisdiction 1 1 0 0
ruling on a question of jurisdiction 1 1 0 0
review by the Constitutional Court 1 0 1 0
statute-law is time barred [decadenza] 1 1 0 0
substantial awards of compensation for 
expropriation (serio ristoro)
1 0 1 0
substantial compensation (serio ristoro) 1 0 1 0
the ‘clean hands’ [mani pulite] inquiries 1 1 0 0
the words “correspondence for the purposes 
of court proceedings” (“corrispondenza par 
ragioni di giustizia”)
1 0 1 0
through the intermediary of a specially 
instructed representative [per mezzo di 
procuratore speciale]
1 1 0 0

